the Adoption of BGH, Matter of, C-95-14

• Decision Date: 23 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. C-95-14,C-95-14
• Citation: 930 P.2d 371
• Parties: In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF BGH, a Minor. GWJ, Appellant, v. MH and MWH and MDH and BGH, Appellees.
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 371

930 P.2d 371

In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF BGH, a Minor.

GWJ, Appellant, v. MH and MWH and MDH and BGH, Appellees.

No. C-95-14.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Dec. 23, 1996.

LaVoy O. Taylor, Cokeville, for Appellant.

James E. Phillips of Phillips & Lancaster, P.C., Evanston, for Appellee MH.

F.L. Thomas, Jr., Kemmerer, for Appellees MWH and MDH.

Gerald L. Goulding, Afton, Guardian ad Litem for BGH.

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN ^* and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

The focal question in this case is whether the statutes relating to the termination of parental rights, WYO.STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -120 (1994), must be invoked in order to terminate the rights of a biological father instead of the statutory grounds provided in an adoption proceeding brought pursuant to WYO.STAT. §§ 1-22-101 to -116 (1988). There are two collateral issues relating to the trial court's application of WYO.STAT. § 1-22-108(c): First, whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion when it found that the biological father "evidenced an interest in," but failed to evidence "responsibility for the child" within the requisite statutory time frame; and second, whether the trial court applied the "best interests * * * of the child" factor to the exclusion of other statutory factors. The final claim of error asserts gender bias in the trial court's decision that violated the rights of the biological father and his child to equal protection of the law afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. We hold the trial court correctly invoked the adoption statutes in this instance, and no other error, as claimed by the biological father, is present in the record. The Final Decree of Adoption is affirmed.

In his Brief of Appellant, GWJ, the biological father, states the issues as follows:

Did the Court abuse its discretion when it held the Appellant did assert an interest in, but did not assert responsibility for Baby Girl [H] within thirty (30) days after Baby Girl [H]'s birth?

Did the Court error in applying W.S.Ann. § 1-22-108, by giving it preference over W.S.Ann. § 14-2-401[sic] thru § 14-2-120?

Did the Court error in applying the "best interest" test in this case in deciding to grant the adoption and terminating the Appellant's parental rights?

Did the District Court violate the Appellant, [GWJ]'s and the Appellee, Baby Girl [H]'s equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution when it terminated the Appellant's parental rights by granting the adoption of Baby Girl [H]?

The Brief of Appellees, MWH and MDH (Petitioners to adopt), in which the natural mother MH, joins, frames the issues before the court in this way:

I. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it held that within 30 days after receiving notice of the birth of BGH, the putative father, GWJ, evidenced an interest in, but did not evidence responsibility for the child?

II. Did the District Court err in applying the adoption statutes (W.S. 1-22-101 thru 1-22-116) rather than the paternity statutes (W.S. 14-2-101 thru 14-2-120)?

III. Did the District Court err in applying the "best interest of the child" test?

IV. Did the District Court violate GWJ's and BGH's right to the equal protection of the laws under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

In the Brief of Baby Girl [H], Filing by Her Guardian Ad Litem, a third version of the issues is stated:

(1) Did the District Court abuse its discretion in making its factual conclusion that [GWJ] did not "evidence ... responsibility for the child within thirty (30) days after receiving notice of the pending birth or birth of the child ...." under W.S. 1-22-108(c)(ii)? (Unless otherwise cited all statutory references are to the Wyoming Statutes).

(2) Did the District Court err in determining that 1-22-108 should be applied in this case?

(3) Did the District Court err in determining that it should consider the "best interests and welfare of the child" (1-22-108(c)(iv)) in deciding whether to grant the adoption?

(4) In granting the adoption, did the District Court violate [GWJ]'s and Baby Girl [H]'s right to equal protection under the laws pursuant to the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution?

GWJ and MH met when they were both seventeen, and they soon became sexually intimate. In late June or early July 1994, MH informed GWJ she was pregnant. GWJ indicated his preference that MH give birth to, and care for, the baby. He did not want anyone else raising his child and preferred that MH have an abortion rather than give the baby up for adoption.

At about the third month of her pregnancy, GWJ proposed marriage to MH, and later, gave her an engagement ring. During their engagement, MH furnished money to GWJ, but he did not give her any money. GWJ did not assume any financial responsibility for MH or offer any support. Once, GWJ did take MH to the doctor, and he gave her a baby seat and clothes for the baby. In all other instances, MH's foster mother took her to medical appointments and generally provided all other care and assistance. When she was approximately five months pregnant, MH was seriously injured in a one-car accident in which GWJ was the driver. She was hospitalized for two weeks, and during that period, the engagement was terminated. GWJ and MH never married, and the State of Utah paid for prenatal care for MH. Even though GWJ was employed, he did not contribute to the care or support of MH or the unborn child.

MH chose to deliver the baby in Wyoming because she believed an adoption could be accomplished here without the consent of GWJ. MH had decided to give the baby to MWH and MDH for adoption. GWJ learned of the birth of BGH from the attorney for MWH and MDH when he received a letter requesting his consent for adoption. Subsequently, GWJ employed an attorney and filed a paternity action pursuant to WYO.STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -120. GWJ also contested the adoption. He participated in a DNA test, for which he paid the expense of $575. The result of the test demonstrated he was the biological father at a 99.999% probability level. GWJ also furnished his bedroom in his parent's home with a crib, and he provided toys, clothes, and pictures. Hearings in the matter were conducted by the district court on May 1, 1995 and July 10, 1995, during which evidence was presented in accordance with WYO.STAT. § 1-22-108(c). Later, the court entered a Final Decree of Adoption terminating the parental rights of MH and GWJ and granted the petition for adoption filed by MWH and MDH. GWJ has appealed from that Final Decree of Adoption.

The threshold claim of error asserted by GWJ is that the district court erred in invoking the adoption statutes, WYO.STAT. §§ 1-22-101 to -116, and failed to apply the provisions of the paternity statutes, WYO.STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -120. GWJ contends, once he filed an action to establish his paternity, his parental rights could be terminated only by proceeding under WYO.STAT. § 14-2-309 (1994) ¹ and could not be terminated as provided in WYO.STAT. § 1-22-108. In arguing this point, GWJ relies upon language from Matter of Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 987 (Wyo.1986), where we said: "But the more liberal adoption test of § 1-22-108 applies to only those adoptions contested by putative fathers who have already shown their lack of concern for their children by failing to establish legal paternity." GWJ contends he has shown concern for his baby daughter by endeavoring to establish his paternity, and for that reason, the paternity statutes must govern over the adoption statutes.

The resolution of this question flows by analogy from GSD. There, we considered an assertion by a father seeking adoption of a stepdaughter that a putative father had no standing because he had failed to establish his paternity as required by WYO.STAT. § 14-2-105. We held the special legislation represented by the adoption statute controlled over the general rules relating to establishment of paternity, and the putative father had standing in the adoption proceeding. The conclusion that must be drawn from GSD is that the adoption statutes control over the more general provisions found in the paternity statutes. In addition to providing for the termination of parental rights for the reasons articulated in WYO.STAT. § 14-2-309, the legislature has provided for the termination of parental rights through the adoption procedure.

There was no necessity to establish GWJ's paternity because all parties agreed that he was the natural father, therefore, the question of paternity was not an issue in the case. Had paternity been contested, GWJ would have met the definition of a putative father articulated in WYO.STAT. § 1-22-101(a)(iv), as "the alleged or reputed father of a child born out of wedlock, whether or not the paternity rights and obligations of the father have been judicially determined * * *." Reliance upon GSD by GWJ is misplaced.

In his first and third issues, GWJ contends the district court did not properly apply WYO.STAT. § 1-22-108(c). He argues the district court committed an abuse of discretion in its application of sub-paragraph (ii) when it found he had asserted an interest in the child, but he had not accepted responsibility for the child. GWJ contends his acceptance of responsibility for BGH was demonstrated by filing his Petition to Establish Paternity. He notes the language of WYO.STAT. § 14-2-113(c) that "[t]he judgment or order may direct the father to pay the reasonable expenses of the mother's pregnancy and confinement", and he asserts that made him a responsible party as a matter of law.

Our holding, that this case is controlled by the adoption statutes and is not impacted by the statutes relating to paternity, causes GWJ's analysis of WYO.STAT. § 14-2-113(c) to be inapt. The applicable statute is WYO.STAT. § 1-22-108(c) (emphasis added), which requires that:

(c) If the putative fa...