The Barber Asphalt Paving Company v. Field

• Decision Date: 01 October 1906
• Citation: 97 S.W. 179,132 Mo.App. 628
• Parties: THE BARBER ASPHALT PAVING COMPANY et al., Respondents, v. RICHARD H. FIELD et al., Appellants
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

97 S.W. 179

132 Mo.App. 628

THE BARBER ASPHALT PAVING COMPANY et al., Respondents, v. RICHARD H. FIELD et al., Appellants

Court of Appeals of Missouri, Kansas City

October 1, 1906 ^[*]

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court.--Hon. Henry L. McCune, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Judgment affirmed.

W. M Williams and R. H. Field for appellants.

(1) The lack of an order of the board of aldermen of Westport, for the newspaper publication of the board's resolution declaring the necessity of the street pavement, is fatal to the validity of such publication and the special taxbills. Laws 1895, p. 86, sec. 95; R. S. 1899, sec. 5989; Higley v. Bunce, 10 Conn. 436; Pennsylvania Co. v Cole, 132 F. 677; Dunnelly v. Tillman, 47 Cal 40; Hummelman v. Saterlee, 49 Cal. 387; Reis v. Groff, 51 Cal. 86; City of Napa v. Easterly, 61 Cal. 509; Chase v. Treas. Los Angeles, 122 Cal. 545; Van Sant v. Portland, 6 Ore. 395; Merriman v. Knight, 43 Minn. 493; Thompson v. Sumner, 9 Wash. 310; Benton Co. v. Morgan, 163 Mo. 676. (2) The Westport Board of Aldermen was required to cause the city clerk to make and keep a journal of its proceedings. Laws 1895, p. 69, secs. 21, 22; R. S. 1899, secs. 5914, 5915; Light & Water Co. v. Lebannon, 163 Mo. 354; Maupin v. Franklin Co., 67 Mo. 329; Kane & Co. v. School District, 48 Mo.App. 414; Edwards v. Berlin, 123 Cal. 545; Jones & Co. v. McAlpine, 64 Ala. 513; Pearson v. Supervisors, 71 Mich. 438; Stevenson v. Bay City, 26 Mich. 44; In re City of Buffalo, 78 N.Y. 362; Tracy v. The People, 6 Colo. 151; Merriman v. Knight, 43 Minn. 493. (3) The unauthorized publication of such resolution was not validated and could not be made valid by any supposed or intended ratification of the board of aldermen. In re City of Buffalo, 78 N.Y. 362; Gentle v. School Inspectors, 73 Mich. 40; Meuser v. Risdon, 36 Cal. 239; Stevens v. The People, 89 Ill. 338; Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill. 160; Buckley v. Tacoma, 9 Wash. 253; Rockman v. Ackerman, 109 Wis. 639; Barber v. Morris, 37 Minn. 194; Judevine v. Jackson, 18 Vt. 470; Langdon v. Poor, 20 Vt. 13; Warren v. Comrs., 181 Mass. 6; Clay v. Mexico, 92 Mo.App. 611; Dickey v. Holmes, 109 Mo.App. 721; Tarkio v. Clark, 186 Mo. 299; Railroad v. Powell, 104 Mo.App. 362. (4) The judgment in the other suit is not res judicata nor any estoppel in this case. Gedney v. Gedney, 160 N.Y. 475; Moran v. Plankington, 64 Mo. 337; White v. Smith, 174 Mo. 209; Edmonson v. Jones, 96 Mo.App. 83; Cunningham v. Cas. Co., 82 Mo.App. 607; Morrison v. Morrison, 142 Mass. 361; Teighen v. Drake, 101 N.W. 893; Hart v. Baty, 17 S. Car. 35; State v. McEldowney, 54 W.Va. 695, 47 S.E. 650; Traction Co. v. Railroad, 64 N.J.Eq. 588; Gas Co. v. Trees, 75 N.E. 2; Railroad v. Ashbrook, 146 U.S. 302; De Solar v. Hanscome, 158 U.S. 221; Dennison v. United States, 168 U.S. 241; Watch Co. v. Meyer, 29 F. 225; Linton v. Insurance Co., 104 F. 584; Payette v. Farrier, 20 Wash. 479; Spurlock v. Railroad, 76 Mo. 67; St. Joseph v. Railroad, 116 Mo. 637; Fritsch F. & M. Co. v. Goodwin Mfg. Co., 100 Mo.App. 414; Tootle v. Buckingham (Mo.), 88 S.W. 622. See these authorities cited and quoted post page 52. (5) The difference of identity in the causes of action in the two suits in this: The other suit, filed in the Federal court, was R. H. Field's alleged cause of action to cancel the special bills. The pending suit is to enforce the alleged lien of the special taxbills--the paving company's alleged cause of action. The two suits are, in no sense, pro eadem causa. Ingram v. Ingram, 75 Vt. 395; Garland v. Smith, 164 Mo. 22; Barkhoefer v. Barkhoefer, 93 Mo.App. 380; Fretsch v. Goodwin Mfg. Co., 100 Mo.App. 414; Dickey v. Heim, 48 Mo.App. 114; State v. McEldowney, 54 W.Va. 695; Gas Co. v. Trees, 75 N.E. 2; Sweenes v. Sprian, 120 Wis. 68; Lindeman v. Rusk, 104 N.W. 120; Land Mortgage Co. v. McDonnell, 93 Tex. 398; Vaughn v. Morrison, 55 N.H. 580; Linton v. Life Co., 104 F. 584; Werkmeister v. Tobacco Co., 138 F. 162; Harrison v. Paper Co., 140 F. 400; Moloney v. King, 30 Mont. 414; Oliver v. Oliver, 179 Ill. 9; Herman on Estoppel and Res Judicata, sec. 124; Hill v. Channing & Scott, 93 Mo.App. 620. (6) Mutuality of estoppel is indispensable to any estoppel of either party by judgment in a previous suit. Bell v. Hoagland, 15 Mo. 360; Garrett v. Greenwell, 92 Mo. 124; Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 524; Werkmeister v. Tobacco Co., 138 F. 163; Railroad v. Bank, 102 U.S. 22; Tregea v. Irrig. Dist., 164 U.S. 188; Goodnow v. Litchfield, 63 Iowa 282; Bulford v. Adell, 43 W.Va. 211; Bank v. Gibson, 104 N.W. 175. The paving company could have foreclosed the alleged lien of the special taxbills by cross-bill or counterclaim in the other suit. Greenwalt v. Duncan, 16 F. 612; Railroad v. Bank, 134 U.S. 276; Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U.S. 313; North British Co. v. Lathrop, 63 F. 508, 70 F. 420; Railroad v. United States, 168 U.S. 2; Offut v. John, 8 Mo. 120; Railroad v. Levy, 17 Mo.App. 510; King v. Chase, 15 N.H. 13; Railroad v. Power Co., 23 Utah 22. (7) The Federal court's jurisdiction in the other case was necessarily limited to the allegations and issues therein as to the legality of the special taxbills. Stokes v. Foote, 172 N.Y. 344; Springer v. Bien, 128 N.Y. 99; Bank v. Smith, 146 Cal. 398; State v. McEldowney, 54 W.Va. 695; Waterhouse v. Levine, 182 Mass. 409; Graham v. Railroad, 3 Wall. 704; Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Peters 483; Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 268; Windsor v. McVey, 93 U.S. 283; Werkmeister v. Tobacco Co., 138 F. 162; St. Joseph v. Railroad, 116 Mo. 637; Garland v. Smith, 164 Mo. 23; Bierer v. Fretz, 37 Kan. 27; O'Connor v. Varney, 10 Gray 231; Watkins v. Bank, 134 F. 36; Groton Bride Co. v. Brick Co., 136 F. 27; Easter v. Welling, 116 F. 100; Lumber Co. v. Lumber Co., 109 F. 411; Baird v. United States, 96 U.S. 430; Johnson v. Murphy, 17 Tex. 216; Swennes v. Sprain, 120 Wis. 68; Bank v. Gibson, 104 N.W. 174; Thompson v. Myrick, 24 Minn. 4; Gilbert v. Fish Co., 86 Minn. 365; Maloney v. King, 30 Mont. 414; White v. Savage, 94 Maine 138; Oliver v. Oliver, 179 Ill. 9; Hill v. Channing Scott & Co., 93 Mo.App. 620; King v. Campbell, 107 Mo.App. 496.

Scarritt, Scarritt & Jones for respondent.

(1) The equity suit in the Federal court was one to cancel the identical taxbills now in suit. Many grounds of invalidity were alleged in complainant's bill. The answer of the paving company alleged that the said taxbills "were then valid and subsisting liens against the lands described in complainant's bill." Complainant denied the allegations of the answer. The court adjudged that (1) said special taxbills were valid; (2) the bill in equity was dismissed; (3) the paving company recovered its costs and had execution. We submit that the uniform rule of the controlling authorities, both of the Federal and State courts, as shown by the decisions from which we will now quote, establishes this proposition. 1 Herman on Estoppel and Res Judicata, sec. 123, p. 131; Werlein v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 390; Ruckman v. Railroad, 45 Or. 578, 78 P. 748; Donnell v. Wright, 147 Mo. 646; Viertel v. Viertel, 99 Mo.App. 710; Nail Company v. American S. L. B. Co., 74 F. 864; Breeze v. Haley, 11 Colo. 351, 18 P. 551; Pennock v. Kennedy, 153 Pa. St. 579, 26 A. 217; Wagoner v. Wagoner, 76 Md. 311, 25 A. 338; Railroad v. Bullard, 89 Ia. 749, 56 N.W. 498; Pennell v. Felch, 55 Kan. 78, 39 P. 1023; Wildman v. Wildman, 70 Conn. 700, 41 A. 1; Sayers v. Auditor General, 124 Mich. 259, 82 N.W. 1045; Cornett v. Cornett (Mich.), 81 N.W. 920. (2) There is no specific finding that the board of aldermen did not cause that resolution to be published. Pennell v. Felch, 55 Kan. 78, 39 P. 1023; Railroad v. Frye, 66 Kan. 296, 75 P. 525; Eklund v. Martin, 87 Minn. 441, 92 N.W. 406. (3) There is no merit in appellants' contention that because the paving company did not file the counterclaim and ask for judgment to enforce the lien and collection of these taxbills in the equity suit, it is now to be prohibited from maintaining these actions. Mason v. Summers, 24 Mo.App. 182; Wright v. Salisbury, 46 Mo. 26; Patillo v. Martin, 107 Mo.App. 653; Tobener v. Hassinbusch, 56 Mo.App. 591; Barkhoefer v. Barkhoefer, 93 Mo.App. 381; Ferguson v. Epperly (Ia.), 103 N.W. 95; Rosenow v. Gardner, 99 Wis. 358, 74 N.W. 982; Baker v. Morehouse, 48 Mich. 334, 12 N.W. 170; Robbin v. Harrison, 31 Ala. 160; Axtel v. Chase, 83 Ind. 546; McEwen v. Bigelow, 40 Mich. 215; Uppfalt v. Woreman, 30 Neb. 189, 46 N.W. 419; Hall v. Clark, 21 Mo. 415; Wright v. Broome, 67 Mo.App. 32; Short v. Taylor, 137 Mo. 517; Foote v. Clark, 102 Mo. 394; Grady v. McCorkle, 57 Mo. 172; Freeman on Judg., sec. 277.

OPINION

JOHNSON, J.

--This action was begun on January 8, 1900, to enforce four special tax bills issued by the city of Westport, a city of the fourth class, on account of the paving of Baltimore avenue. The bills were issued and delivered to plaintiff on November 20, 1897, and in December following, the territory included within the corporate limits of Westport was incorporated with Kansas City by an extension of the limits of the latter city, and the corporate existence of Westport ipso facto ceased.

The validity of the bills is attacked in the answer on a single ground. The laws governing cities of the fourth class in force at the time the improvement was made and during the period covered by the preliminary steps (section 95, Session Acts 1895, page 86), provided that: "When the board of aldermen shall deem it necessary to pave . . . any street . within the limits of the city for which a special tax is to be levied as herein provided, the board of aldermen shall by resolution declare such work or improvement necessary to be done and cause such resolution to be published in the city for two consecutive weeks," etc. It is admitted the resolution declaring the...