The Cent. Bank Of Ga. v. Gibson

Decision Date31 July 1852
Docket NumberNo. 63.,63.
Citation11 Ga. 453
PartiesThe Central Bank of Georgia, plaintiff in error. vs. Blanche G. Gibson, defendant in error.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Motion to set aside a judgment. In Muscogee Superior Court. Decision by Judge Iverson, May Term, 1852.

This was a motion to set aside a judgment in favor of Blanche G. Gibson, against the Central Bank, recovered in the Superior Court of Muscogee County, on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction; the bank being located by its charter, in Baldwin County.

To this motion, Blanche G. Gibson replied, that H. W. Jer-nigan & Co. had a claim upon the Government of the United States, of which she was half owner; that Jernigan transferred his interest therein to the Central Bank of Georgia; that when the claim was before the Congress of the United States, a conflict of interest being about to arise between herself and the bank, which would defeat the allowance of the claim, Alfred Iverson, Esq. as attorney for Mrs. Gibson, and David C. Campbell, Esq. as the Director of the Central Bank, agreed, that upon withdrawing all objections to the allowance of the claim to the bank, the claim of Mrs. Gibson to one-half the amount should be referred to arbitrators to be selected by the parties; that after the money was recovered by the bank, the Director (Campbell) proposed, instead of an arbitration, a suit, which was agreed to, on condition that, by consent, the suit should be brought in Muscogee County, for the convenience of the attorneys—Joseph Sturgis, for the Bank, Alfred Iverson, for Mrs. Gibson; that suit was brought, jurisdiction waived by the Director, the cause tried before Judge Powers, and judgment obtained. Before the trial, however, counsel for Mrs. G. was notified by the Governor, that he would not recognize the validity of the suit; that there was no fraud or collusion, and that the rights of third persons are not affected by the judgment.

The Court refused the motion to set aside the judgment, and this decision is assigned as error.

A. H. Kenan, for plaintiff in error.

Benning, for defendant in error.

By the Court.—Nisbet, J. delivering the opinion.

A judgment rendered by a Court not having jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, is a nullity, and may be impeached whenever and wherever it is sought to be used as a valid judgment. Towns, Governor, vs. Springer et al. 9 Geo. R. 130. 4 Geo. 47.

This judgment was rendered against the Central Bank by the Superior Court of Muscogee County, and the question is this, to wit: had that Court jurisdiction over the Central Bank in that County? By the Constitution of the State, all civil cases shall be tried in the County wherein the defendant resides. Prince, 910. Except in the cases provided for in the Constitution and in Equity cases, a citizen cannot be called to answer to a suit in any County of the State other than that of his residence. Anywhere else, jurisdiction over his person is denied to the Courts by the Constitution. Does this constitutional provision apply to The Central Bank of Georgia? It is claimed to apply only to natural persons. The reading of the Constitution is wholly free from ambiguity. It has no reference to the character of the person, but refers to cases. The declaration of the fundamental law is, that all civil cases shall be tried in the County where the defendant resides. This was a civil case. But it was farther argued that the defendant in this case, to wit: the Central Bank has no residence in any particular County; that its residence is in each and every County within the limits of the State, and if so, was as liable to suit in the County of Muscogee as any where else. If this be true, the Constitution was not violated, and the judgment is valid.

However plausible the idea may be, that a corporation, an intangible entity, deriving its existence and all its functions from the Legislature, and possessing no natural personality, is ubiquitous within the limits of the State, in the absence of anydesignation of its locality by law; yet in this case it has no application, because the charter of the Central Bank fixes its locality at Milledgeville. There, therefore, it is suable—there, it is made by law, commorant. It is an artificial person, resident, by legislative enactment, at Milledgeville. The charter provides, " that a bank shall be established in behalf of the State of Georgia at Milledgeville, in said State, to be known and called by the name and style of the Central Bank of Georgia." Prince, 72. This seems to be conclusive of this question. If, however, the charter did not determine the locality of the bank, I should hold that it would be considered as resident, for the purposes of a suit, in that County, wherein its place of business was situated. If the Constitution had directed that all civil cases should be tried in the County where the citizen resides, the argument of counsel would be more pertinent. It speaks of the defendant. A corporation is as truly a defendant as a natural person. Being a defendant in a civil suit, and made resident in a particular County, by a provision of its charter, we have no doubt but that it is within the protection of the constitution, and that suit can be brought against it alone in that County.

It is claimed farther that the charter subjects the bank to suit before any Court of Record, or in any other place whatsoever; and the effect of this is to give it a residence in any County of the State for the purposes of a suit. The 15th section of the charter declares that the Central Bank of Georgia, by that name, " shall be and is hereby made able and capable in law, to sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, answer and be answered, defend and be defended, in Courts of Record, or any other place whatsoever." Prince, 74. This clause is not understood to enlarge the jurisdiction of any particular Court or Courts, but to give a capacity to the corporation to appear, as a corporation, in any Court which...

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53 cases
  • Ray v. Tattnall Bank
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • September 9, 1983
    ...1967, pp. 226, 239, 240; 1974, p. 1138) (now OCGA § 9-11-60(f)); Edwards v. Lampkin, 112 Ga.App. 128, 144 S.E.2d 119; The Central Bank of Georgia v. Gibson, 11 Ga. 453; and Ricks v. Liberty Loan Corp., 146 Ga.App. 594, 247 S.E.2d 133. The court held that the small claims court having render......
  • Rosenthal v. Langley
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • February 12, 1935
    ...inferior court, and it was held that the superior court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter. In Central Bank of Georgia v. Gibson, 11 Ga. 453, it was held that 'when the court has jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, and the defendant has some privilege which exempts him fro......
  • Rosenthal v. Langley
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • February 12, 1935
    ...... of the holder of a waiver note. In Lockwood v. Exchange. Bank, 190 U.S. 294, 23 S.Ct. 751, 47 L.Ed. 1061, carried. to the Supreme Court of the United States ... of the subject-matter. In Central Bank of Georgia v. Gibson, 11 Ga. 453, it was held that 'when the court. has jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, ......
  • Dewitt v. Herron
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Texas
    • January 1, 1873
    ......Chisholm, 3 Tex. 157;Lyell v. Guadalupe County, 28 Tex. 57;24 Tex. 190;28 Tex. 230;Central Bank of Georgia v. Gibson, 11 Ga. 453.         In addition to the authorities already cited to ......
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