The Cent. R.R. v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 31 March 1886
• Citation: 76 Ga. 770
• Parties: The Central Railroad. vs. Thompson.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

76 Ga. 770

The Central Railroad. vs. Thompson.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

MARCH TERM, 1886.

[COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED]

Railroads. Damages. Negligence. Charge of Court. Life Tables. Trespass. Husband and., Wife. Before Judge Carswell. Scriven Superior Court. November Adjourned Term, 1885.

To the report contained in the decision, it is necessaryto add only that the following were among the grounds of the motion for a new trial:

(1) to (3.) Because the verdict was contrary to law, evidence and the charge of the court.

(4.) Because the court erred in charging the jury as follows: " The law required of them (defendant) extraordinary diligence in the protection of his person and life, until he had a safe and secure exit from their station at No. 6. He should have been given a safe exit from No. 6."

(The fifth, sixth and eighth grounds rested on substantially the same point.)

(7.) Because the court charged the jury as follows: " They (the defendant) must comply with the obligations which the law and reason impose upon them; and, after having done so, they cannot be held liable for an injury to a person caused by unavoidable accident or catastrophe, which nothing could prevent; in other words, which the railroad company could not prevent."

(9.) Because the court charged as follows: " From the moment Moses M. Thompson entered the passenger cars of defendant at Savannah, to be carried to Station No. 6, the company was bound to extraordinary diligence in vouchsafing to him a safe transit to and delivery at the proper depot landing of said station; and if, by the announcement of any of its officers or employes of No. 6, followed by prompt stopping of the train, passengers got out, unwarned by any of said officers of the company of their mistake, at a point some hundreds of yards below the depot, and Moses M.Thompson with others so got out, and, while threading, or attempting to thread, his way up to the depot, was crushed and killed by another train of cars of said defendant, of the presence of which said other train said Thompson had no knowledge, this state of facts, so found by you, would show negligence, when extraordinary care and diligence were demanded, and entitle the plaintiff to recover for her damages the full proven value ofher husband\'s life. That is true, gentlemen, and I so charge you."

(10.) Because the court charged as follows: " Second.— If it appears from the evidence that an announcement of No. 6 was made, and the train slopped, it was the duty of passengers bound for that station to get off with all reasonable haste, so as not to needlessly delay the train; and if you are satisfied that, thus misled, passengers got off at that point, under the impression that they were at the station, and were not warned by the conductor or other employe of the company to the contrary, and no sufficient time was then afforded for them to get back on the train; and, under the circumstances, Moses M. Thompson had gotten off, and was left to grope his way in the dark and cloudy night to the station, and was then and there killed by the cars of one of the trains of the company, then the company is shown to be negligent and is liable."

(11.) Because the court charged as follows: "Third. —If it appears from the evidence that two freight trains were ahead of the passenger train on that night at No. 6, and one of these had produced the stopping of the passenger train at an unusual place, by being behind time, which facts were known to the conductor and other employes on the passenger train, and it was further known to them that, immediately upon the passage of their train, one or both of these trains would back down on the main track, it was their duty to notify every passenger that had under mistake gotten off of this fact, and a failure to do so was a want of diligence for which defendant would be liable in case of an injury to a passenger thus unnotified. That is true, gentlemen."

(12.) Because the court charged as follows: "Fourth.— The law demanding extraordinary diligence on the part of the railroads and their employes, in cases of transportation of passengers, is laid in wisdom, as human life is at great risk, especially when public carriers employ steam for rapid transit, and extraordinary diligence is requiredat their hands. For slight negligence, they are and ought to be responsible. This is true and is the law."

(13.) Because the court charged as follows: "Fifth.—In arriving at the amount of damages to be allowed in this case, if they allow any, the jury, to use the language of 0. J. Jackson, are not restricted to any procrustean rule in the mode of estimating the value of a life; the age of a man, the health he enjoys, the money he is making by his labor, his habits, are data from which the jury may argue how long he will probably live and work, and what his life is worth to his wife in its pecuniary value. This is true, gentlemen. This is the rule laid down by which you are to estimate the damages, if you find any."

(14.) Because the court charged as follows: "Sixth.— A man is not a trespasser for merely walking on the track; and certainly he is not, if, at the time he walks on it, it is not known to him that the trains are coming."

(15) Because the court, after charging the jury, at the request of the defendant's counsel, as follows: "If you should find from the testimony that the deceased, from his own choice or volition, before reaching the depot, and while the train was stopped, saw proper to leave the car and walk to the depot, instead of remaining on the cars until arriving at the depot, then the railroad company had discharged its whole duty to him as a passenger, and the rule of law requiring extraordinary diligence of defendant as a common carrier of passengers, as far as related to the deceased, no longer applied to his case, " added thereto the following: "I give you that in charge, gentlemen, with this qualification, that it was defendant's duty to transport Mr. Thompson safely from Savannah to Station No. 6, and to furnish him with a safe exit from the railroad track. Their duty was to give him a safe crossing over their track and their right-of-way at No. 6. He was entitled to a safe discharge from their track, and a safe crossing over their right-of-way at Station No. 6. If they didthat, then the relation of passenger and common carrier ceased, and they have discharged the obligation of extraordinary diligence required of them by law."

(The sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, twenty first and twenty-second grounds are set out in the eighth and ninth divisions of the decision.)

The motion was overruled, and the defendant excepted.

Lawton & Cunningham, for plaintiff in error.

Hobby & Mathews; Hook & Montgomery, for defendant.

Jackson, Chief Justice.

Mrs. Thompson sued the Central Railroad and Banking Company of Georgia for the homicide of her husband, and recovered a verdict for the sum of §7, 500.

The defendant made a motion for a new trial on twenty-two grounds, and assigns error on each of those grounds. They can be grouped together so as to make our task much less laborious than it would be should each be considered separately.

The homicide occurred near Station No. 6 of the Central Railroad, and was caused by the husband of plaintiff leaving the car before it reached the station at a spot some several hundred yards below it, and being run over by the backing of a freight train while he was making his way towards the station. The passenger train on which he was a passenger had stopped because the freight trains were so long as to block its way with some two or three cars. These freight trains were also out of time. The position of the plaintiff is that her husband was induced to leave the car by the announcement of "No. 6—passengers get off!" or words to that effect, by the conductor or officer of the road authorized to make such announcement and give such direction, while the contention of the defendant is that no such announcement was made or direction give by one inauthority, but he left the car of his own volition, being well acquainted with the station and all its surroundings, and assuming the responsibility of caring for himself. The contention of the plaintiff is, further, that her husband wished to get back on the train, but was prevented by the conductor, who told him not to do so, as it was moving, and thus he was left in darkness; while, on the other side, the company contend that he was warned not to get off by the conductor, and after he did, he was asked to get back by a friend and declined, saying in both cases words to the effect that he could take care of himself. The contention of the plaintiff is that it was the company\'s negligence thus to leave him in darkness, to thread his way as best he could to the station, even though it was his own carelessness to get off where, and under the circumstances, he did; while to this the company replies that he could have avoided the consequences to himself of that negligence of theirs by ordinary care, familiar as ho was with the locality and surroundings, and therefor can not recover under section 2972 of the Code.

1.These mainly were the issues between the parties, and inasmuch as the case will be remanded for a new trial, we decline to express an opinion on the first three grounds of the motion, which attack the verdict because contrary to evidence, and therefore to law.

2.The 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and the qualification of the request in the 15th ground of the motion, make the same allegation of error and may be considered together. They are all to the effect that the judge erred in charging the jury to the effect that the law required the defendant to use extraordinary diligence in protecting the passenger's life and person until he had a safe and secure exit from their station at No. 6, repeating it again and again, with the variations, that he must have a safe and secure exit from their...