The Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railway v. Hedges

• Decision Date: 13 March 1889
• Docket Number: 13,624
• Citation: 20 N.E. 530,118 Ind. 5
• Parties: The Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railway Company v. Hedges, Administratrix
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

20 N.E. 530

118 Ind. 5

The Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railway Company v. Hedges, Administratrix

No. 13,624

Supreme Court of Indiana

March 13, 1889

From the Fountain Circuit Court.

The judgment is reversed, with costs.

T. F Davidson and W. Armstrong, for appellant.

L Nebeker and H. H. Dochterman, for appellee.

OPINION

Mitchell, J.

This action was brought by Maria Hedges, administratrix of the estate of Daniel T. Hedges, deceased, against the appellant railroad company, to recover damages alleged to have resulted to the widow and children of the intestate on account of the death of the latter, which it is charged was caused by the wrongful acts and omissions of the defendant.

The particular wrong charged in the complaint is, that on a certain date, as one of the defendant's trains approached the town of Covington, the servants of the defendant having the train in charge, carelessly and negligently detached the engine from the cars; that the engine was run with accelerated speed to a water-tank about fifty yards west of the depot, leaving the cars to follow of their own momentum down a descending grade to the depot. It is charged that the train of cars thus following passed over a highway which crosses the railway track near the depot, and that the defendant's servants negligently omitted to give any signals by ringing the bell, sounding the whistle, or otherwise, of the approach of the cars, from which the engine had been thus detached, and that in consequence of such neglect the intestate, being unaware of their approach attempted to pass over the highway crossing, and was run against and over, the result being that his death was caused without any fault on his part.

The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and in answer to interrogatories propounded they returned the following facts specially: The decedent had been familiar with the crossing for ten years, and for two or three months before his death his business had taken him to the depot, about the same hour that he was killed, on each week day. He was on foot, and was on his way to the depot at the time he was struck by the train, which arrived at Covington on its schedule time. The train approached from the east, while the decedent was passing southwardly along the highway toward the depot. There were two side-tracks, lying north of the main track upon which the train was approaching, the one lying nearest the main track being nine feet distant therefrom. Having thus summarized the facts specially returned in answer to the first eighteen interrogatories, we set out the following questions, together with the answers of the jury, in full:

"19. How far east along the main track could the deceased have seen had he looked when he reached the south rail of the south side-track? About two hundred feet.

"22. Had it been the habit of those in charge of the train, for two or three months before the injury, to detach the engine and run it to the water-tank, as was done on the day of the injury? Yes.

"23. Did the accident happen in the daytime? Yes.

"24. Could the deceased, if he had looked in the direction of the approaching train, have seen it when he was on the south side-track? Yes.

"25. Could the deceased have seen the train, if he had looked, in time to have avoided the injury? Yes.

"27. Did the train conductor stand on the depot platform and shout a warning to the deceased? Yes.

"32. Was there a brakeman on the car next to the forward car of the train? Between the second and third cars.

"33. Did this brakeman shout a warning to the deceased while deceased was on the south side-track? Yes.

"35. Were the brakes on the front car set against the wheels from the time the engine was detached until the deceased was struck? Yes.

"38. At what rate of speed was the train approaching the crossing? About four miles an hour."

Other answers returned by the jury show that the decedent approached the crossing with his head down; that he was probably giving attention to the engine, which had passed some minutes in advance of the train from which it had been detached, and which was at the water-tank some 240 feet west of the crossing. The fifty-fifth question and answer were as follows:

"What was there to prevent the deceased from seeing the approaching train when he had reached the south rail of the south side-track? Nothing."

There were other answers, but none which in any way qualified or mitigated the force of those above set out.

The only question we deem it necessary to consider is, whether or not the court ruled correctly in overruling the defendant's motion for judgment on the special findings of the jury, notwithstanding the general verdict.

We quite agree with all that is said in support of the ruling below, concerning the scope and effect of the general verdict, and the necessity that there should be an irreconcilable conflict between it and the facts specially found, before the latter will prevail over the former. The general verdict must be regarded in the first instance as affirming the truth of each and every proposition or fact necessary to support the general conclusion arrived at, and every reasonable presumption will be indulged in its favor, while nothing will be inferred or presumed in aid of the special findings as against the general verdict. McComas v. Haas, 107 Ind. 512, 8 N.E. 579, and cases cited; Rice v. Manford, 110 Ind. 596, 11 N.E. 283.

When the jury are required by direct and unambiguous questions to return answers pertinent to the particular facts in issue, each answer, unless it is clearly inconsistent with some other relating to the same subject, is to be regarded as stating the exact truth in respect to the particular fact or proposition embraced by the question; and where it appears by the answers, construed together, that the facts, or some one of them, essential to support the general verdict, are directly inconsistent, and in irreconcilable conflict with the general verdict, it becomes the plain duty of the court to accept the facts specially found as true, and to render judgment accordingly. Frank v. Grimes, 105 Ind. 346, 4 N.E. 414; Cox v. Ratcliffe, 105 Ind. 374, 5 N.E. 5.

It has often been decided that in actions such as this the burden of proof lies entirely on the plaintiff. Two propositions, one affirmative, and the other in a sense negative, must be established by him. It is for the plaintiff to show, either directly or by the facts and circumstances surrounding the occurrence, that the accident which caused the death of the intestate happened through or on account of the negligence of those for whose acts the railroad company was responsible, and that the injury resulted solely from their negligence, to the extent, at least, that the intestate was not himself guilty of any negligence which directly contributed to the result. Tolman v. Syracuse, etc., R. R. Co., 98 N.Y. 198. If the injury resulted from the joint or concurring negligence of both parties to the transaction, it was not, in legal contemplation, the negligence of the railroad company which caused it, and the plaintiff must fail. Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Butler, 103 Ind. 31, 2 N.E. 138; Indiana, etc., R. W. Co. v. Greene, 106 Ind. 279, 6 N.E. 603, and cases cited; Indiana, etc., R. W. Co. v. Hammock, 113 Ind. 1, 14 N.E. 737; Davey v. London, etc., R. W. Co., 37 Eng. Rep. (Cook's notes) 606.

Conceding as we do, that the jury might well have found that the railroad company was negligent in detaching the engine from the cars, and in increasing its speed so as to let the train drift over a highway or street crossing without any sufficient means of giving the statutory warnings--...