The Chicago v. Berg
| Decision Date | 31 March 1882 |
| Citation | 10 Bradw. 607,10 Ill.App. 607 |
| Parties | THE CHICAGO AND WESTERN INDIANA RAILROAD COMPANY.v.JOHN BERG. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. S. WILLIAMSON, Judge, presiding. Opinion filed May 9, 1882.
This was an action on the case brought by appellee, John Berg, against the Chicago and Western Indiana Railroad Company, to recover for damages to his premises fronting on Wallace street, in the town of Lake, occasioned by the construction and operating of appellant's railroad in said street. The town was an incorporate municipality, and the railroad was constructed in the street by its permission and consent.
The declaration avers, inter alia, that by the construction of the road, the throwing up of embankments and cutting of ditches, the plaintiff has been deprived of the use of the street; that access to his premises has been cut off, water has been thrown thereon, and caused to stand in stagnant pools, and to run into the basement of his house; that by the running of locomotives and cars on the railroad, smoke, ashes, cinders, soot, sparks of fire, noxious gases and other injurious substances have been thrown upon and into his dwelling-house; that the running of the cars causes the plaintiff's house to be shaken, damaging the ceiling and walls, and causing the plastering to crack and fall off, etc., whereby the plaintiff's property has been greatly impaired in value.
The case was tried by a jury under a plea of not guilty; there was a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $1,400. The defendant brings the case here by appeal.
MR. CHARLES M. OSBORN, for appellant; as to the legal right of the railway company to construct and operate its road in the streets, cited Stetson v. C. & E. R. R. Co. 75 Ill. 74.
The damages for maintaining and operating the road must be damages sustained between the time of beginning to operate the road and the commencement of this suit: C. M. & St. P. R. R. Co. v. Hall, 90 Ill. 42; C. & E. I. R. R. Co. v. Loeb, 8 Bradwell, 630; C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Maher, 91 Ill. 312.
The difference in value of the property caused by building and operating the road is not the proper measure of damages, because it includes damages arising from all causes: C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. McGinnis, 79 Ill. 269; C. M. & St. P. R. R. Co. v. Hall, 90 Ill. 42; C. & E. I. R. R. Co. v. Hall, 8 Bradwell, 624; St. L. V. & T. H. R. R. Co. v. Haller, 82 Ill. 208.
There are certain injuries which are necessarily incident to the ownership of property in towns and cities, which directly impair its value, for which the law does not, and never did afford any relief: Rigney v. Chicago, 13 Chicago Legal News, 228; Stone v. F. P. & N. W. R. R. Co. 68 Ill. 394; C. M. & St. P. R. R. Co. v. Hall, 90 Ill. 42; Shawneetown v. Mason, 82 Ill. 343.
The tenant occupying the house under plaintiff as landlord, is entitled to an indeterminate amount of the damages, and judgment in favor of plaintiff for all the damages is erroneous: I. B. & W. R'y Co. v. McLaughlin, 77 Ill. 275; Cooper v. Randall, 59 Ill. 317.
Damages to the house as improved after the road was constructed, can not be recovered: C. & E. I. R. R. Co. v. Loeb, 8 Bradwell, 627; I. B. & W. R. R. Co. v. McLaughlin, 77 Ill. 275.
Mr. H. O. MCDAID, for appellee; that under many of the decisions, it was held that there should be at least a scintilla of taking of the corpus of the property before consequential damages could be recovered as to the residue of the land, and where railways were authorized by municipal corporations to construct their roads upon streets, the legal title to which was in such municipality, it was held to be a use consistent with that for which they were dedicated, and no recovery could be had for damages suffered by abutting land owners, cited Moses v. P. Ft. W. & C. R. R. Co. 21 Ill. 516; The People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 191; Richardson v. Vt. C. R. R. Co. 25 Vt. 465; Bradley v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co. 21 Conn. 294; Milburn v. Cedar Rapids, 12 Iowa, 261; Davenport v. Stevenson, 34 Iowa, 225; Atchison R. R. Co. v. Garside, 10 Kan. 552.
As to what constitutes a taking of property within the meaning of the constitutional terms: Nevins v. City of Peoria, 41 Ill. 502; Tate v. O. & M. R. R. Co. 7 Ind. 479; Alton & U. A. H. R. R. Co. v. Deitz, 50 Ill. 210; Eaton v. B. & C. R. R. Co. -- N. H. 504; Pumpelly v. Green Bay, 13 Wall. 166; Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mich. 206; Montgomery v. Gelneer, 33 Ala. 116; Haskell v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 208; Indianapolis v. Huffer, 30 Ind. 235; Rochester White Lead Co. v. Rochester, 3 Connt. 463; Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 1 L. R. 93; Tootle v. Clifton, 22 Ohio St. 247; Crawford v. Village of Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 465; Lochland v. N. Mo. R. R. Co. 31 Mo. 184; Tate v. R. R. Co. 64 Mo. 149; R. R. Co. v. Naylor, 2 Ohio St. 235; Cincinnati v. Penny, 21 Ohio St. 499; Youngstown v. Moore, 30 Ohio St. 142; Akron v. Chamberlain Co. 34 Ohio St. 334; Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio, 159; Lexington R. R. Co. v. Applegate, 8 Dana, 289; Anderson v. Turbeville, 6 Cold. 158; Elizabethtown R. R. Co. v. Combs, 10 Bush, 382; Cadle v. Muscatine R. R. Co. 44 Iowa, 11; Washburn on Easements 458; 2 Thompson on Negligence, 748.
Courts have frequently held that an incorporeal subject of property may be taken in the exercise of the right of eminent domain: Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19; Nor. R. R. Co. v. Concord R. R. Co. 7 Foster, 183; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 343; Covington R. R. Co. v. Covington R. R. Co. 19 Am. Law Reg. 770; West. Riv. Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (U. S.) 507; Richmond R. R. Co. v. Louisa R. R. Co. 13 How. (U. S.) 71; B. & L. R. R. Co. v. S. & L. R. R. Co. 2 Gray, 1; Central Bridge Co. v. Lowell, 4 Gray, 474; Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. H. N. H. R. R. Co. 17 Conn. 40; Met. City R'y Co. v. Chicago West Div. R'y Co. 87 Ill. 317.
In most of the cases where there has been no structural injury to the land from the construction of public works, the decisions where property has been held to be taken, are based upon the fact that substances--such as smoke, cinders, ashes, etc.,-- have been thrown upon the land by the construction and operation of the works: Easton v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co. 51 N. H. 504; Nevins v. Peoria, 41 Ill. 502; Pumpelly v. Green Bay, 13 Wall. 136; Short v. Batt, City Pass. R. R. Co. 50 Md. 13; Mayor, etc., v. Willison, 50 Md. 138; Inman v. Tripp, 11 R. I. 520; Ottawa Gas Co. v. Graham, 28 Ill. 73. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Grabill, 50 Ill. 241; Ottawa Gas Co. v. Thompson, 39 Ill. 598; Hurdman v. Eastern R. R. Co. L. R. 3 C. P. Div. 168; Caro v. Met. Elevated R. R. Co. 19 Am. Law Reg. 384; City of Pekin v. Winkel, 77 Ill. 56; Elgin v. Eaton, 83 Ill. 535; Stack v. E. St. Louis, 85 Ill. 377; City of Pekin v. Brereton, 67 Ill. 477; Aurora v. Gillette, 56 Ill. 132; Aurora v. Reed, 57 Ill. 29; City of Dixon v. Baker, 65 Ill. 518; Shawneetown v. Mason, 82 Ill. 338; Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Wis. 223; Arimond v. Green Bay Co. 31 Wis. 335; Evansville v. Dick, 9 Ind. 433; Delaplaine v. C. & N. W. R. R. Co. 42 Wis. 214; Weaver v. Miss. R. R. Boom Co. 13 Reporter, 372; Bertholf v. O'Rilly, 18 Am. Law Reg. 115.
The sending upon the private property of another, noxious smells, gases, smoke or cinders whereby the atmosphere is corrupted, constitutes an intrusion upon such property: Tipping v. St. Helene' Smelting Co. 4 B. & S. 508; Citizens Gas Light Co. v. Cleveland, 5 C. E. Greene, 201; Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co. 13 Allen, 95; Wahle v. Reinbach, 76 Ill. 326; Ross v. Butter, 4 C. E. Greene, 294; Cooper v. Randall, 53 Ill. 24; Rex v. White, 1 Burr. 337; Duke, etc., v. Clowes, 3 Chitty's Pl. 217; Robinson v. Baugh, 31 Mich. 290.
It has been held that changing the grade of streets by the construction of public works, does not constitute a taking of property, even though they obstruct access to abutting street property: Moses v. P. Ft. W. & C. R. R. Co. 21 Ill. 516; Murphy v. Chicago, 29 Ill. 279; Roberts v. Chicago, 26 Ill. 249; The People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 291; Richardson v. Vt. C. R. R. Co. 25 Vt. 465; Bradley v. N. Y. N. H. R. R. Co. 21 Conn. 294.
But where the fee of the highway, subject to the public easement of passage, is in the abutting proprietor, the construction of a railway thereon is a taking of the property: Fletcher v. S. R. R. Co. 25 Wend. 462; Drake v. H. R. R. R. Co. 7 Barb. 508; Trustees Pres. Soc. v. A. & R. R. R. Co. 3 Hill, 567; Davis v. The Mayor, 14 N. Y. 506; Williams v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co. 16 N. Y. 97; Wager v. T. U. R. R. Co. 25 N. 526; Craig v. R. C. & B. R. R. Co. 39 N. Y. 404; Henderson v. N. Y. R. R. Co. 78 N. Y. 423; Carpenter v. O. & S. R. R. Co. 24 N. Y. 655; I. B. & W. R. R. Co. v. Hartley, 67 Ill. 439; Kucheman v. C. B. & B. R. R. Co. 46 Iowa, 366; Hinchman v. Patterson R. R. Co. 17 N. J. Eq. 75; Harrington v. St. Paul R. R. Co. 17 Minn. 215.
If the construction of a railway in a street deprives the abutting owner of the beneficial use of his rights of property, it is a taking for which he is entitled to compensation: Caro v. Met. Elev. R. R. Co. 19 Am. Law Reg. 384; Croton Turnpike Co. v. Tyler, 1 Johns. Ch. 610; Newburg Turnpike Co v. Miller, 5 Johns. Ch. 101; B. & L. R. R. Co. v. S. & L. R. R. Co. 2 Gray, 1; Cooley on Con. Lim. 542.
It is a mistake to say that a municipality is seized of a fee simple in streets. There is always a reservation, by operation of law, of the incorporeal rights of property that necessarily attach to abutting lots, and these rights do not pass to the municipality or the public: Dovaston v. Payne, 2 Smith's Law Cas. 142; Morrison v. Hinkson, 87 Ill. 587; The People v. Walsh, 96 Ill. 232; Haynes v. Thomas, 7 Ind. 479; Protzman v. I. & C. R. R. Co. 9 Ind. 467; Alden v. Murdock, 13 Mass. 256; New Orleans v. U. S. 10 Pet. 663; Parker v. Inhabitants etc. 8 Met. 260; Transylvania Univ. v. City of Lexington, 3 B. Mon. 25; Kirkham v. Sharp, 1 Wheat. 323; Cope v. Grant,...
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