The Chicago v. People Ex Rel. Joseph Dennison

• Decision Date: 21 March 1881
• Citation: 1881 WL 10487,98 Ill. 350
• Parties: THE CHICAGO AND ALTON RAILROAD COMPANYv.THE PEOPLE ex rel. Joseph Dennison, Collector, etc.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

98 Ill. 350

1881 WL 10487 (Ill.)

THE CHICAGO AND ALTON RAILROAD COMPANY

v.THE PEOPLE ex rel. Joseph Dennison, Collector, etc.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed at Springfield Mar. 21, 1881.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

WRIT OF ERROR to the County Court of McLean county; the Hon. REUBEN M. BENJAMIN, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. WILLIAMS, BURR & CAPEN, for the plaintiff in error:

1. Property can only be assessed by some competent person or number of persons designated by law to perform that duty, and any attempted assessment by any one else is null and void. Const. 1870, art. 4, sec. 1; Bureau Co. v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. 44 Ill. 229; Cooley on Tax. 184.

2. A double assessment of the same property is void. Const. 1870, art. 9, sec. 1; People v. Bradley, 39 Ill. 130; C. & N. W. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 72 Id. 144.

3. All the property in controversy is denominated in the statute “railroad track.” Secs. 41, 42 and 43, Revenue act; C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 17 Ill. 123; Low v. G. & C. U. R. R. Co. 18 Id. 324; C. & N. W. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 72 Id. 144; C., R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. People, 4 Bradw. 468. 4. The property denominated “railroad track” by the statute is only assessable by the State Board of Equalization. Secs. 48, 50, 109, Revenue act, Rev. Stat. 1874.

5. The State Board of Equalization did, in fact, assess said lots 1 and 2 as railroad track, and such assessments have been paid, as shown by the evidence.

6. The assessment of the property is void for uncertainty, as it can not be located. Shackleford v. Bailey, 35 Ill. 387; Laflin v. Herrington, 16 Id. 301; Hughes v. Streeter, 24 Id. 647.

7. No judgment can be rendered against property for taxes unless the description is such that it can be located. Cooley on Tax. 282, and cases cited; Blackwell on Tax Titles, 124; Fitch v. Pinckard, 4 Scam. 69; Fowler v. People, 93 Ill. 116.

8. If land is listed in one class and assessed in another, the assessment is void. Tibbetts v. Job, 11 Ill. 453; Graves v. Bruen, Id. 431.

9. A decree of court of competent jurisdiction is binding on the parties till reversed.

Mr. C. BECKWITH, also for the plaintiff in error:

1. The property assessed by the local assessors was held by the railroad company for its right of way, and was therefore embraced in the class of property denominated by the Revenue law as “railroad track,” and not assessable by town assessors. Rev. law of 1872, secs. 40-50.

2. As to the right of the company to acquire lands for right of way, and hold the same, except on a direct proceeding on the part of the State for an abuse of its powers, see Sheewalter v. Pirnier, 55 Mo. 258; Natonia Water and Mining Co. v. Clarkin, 14 Cal. 544; DeCamp v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. Eq. 36; Speare v. Crawford, 14 Wend. 20; C., M. & S. Co. v. V., H. & W. Co. 1 Sawyer, 470; Claremont Bridge Co. v. Royce, 42 Vt. 730; Cowell v. Springs Co. 11 Otto (101 U. S.), 55. Mr. ROBERT B. PORTER, and Mr. J. W. FIFER, for the defendants in error:

1. The description is sufficient. It excepts the strip used as “railroad track.” The exception in a deed need not be as exactly described as the land conveyed. Lake Shore and Mich. South. R. R. Co. v. P., Ft. W. & C. R. R. Co. 71 Ill. 38; Williams v. Warren, 21 Id. 541; Bowman v. Wettig, 39 Id. 416.

2. The land in controversy is “real estate other than ‘railroad track,’ ” and only assessable by the local assessors. Rev. law, secs. 46, 47, 49, 109; C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Paddock, 75 Ill. 616.

3. The court below found this to be “real estate other than ‘railroad track;% 7D ” and, that being a finding of fact, this court will not disturb it unless it is manifestly against the great weight of evidence. This proposition we regard so well settled by the decisions of this court as to need no citation of authorities.

4. The real question at issue, the question that is of vital interest, both to the public and the plaintiff in error, is, what is the property in controversy? “Railroad track,” or “real estate other than ‘railroad track?% 7D ” If the first, then manifestly the State Board is the only proper assessor. If the second, then the local assessors are the only proper legal authorities to make the assessment. See secs. 46-48, 50, 109, Revenue law; Porter v. Railroad Co. 76 Ill. 561; Life Ins. Co. v. Pollack, 75 Id. 292; C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Cole, Id. 591; Pacific Hotel v. Lieb, 83 Id. 602; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. (2 Otto), 575.

5. These thirty-two acres have been found by the court below to be “real estate other than ‘railroad track.’ ” The opportunities of that court for determining were good; and an inspection of the map of the plaintiff in error will demonstrate to this court that there is no reason for disturbing that finding. Turnouts are only means of access to the buildings, and would not be used if it were more economical to transport material by other means. The value of the side tracks and turnouts was not included in these assessments.

That the finding should not be disturbed unless manifestly against the weight of evidence needs only to be suggested to the court; but we risk citing a few of the many cases in support of the proposition. Chicago City Railway Co. v. Young, 62 Ill. 238; Bourne v. Stout, Id. 261; American Express Co. v. Bruce, 50 Id. 201; Malburn v. Schreiner, 49 Id. 69; Powell v. Feeley, Id. 143; Lalor v. Scanlan, Id. 152; Baker v. Robinson, Id. 299.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an application by the collector of McLean county for judgment against certain lands, for taxes, described as blocks one and two of the Chicago and Alton Railroad Company's survey of its grounds in the city of Bloomington, except a strip of land one hundred feet in width extending through blocks one and two, on which strip the company's main line is located. The taxes are claimed to be due for the years 1873 to 1879 inclusive. Lot one lies in Bloomington township and lot two in Normal township. Both tracts, however, are within the city of Bloomington. The taxes for which application for judgment was made were assessed by the township assessors of the respective townships.

The principal objection urged by the Chicago and Alton Railroad Company to the application for judgment in the county court, and the only one which we shall consider, is, that the property was land held by the railroad company for its right of way, and embraced in the class of property denominated by the Revenue law as “railroad track,” and, therefore, not assessable by local assessors. If the property in question belongs to that class known in the Revenue law as ““railroad track,” then it was assessable by the State Board of Equalization, and the township assessors had no power to make the assessment, and the judgment based on such assessment is erroneous. If, on the other hand, the property is real estate belonging to the railroad company, other than railroad track, then the assessment by the township assessors was valid and the judgment rendered regular.

Under sec. 1, art. 9, of the constitution, an assessment must be made by the person or persons to be elected or appointed in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise. It is therefore apparent that unless the assessment here involved was made by the person or persons authorized by law it is void.

Section 41 of the Revenue law, Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 865, requires that all railroad corporations owning, operating or constructing a railroad in this State, “shall, in the month of May of the year 1873, and at the same time in each year thereafter, when required, make out and file with the county clerks of the respective counties in which the railroad may be located, a statement or schedule showing the property held for right of way, and the length of the main and all side and second tracks and turnouts in such county, and in each city, town and village in the county, through or into which the road may run, and describing each tract of land, other than a city, town or village lot, through which the road may run, in accordance with the United States surveys, giving the width and length of the strip of land held in each tract, and the number of acres thereof. They shall also state the value of improvements and stations located on the right of way.”

Section 48 of the same statute requires the railroad company at the same time to return a schedule to the Auditor of Public Accounts, of the property denominated “railroad track,” giving the length of the main and side or second tracks and turnouts, etc. Also showing the rolling stock, etc.

Section 50 requires the Auditor annually, on the meeting of the State Board of Equalization, to lay before the board the statements and schedule required to be returned to him and makes it the duty of the board to assess the property named in the schedule.

It will be observed, that by the terms of section 41 the railroad company is required to return to the county clerk and Auditor a statement or schedule showing the property held for right of way. This is followed by section 42, which undertakes to determine what property is know by the term railroad track, as follows:

“§ 42. Such right of way, including the superstructures of main, side or second track and turnouts, and the station and improvements of the railroad company on such right of way, shall be held to be real estate for the purposes of taxation, and denominated ‘railroad track,’ and shall be so listed and valued; and shall be described in the assessment thereof as a strip of land extending on each side of such railroad track, and embracing the same, together with all the stations and improvements thereon, commencing at a point where such railroad track crosses the boundary line in entering the county, city, town or village, and extending to the point where such track crosses the boundary line leaving such county, city, town or village.”

What was intended by the enactment of this section of the statute by the use of the words here employed, ...