The Children's Medical Center v. Tammy L. Ward and Valerie A. Woodmansee, D.O.
| Decision Date | 23 April 1993 |
| Docket Number | 93-LW-0762,13596 |
| Parties | THE CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. TAMMY L. WARD and VALERIE A. WOODMANSEE, D.O., Defendants-Appellees Case |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
STEVEN O. DEAN, S. Ct. No. 9095, 367 West Second Street, Dayton, OH 45402, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant.
THOMAS E. DYSINGER, S. Ct. No. 372, 115 S. Tippecanoe Drive, Suite C, Tipp City, OH 45371 and JEROME G. MENZ, S. Ct. No. 18750 20 King Avenue, Xenia, OH 45385, Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees.
Plaintiff-Appellant Children's Medical Center (CMC) appeals from a summary judgment rendered in favor of defendant-appellee Tammy L. Ward, Administratrix of the Estate of Montay Sibert.
We conclude that R.C. 2117.06(A) (1) is satisfied by a computer-generated billing statement that: (1) clearly indicates the creditor's name, address, and the precise amount of the obligation due; (2) identifies the decedent as the debtor; and (3) that is timely received by the administratrix of the decedent's estate. We find that Ms. Ward is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law; accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this cause for further proceedings.
Ms. Ward was appointed Administratrix of the Estate of Montay Sibert on May 8, 1990. Montay died on April 25, 1990.
Ms. Ward averred that after Montay's death, in May, 1990, she received three computer-generated billing statements from CMC. The record shows that these billing statements included CMC's name, address, the amount due, indicated the patient's name as Montay Sibert, and indicated the "Responsible Party" as Tammy Ward. Ms. Ward further averred that during Montay's life, she regularly received these billing statements and would routinely forward them "directly to the guardian of Montay Sibert's estate for payment."
The amounts due on the three bills were $43,000, $9,000, and $6,843.69. Ms. Ward averred that Montay Sibert had been treated extensively by CMC since his birth for various medical conditions, and she characterized CMC's past billing statements as "statements for medical services."
Ms. Ward also averred that "shortly after his death," she had notified employees of CMC that Montay had died. There is no evidence of written notification to CMC of either Montay Sibert's death or the appointment of an executor for his estate.
CMC brought an action against Ms. Ward, as the Administratrix of the Estate of Montay Sibert, seeking payment of the three bills at issue. Ms. Ward filed a counterclaim of wrongful death and medical malpractice against CMC and Valerie A. Woodmansee, D.O. The counterclaim is not material to this appeal.
The trial court found that "Tammy Ward reported the death of Montay Sibert to employees of The Children's Medical Center." The trial court also stated, in its order sustaining Ms. Ward's motion for summary judgment, that "[t]here is no evidence before the Court that the plaintiff sent any bills to Tammy Ward after the death of Montay Sibert other than the bills in May and June of 1990."
The trial court held that the three computer-generated billing statements did not constitute proper presentment of claims against an estate under R.C. 2117.06, and that
From the judgment of the trial court, CMC appeals.
II
CMC's Sole Assignment of Error is as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE DEFENDANT ADMINISTRATRIX, IN REGARD TO CLAIMS MADE AGAINST AN ESTATE, ON THE BASIS OF IMPROPER PRESENTMENT OF CLAIM, WHERE THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT ESTABLISHED THAT THE ADMINISTRATRIX RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE CLAIMS IN WRITING PRIOR TO THE FILING OF SUIT, AND WITHIN THE TIME LIMITS IMPOSED BY STATUTE.
As a threshold issue, we must determine whether the trial court was correct in observing that CMC'S complaint was fatally flawed for failing to state that the claims were presented to Ms. Ward, as Administratrix of the Estate of Montay Sibert, and that the Administratrix rejected the claims. Rejection by an administrator has been held to be a condition precedent to bringing an action on a claim. Morgan v. The City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Columbus (1964), 4 Ohio App. 2d 417. A non-response by an administrator cannot be considered a rejection under R.C. 2117.06(D) because a non-response does not prevent an executor from later either rejecting or allowing the claim. R.C. 2117.06(D) provides, in pertinent part:
In the absence of any prior demand for allowance, the executor or administrator shall allow or reject all claims. . .within thirty days after their presentation, provided that failure of the executor or administrator to allow or reject within that time shall not prevent him from doing so after that time and shall not prejudice the rights of any claimant.
R.C. 2117.06(H) provides, in pertinent part:
Any person whose claim has been presented, and not thereafter rejected, is a creditor as that term is used in Chapters 2113. to 2125. of the Revised Code.
It is doubtful that an executor can both reject and allow the same claim. Therefore, a challenge to the form of a presentment must be considered a rejection, at least by implication. There is no reason to consider an implicit rejection to be anything but a final rejection because an executor has no affirmative duty to notify a potential claimant that a submitted bill is improperly presented. Generally, it is the responsibility of the claimant to ascertain who and where the executor is,and executors or legal representatives of the estate have no duty under R.C. 2117.06 to advise potential claimants on the procedure for properly presenting a claim. 33 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1982) 460, Decedent's Estates, Section 1152.
Silence by an executor, in response to a submitted bill, does not save an improperly presented claim from being time-barred. On the other hand, if the claim is properly presented, silence by an executor should not bar the claimant from joining the class of creditors of the estate, or prevent the creditor from suing on the claim.
Additionally, as one Ohio court has commented, "[f]or obvious reasons, a fiduciary should not be permitted to accept a claim within the statutory period, hold it indefinitely, and then raise the statute of limitations as a defense because of some claimed defect in its form." Gladman v. Carns (1964), 9 Ohio App.2d 135, 138.
We conclude that an executor with actual knowledge of a legitimate debt of the estate, who personally receives a proper statement of that debt under R.C. 2117.06(A), and does not accept the claim within the thirty-day time period prescribed by R.C. 2117.06(D), effects a constructive rejection of the claim.
R.C. 2117.06(D) provides that if the executor does nothing with a properly presented claim, the rights of the creditor cannot be prejudiced by executor inaction. Therefore, we reject the trial court's contention that CMC's suit was not properly brought.
Another ancillary issue, raised by CMC, is whether CMC received sufficient notice of the decedent's death and whether a lack of written notice to CMC would either extend the statutory presentment period, or revive the claim. We do not reach this issue here because we find that the claim was properly presented.
Ms Ward is entitled to summary judgment only if she can establish, through evidentiary material permitted by Civ. R. 56(C), that there is no genuine...
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