The City of Chicago v. Bixby

Decision Date30 September 1876
Citation25 Am.Rep. 429,1876 WL 10442,84 Ill. 82
PartiesTHE CITY OF CHICAGOv.MARY E. BIXBY.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. HENRY BOOTH, Judge, presiding.

This was an action on the case, by the appellee against the appellant, to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from an alleged defective sidewalk.

A trial was had, resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $2000, to reverse which this appeal was taken.

Mr. EGBERT JAMIESON, for the appellant.

Messrs. E. & A. VAN BUREN, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

Appellee, in passing along Green street, in the city of Chicago, slipped and fell, and broke her leg. She thereupon sued the city to recover damages for the injury, charging negligence on the part of the city in constructing the walk at the place of the accident. At the place where appellee fell, a portion of the walk was up to grade, and a portion ten or twelve inches below grade, and to enable persons to pass conveniently, a step had been placed at the intersection of the two walks, about six or seven inches wide and two inches thick, extending the entire width of the sidewalk, and it was sound and firmly fastened. It seems there was ice on the walk, and it was very slippery at the time. Appellee was descending from the upper to the lower walk, and was on the step when she fell and sustained the injury.

It is first claimed that the back part of the step was in front of a perpendicular line from the front edge of the upper sidewalk, and appellee's heel caught back of the step and caused her fall. We think the evidence fails to establish the fact. Appellee says it was very near on a perpendicular line, and Smith, a sidewalk inspector, who examined it at the request of appellee's husband, says it was on a line. Other witnesses, however, think it was forward of such a line about one inch. But even concede that it was an inch forward of a perpendicular line, we fail to see how the heel could be caught behind the step, in descending from the upper to the lower walk. To do so, the the foot would have to descend perpendicularly from the upper walk to the step. All must know that persons do not descend stairs or steps in that manner. In doing so, they naturally step forward and downward. To step down perpendicularly, it would require a fixed purpose to do so, and would be a departure from what would be the natural course of stepping down and forward. We fail to see that there was any negligence in this part of the structure.

It is also urged that there should have been a board back of the step, so as to have closed up the space, so that appellee's foot could not have slipped back as she says it did, and that it was negligence in failing to so construct the step. We do not see, nor has it been shown, that this was essential to safety, or that it was negligence to so construct the step. It certainly could not have been very dangerous, as it had been used for about three years before the accident, and there is evidence of but one other person ever having fallen at that place, and he says he had at the time forgotten that the step was there. So that proves nothing as to the safety or danger of the place, as the fall was occasioned by the negligence or inattention of this witness. Had it been improperly or dangerously constructed, we would have expected that some one, in this long period, would have been injured or, at least, endangered by the defect. It was on a public street in Chicago, where there was, no doubt, much travel, and, if so, it tends strongly to prove its proper construction and safety.

After such an accident, it is natural for persons then to conclude it was not safe. But it is the fact of the injury having occurred, that suggests the idea of want of proper construction. It is more than probable, that immediately before this occurrence the same witnesses...

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41 cases
  • McLean v. City of Lewiston
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • June 5, 1902
    ...not insurers of the safety of persons traveling upon such sidewalks, and the court should have given the instructions. (Chicago v. Bixby, 84 Ill. 82, 25 Am. Rep. 429; William's Municipal Liability for Tort, p. 177, 105.) We earnestly insist that $ 12,000 are excessive damages in an action o......
  • Jackson v. City of Grand Forks
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • March 3, 1913
    ... ... exercising ordinary care and due prudence. Quincy v ... Barker, 81 Ill. 300, 25 Am. Rep. 278; Chicago v ... Bixby, 84 Ill. 82, 25 Am. Rep. 429; Schafler v ... Sandusky, 33 Ohio St. 246, 31 Am. Rep. 533; Evans v ... Utica, 69 N.Y. 166, 25 ... ...
  • Schmoll v. National Shirt Shops of Mo.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • March 11, 1946
    ...extraordinary prevision. Green v. Sibley, 177 U.S. 416; Dabrowski v. Ill. Central, 303 Ill. 31; Bleiman v. City, 314 Ill.App. 471; City v. Bixby, 84 Ill. 82. (5) ordinary entrance way similar to hundreds in daily use does not present evidence of danger to the ordinary prudent person, even i......
  • The Vill. of Gibson v. Johnson
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • May 31, 1879
    ...ordinary care: Chicago v. McGiven, 78 Ill. 347; Bloomington v. Reed, 2 Bradwell, 542; Gridley v. Bloomington, 68 Ill. 47; Chicago v. Bixley, 84 Ill. 82; City of Quincy v. Barker, 81 Ill. 300. The negligence of the plaintiff will preclude a recovery: Loker v. Inhabitants of Brooklyn, 13, Pic......
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