The Estate of Stanley v. City of San Jose

JurisdictionUnited States,Federal,California
PartiesTHE ESTATE OF DEMETRIUS STANLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SAN JOSE, et al., Defendants.
Decision Date20 January 2024
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California
Docket Number22-cv-03000-VKD
ORDER RE MOTIONS IN LIMINE RE: DKT. NOS. 50 51

Virginia K. DeMarchi United States Magistrate Judge

The Court held a pretrial conference in this matter on January 17, 2024. Dkt. No. 56. This order resolves the parties' motions in limine. Dkt. Nos. 50, 51. The Court will issue separate orders regarding the parties' proposed jury instructions (Dkt. No. 55-8) and other matters discussed during the pretrial conference.

I. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1

Plaintiffs move to exclude matters that officers were unaware of at the time of the shooting. Specifically, they move to exclude: (1) any reports and testimony by San Jose Detective Amanda Estantino regarding a March 2021 armed robbery, which was the basis for the outstanding warrant for Mr. Stanley's arrest and the May 31, 2021 reconnaissance by the San Jose Police Department (“SJPD”); (2) the Santa Clara County District Attorney's post-incident report; and (3) toxicology results referenced in the Santa Clara County Medical Examiner's autopsy report.

A. Reports and Testimony of Detective Estantino

Plaintiffs contend that any reports or testimony by Detective Estantino regarding the March 2021 armed robbery are irrelevant because Officer Baza received all information about that incident from other officers-namely, Officers Lopez and Jorgensen. Plaintiffs also contend that this evidence is unfairly prejudicial, confusing, and a waste of time. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. Defendants respond that Detective Estantino's testimony and reports are necessary to “lay[] the foundation for the SJPD pursuing arrest and search warrants against [Mr.] Stanley,” “what Officer Baza knew the night of the surveillance,” or the reason why SJPD's Covert Response Unit (“CRU”) conducted the May 31, 2021 reconnaissance. See Dkt. No. 53 at 2-3.

Plaintiffs' motion to exclude Detective Estantino's testimony and reports is granted with respect to the trial on liability issues.[1] The parties agree that Officer Baza “was conducting reconnaissance at an address where [Mr.] Stanley was believed to be living in preparation for the execution of an arrest warrant the following day,” and that the “warrant authorized [Mr.] Stanley's arrest for robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and unlawful possession of a firearm after Stanley was identified as the suspect in a March 12, 2021 incident.” Dkt. No. 55 at 3. No foundation of the type defendants describe is relevant here. There is no evidence that prior to the May 31, 2021 shooting, Officer Baza spoke with Detective Estantino or read her report(s) regarding the March 2021 armed robbery. See Hayes v. Cnty. of San Diego, 57 Cal.4th 622, 632 (2013) ([A]s the nation's high court has observed, ‘[t]he ‘reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.') (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). With respect to liability issues, any probative value of Detective Estantino's testimony or report therefore is outweighed by a danger of confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, and waste of time. Fed.R.Evid. 403. If plaintiffs argue or present evidence challenging whether Officer Lopez properly or thoroughly vetted and prepared the CRU operational plan, the Court will consider whether Detective Estantino's evidence is admissible to counter plaintiffs' presentation.

Based on the discussion at the pretrial conference, the Court understands that defendants also wish to present testimony and evidence from Detective Estantino to rebut plaintiffs' claimed damages. Detective Estantino is expected to testify that during her interview of Mr. Stanley, he confessed to committing the March 2021 robbery. Thus, defendants contend that her testimony is relevant to show that Mr. Stanley “was likely to be convicted of the armed robbery and other charges” and “would not be providing financial assistance or regular affection, companionship, etc. to [Ms.] Lebreton” while incarcerated. Id. at 2. Further, defendants argue that “as a convicted felon with prior arrests, [Mr.] Stanley would have fewer and less lucrative employment opportunities once released from prison, which would also affect the damages calculation.” Id. The Court reserves judgment on the admissibility of such evidence, depending on the nature and scope of evidence presented by plaintiffs regarding their claimed damages.

B. Santa Clara County District Attorney's Report

Plaintiffs move to exclude the Santa Clara District Attorney's post-incident report in which the District Attorney concluded that Officer Baza's use of deadly force was necessary for self-defense and reasonable under the circumstances. Plaintiffs argue that the report is irrelevant. Defendants represent that they do not intend to offer the District Attorney's report at trial for any purpose, except for impeachment. Dkt. No. 53 at 3. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion to exclude the District Attorney's post-incident report is granted, subject to the use of such evidence for impeachment.

C. Santa Clara County Medical Examiner's Toxicology Results

Plaintiffs move for an order precluding defendants from presenting toxicology results referenced in the Santa Clara County Medical Examiner's autopsy report. That autopsy report, which defendants propose to enter into evidence,[2] indicates that Mr. Stanley's blood alcohol level was 0.163 g%, and that Delta 9 THC (tetrahydrocannabinol) and metabolic, carboxy THC” and “MDA and MDMA (Ecstasy) were also detected, although the levels of THC and MDA/MDMA are not reported. See Dkt. No. 50-4. Plaintiffs argue that the toxicology results should be excluded because defendants did not disclose the underlying toxicology report in discovery[3] and did not identify any expert to testify about the toxicology results referenced in the autopsy report. Defendants argue that the toxicology report corroborates Officer Baza's observations that Mr. Stanley's actions and behavior on the night in question were aggressive, unpredictable, and unusual. Additionally, defendants contend that the report is relevant to show Mr. Stanley's comparative negligence, and is also relevant to the jury's assessment of plaintiffs' claimed damages.

Evidence of alcohol or drug use would be relevant if defendants can establish a connection between the alcohol or drugs detected in Mr. Stanley's system and his behavior on the night in question. See Boyd v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 576 F.3d 938, 949 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming admission of evidence of drug use as probative of alleged erratic behavior); but see Hayes v. Cnty. of San Diego, 736 F.3d 1223, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 2013) ([W]e can only consider the circumstances of which [officers] were aware when they employed deadly force.... [W]hen analyzing the objective reasonableness of the officers' conduct under Graham, we cannot consider the fact that [the decedent] was intoxicated or that he had previously used a knife in harming himself.”) (internal citations omitted); Hayes, 57 Cal.4th at 632 ([A]s the nation's high court has observed, ‘[t]he ‘reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.') (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Defendants have offered no evidence establishing a connection between the alcohol or drugs detected and Mr. Stanley's behavior on the night in question. Nor do they have any evidence regarding when the alcohol or drugs were ingested and what effect they would have on Mr. Stanley at the time of the incident. Rather, defendants suggest that the jury should be permitted to speculate that Mr. Stanley's behavior was impacted by alcohol or drug use based merely on the detection of such substances in his body. The Court is not persuaded that a lay jury may reasonably so conclude without the benefit of additional evidence regarding the significance of the detection of alcohol and drugs in Mr. Stanley's system. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion to exclude the toxicology results and any references to those results in the autopsy report is granted. However, the Court reserves judgment regarding whether defendants may present the autopsy report for some other purpose.

II. DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE
A. Motion in Limine No. 1 to Exclude Testimony of Roger Clark

Defendants move to exclude the testimony of plaintiffs' retained police practices expert, Roger Clark, on the grounds that the opinions offered by Mr. Clark are speculative and constitute legal conclusions that invade the fact-finding role of the jury. Additionally, defendants argue that Mr. Clark should not be permitted to offer opinions based on the alleged flawed formulation or execution of the CRU operational plan.

Preliminarily the Court's August 23, 2022 case management order set an October 31, 2023 deadline for a hearing on dispositive and Daubert[4] motions. Dkt. No. 19. Because defendants' motion to exclude Mr. Clark's testimony challenges his qualifications and the reliability of his opinions, defendants should have filed their motion no later than September 26, 2023. See Civil L.R. 7-2(a). This is not the first time that the City Attorney's Office has not complied with this Court's dispositive/Daubert motion deadline, and has filed a tardy motion to exclude an expert's testimony, as a motion in limine, months after the filing deadline. See Berry v. Parodi, Case No. 5:21-cv-08436-VKD, Dkt. Nos. 23, 65, 72 at 1 n.3. The Court would otherwise strike the...

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