The Faith P. & Charles L. Bybee Found. v. Knutzen
| Docket Number | 03-21-00561-CV |
| Decision Date | 30 November 2023 |
| Parties | The Faith P. and Charles L. Bybee Foundation a/k/a Texas Pioneer Arts Foundation, Appellant v. Douglas J. Knutzen; Douglas and Diana Knutzen Family Partnership, Ltd; Douglas and Diana Knutzen Family Partnership Two, Ltd; Knutzen Family GP, LLC; and Knutzen Family GP Two, LLC, Appellees |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
FROM THE 155TH DISTRICT COURT OF FAYETTE COUNTY NO. 2020V-099, THE HONORABLE JEFF R. STEINHAUSER, JUDGE PRESIDING
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Smith
The Faith P. and Charles L. Bybee Foundation appeals a summary judgment ruling that the Foundation take nothing on its claims for trespass to try title and awarding the defendants attorneys' fees and conditional appellate fees. The Foundation began this action by suing Douglas J. Knutzen; the Douglas and Diana Knutzen Family General Partnership; the Douglas and Diana Knutzen Family General Partnership Two Knutzen Family GP, LLC; and Knutzen Family Two GP, LLC (collectively, the Knutzen Parties). The Knutzen Parties are the parties appearing before us as appellees. In seven issues, some with discrete subparts, the Foundation maintains that the summary judgment awarded more relief than the court had the authority to award, the Knutzen Parties' grounds for summary judgment in their hybrid motion failed to discharge the relevant initial summary-judgment burdens, fact issues precluded summary judgment, the trial court should not have proceeded to judgment because necessary parties had not yet appeared in the suit, and the fees awards should be reversed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The Foundation brought this suit to determine title to disputed land within Lot 4, Block 13 in Round Top, Texas. The disputed land sits within the block that lies south of the intersection of Washington Street and Mill Street. After the Foundation filed its original petition, the Knutzen Parties answered and filed a hybrid motion for summary judgment seeking a judgment that the Foundation take nothing on its claims and an award of fees.[1] After a continuance on the submission of the hybrid motion, the Foundation filed a First Supplemental Petition (Supplemental Petition) and then a First Amended Original Petition (Amended Petition). In the Supplemental Petition, it raised a purported defect in parties in the suit because of missing parties whom the Foundation alleges own interests in the lands in dispute. Then in the Amended Petition, the Foundation added those purportedly necessary parties as defendants, keeping the Knutzen Parties as defendants as well. Nothing in the record shows that the newly added defendants (the Unserved Parties) were ever served with citation, and they did not file any pleadings.
After the Foundation responded to the Knutzen Parties' hybrid motion for summary judgment, the court heard the hybrid motion by submission. The court then granted the Knutzen Parties their requested summary judgment; ruled that the Foundation take nothing on its claims against them; and awarded them attorneys' fees, conditional appellate fees and costs. It did all this in a judgment styled as the "Final Judgment" that also contains this three-part statement: [2] The Foundation now appeals that judgment.
In its first issue, the Foundation maintains that the summary judgment is in error because it awards relief on claims that the Knutzen Parties' hybrid motion had not addressed. The parties' competing positions under this issue require us to decide what claims the Foundation had pleaded to determine whether all were adequately addressed.
After the Knutzen Parties answered and filed their hybrid motion, the Foundation filed its Supplemental Petition and later its Amended Petition.[3] The Amended Petition purported to add the Unserved Parties as defendants. And, the Foundation says, the Supplemental Petition and Amended Petition added claims that had not been pleaded in the Foundation's original petition and that the hybrid motion had not addressed.
Because a court's authority to render a summary judgment depends on "the issues expressly set out in the motion or in an answer or any other response," see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c), a summary judgment must not award the movant more relief than requested, see Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. 2001). In such an instance, the part of the summary judgment awarding relief on a claim not addressed by the motion for summary judgment generally must be reversed. See Hayes v. Vista Host, Inc., No. 03-08-00053-CV, 2009 WL 722288, at *5 (Tex. App.-Austin Mar. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Clark v. First Nat'l Bank of Highlands, 794 S.W.2d 953, 955-56 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ) ( summary judgment because it awarded judgment on claims added by amended pleading filed after summary-judgment motion had been filed). But there are exceptions to this rule. First, for traditional grounds for summary judgment, "[c]ourts have granted summary judgments on causes of action not specifically addressed in a movant's motion if the movant has conclusively disproven an ultimate fact which is central to all causes of action alleged, or the unaddressed causes of action are derivative of the addressed cause of action." Hayes, 2009 WL 722288, at *5 (quoting Smith v. Heard, 980 S.W.2d 693, 697 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied)). And for no-evidence grounds, "when a previously filed no-evidence summary-judgment motion already challenges an essential element of a later-added claim," the later-added claim may be disposed of by summary judgment even if not expressly addressed by the no-evidence motion. See id. Therefore, the grounds for summary judgment that the Knutzen Parties presented in their hybrid motion may meet these exceptions and still support the summary judgment on all the Foundation's claims.
When we review pleadings for whether they plead certain claims, we are guided by the "fair notice" standard. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 47(a); Bos v. Smith, 556 S.W.3d 293, 305-06 (Tex. 2018). "In the absence of special exceptions or other motion challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings, we construe a petition liberally in favor of the pleader."[4] Brumley v. McDuff, 616 S.W.3d 826, 831 (Tex. 2021); accord Bos, 556 S.W.3d at 306. "Even so, a liberal construction 'does not require a court to read into a petition what is plainly not there.'" Bos, 556 S.W.3d at 306 (). "A plaintiff sufficiently pleads a cause of action when the elements of the claim and the relief sought may be discerned from the pleadings alone." Brumley, 616 S.W.3d at 831.
Turning to the Foundation's live pleadings, we first observe that the Foundation pleaded trespass-to-try-title claims. "By statute, a trespass-to-try-title action 'is the method of determining title to lands.'" Id. at 831-32 (quoting Tex. Prop. Code § 22.001(a)). "Although related claims exist to determine narrower questions of possession, a cloud on a title, or a non-possessory interest, a trespass-to-try-title action is the exclusive remedy for resolving overarching claims to legal title." Id. at 832. Any of several theories can support a trespass-to-try-title claim: (1) a regular chain of title of conveyances from the sovereign to the plaintiff; (2) a superior title to that of the defendant out of a common source; (3) title by limitations, that is, by adverse possession; (4) possession that has not been abandoned; or (5) title by recorded deed if the only dispute between the parties is the location of the property's boundary lines. See id. at 832-33; Lance v. Robinson, 543 S.W.3d 723, 735-36 & n.10 (Tex. 2018); Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 265-66 (Tex. 2004), superseded by statute on other grounds by Act of May 17, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 305, § 1, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 581, 581 ), as recognized in Lance, 543 S.W.3d at 736 n.10.
The Foundation pleaded its claims for trespass to try title concerning what it calls Tracts 1, 2, and 3. By its claims, it seeks title to what it has termed in the following graphic of the land at issue the "[d]isputed" portions of Tracts 1 and 2 and all of Tract 3:
(Image Omitted)
The Foundation pleaded trespass to try title concerning Tracts 1 and 2 based on the theories of superior title out of a common source, adverse possession, and boundary lines established by recorded deeds. For Tract 3, it pleaded trespass to try title but using only the theories of adverse possession and boundary lines established by recorded deeds. As relief for all these claims, the Foundation pleaded for damages, declaratory relief,[5] injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees.
Some of the Foundation's briefing suggests that beyond claims for trespass to try title, the Foundation believes it had also pleaded quiet-title claims. A claim for trespass to try title is distinct from a claim to quiet title, though the differences are nuanced. See Brumley, 616 S.W.3d at 835 & n.46; McCammon v. Ischy, No 03-06-00707-CV, 2010 WL 1930149, at *7 (Tex. App.- Austin May 12, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.). A claim "to quiet title is traditionally one in which the superior title holder seeks to remove a challenge to that title." Brumley, 616 S.W.3d at 835. "Thus, '[t]he plaintiff in a quiet-title suit...
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