The First National Bank of Frankford v. Andrews
| Decision Date | 28 October 1942 |
| Citation | 26 Del.Ch. 344,28 A.2d 676 |
| Court | Court of Chancery of Delaware |
| Parties | THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF FRANKFORD, a corporation of the United States of America, v. MAE ANDREWS, Individually, and as Administratrix of the ESTATE OF HARRY ANDREWS, DECEASED |
BILL IN EQUITY to enjoin the sale of the lands of Harry Andrews deceased, by his administratrix, by order of the Orphans' Court of Sussex County, for the payment of his debts.
The bill contained two other alternative prayers:
(1) That the administratrix of the deceased be enjoined from distributing the proceeds arising from the sale of his lands by order of the Orphans' Court, except for the payment of costs; and (2) that this court enter a decree that the judgment creditor of Mae Andrews, widow of Harry Andrews deceased, had a lien on all of her rights, as such, in his lands, to the same extent as though they had been sold on execution process in the Superior Court.
The bill was apparently filed shortly before the sale of the lands of the said deceased, but the order, requested by the complainant's solicitor, and signed by this court, merely restrained any distribution of the proceeds of the sale except for the payment of costs.
The case was heard on demurrer to the complainant's bill.
Other facts will appear in the opinion of the court.
Demurrer sustained and bill dismissed.
James M. Tunnell, Jr., of the firm of Tunnell & Tunnell, for complainant.
Howard W. Bramhall, for defendant.
Section 4792 of the Revised Code of 1935 provides:
"Lands, tenements and hereditaments and all right of dower and curtesy therein when no sufficient personal estate can be found may be seized and sold upon judgment and execution obtained."
This provision relates to sales on execution process issued by the Superior Court.
On November 30th, 1940, two judgments, by confession, were entered in the Superior Court for Sussex County by "The First National Bank of Frankford" against Harry Andrews and Mae Andrews, his wife. One of these judgments was for the real debt of $ 600.00; the other was for $ 349.39. The latter was subject to a credit of $ 75.00 on November 29th, 1940. The interest on both judgments was paid to that date. The judgment for the original debt of $ 349.39 was entered on a note, payable to the order of "I. W. Long & Son," which was subsequently "assigned" to the complainant. It appears that it was entered in the name of "I. W. Long & Son, for the use of The First National Bank of Frankford."
Harry Andrews died on or about May 22nd, 1941, and letters of administration on his estate were subsequently granted to the said Mae Andrews, his widow. On or about November 15th, 1941, pursuant to her petition as administratrix, the Orphans' Court for Sussex County entered an order directing that the lands of the said Harry Andrews, deceased, be sold for the payment of his debts. The bill does not allege that a sale was made pursuant to that order, but the defendant admits that it was made on December 6th, 1941, or a few days after the filing of the bill. The sale price does not appear. The bill alleged, however:
1. That, under the practice long established in the Orphans' Court, the complainant will not be permitted to assert its rights as a judgment creditor "to the prejudice of the common law and statutory rights of Mae Andrews, widow of the deceased."
2. That because of the extreme youth of the said Mae Andrews, if the usual rules governing the procedure in the Orphans' Court are applied, as widow of Harry Andrews, deceased, she will be entitled to retain "more than 74% of the net proceeds of such sale."
The inference is that the balance will not pay the complainant's judgment.
A jurisdictional question is involved--whether adequate relief can be given by the Orphans' Court.
Section 10 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1897 provides that the Court of Chancery "shall have all the jurisdiction and powers vested by the laws of this State in the Court of Chancery."
Section 11 of the same Article provides that the Orphans' Court "shall have all the jurisdiction and powers vested by the laws of this State in the Orphans' Court."
Section 4367 of the Revised Code of 1935 provides that the Court of Chancery "shall have power to hear and decree all matters and causes in equity * * *."
This statutory provision has been the law of this State from an early date. Under it, it has been uniformly held that the Court of Chancery has all the equitable jurisdiction of the State; all of the jurisdiction that was possessed by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the separation of the colonies. See Fox v. Wharton, 5 Del.Ch. 200.
The same section of the statute contains a proviso that the Chancellor "shall not have power to determine any matter, wherein sufficient remedy may be had by common law, or statute, before any other Court or jurisdiction, of this State; * * *."
That provision is merely declaratory of the old English rule. Bovay, et al., v. Byllesby & Co., ante p: 69, 22 A.2d 138.
When a Register of Wills is interested in matters ordinarily coming before his court, the Constitution gives the Orphans' Court jurisdiction. Section 33, Article IV, Constitution of 1897. In all other cases, the jurisdiction of that court is confined to the special jurisdiction conferred on it by the various provisions of the statutes; and there is no provision giving it any equitable jurisdiction. But there is a broad distinction between the exercise of equitable jurisdiction and the limited exercise of incidental equitable powers, in order to do full and complete justice in a case. Bearing in mind that distinction, it has been held in this State, and elsewhere, that the Orphans' Court, in exercising the jurisdiction conferred upon it, has such incidental equitable powers as may be reasonably necessary and proper to fully determine the matters lawfully before it. Farrow v. Farrow, 1 Del.Ch. 457; Green v. Saulsbury, 6 Del.Ch. 371, 33 A. 623; Petition of Gray (In re Hitchens' Estate), 12 Del.Ch. 417, 109 A. 574; see also In re Nimlets' Estate, 299 Pa. 359, 149 A. 658; Easton v. Goodwin, et al., 119 N.J.Eq. 114, 181 A. 275.
In Green v. Saulsbury, supra, the Chancellor, sitting as President Judge of the Orphans' Court, said that that court possessed equitable powers "in reference to all matters coming under the cognizance of said courts to which the application of equitable principles and powers are necessary and proper for their determination, unless there be any case where the exercise of such jurisdiction and such powers have been prohibited." [6 Del.Ch. 371, 33 A 623.] That is apparently what Chancellor...
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