The Huntington National Bank v. Ewing Lumber Co., Inc., Charles W. Ewing and Charlotte Ann Ewing
Decision Date | 05 April 1983 |
Docket Number | 83-LW-1459,82AP-785 (REGULAR CALENDAR) |
Parties | The Huntington National Bank, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Ewing Lumber Company, Inc., Charles W. Ewing and Charlotte Ann Ewing, Defendants-Appellants, (Central Savings and Loan Company, et al., Defendants-Appellees). |
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
APPEAL from the Franklin County Common Pleas Court.
MESSRS PORTER, WRIGHT, MORRIS & ARTHUR, and MR. CHARLES M. COBBE and MR. CRAIG D. BARCLAY, for appellee Huntington National Bank.
MR JOHN H. LEWIS, for appellants.
Plaintiff-appellee (hereinafter appellee) filed this action against appellants for replevin and for the recovery of an indebtedness of the corporation as well as individual appellants. Subsequently, an action in foreclosure was added by an amended complaint.
The trial court granted the Fairfield County Sheriff an order to take possession of appellants' inventory. The order did not refer specifically to appellants' indebtedness to appellee following the sale of the inventory, which was replevied, or the claim of foreclosure, and did not contain any determination pursuant to Civ. R. 54(B) that there was "no just cause for delay."
The court scheduled a trial for September 20, 1982. Appellants, on September 13, 1982, moved, pursuant to Civ. R. 60(B), to vacate the prior order and continue the trial. Appellants also moved to dismiss the case or limit appellee's claim for reasons which were not related to the replevin order. The trial court overruled both motions and included a statement that there was "no just cause for delay."
Appellants advance two assignments of error:
Appellee has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal and appellants have responded by a memorandum contra. At any rate, Mories v. Hendy (1965), 1 Ohio App. 2d 349, 354 states the following:
Further, Ryan v. The Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. (1937), 56 Ohio App. 469, 476-477, reads as follows:
The denial of a motion to dismiss does not determine the primary action or prevent a judgment....
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