The John L. Roper Lumber Co. v. Wallace

• Decision Date: 31 October 1885
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: THE JOHN L. ROPER LUMBER CO. v. JOHN G. WALLACE et al.

93 N.C. 22

THE JOHN L. ROPER LUMBER CO.

v.JOHN G. WALLACE et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

October Term, 1885.

This was a CIVIL ACTION pending in CAMDEN county, heard upon an application for an injunction, before Shepherd, Judge, at Chambers on 30th May, 1885.

From the order of the Judge enjoining the plaintiffs, they appealed.

The plaintiffs allege in substance that they are the owners of the land described in the complaint--that it is valuable mainly for the timber on it-- that at great expense and trouble they have prepared themselves to cut and manufacture the timber into lumber for market--that the defendants forcibly entered upon the lands and interfered with their rights and property, and threatened to continue to do so. They demanded equitable relief by injunction, and this the Court granted.

In their answer, the defendants deny that the plaintiffs are the owners of the most, if not all of the land described in the complaint; they allege that they are the real owners of the land, or such part thereof as they describe and specify in their answer; they allege that the land is mainly valuable for the timber on it--that the timber is peculiar and generally scarce--that it is particularly valuable to them as manufacturers of wooden-ware made of it, and they suffer damage in not being able to use it--that the plaintiffs are unlawfully in possession of it, and have placed upon it large machinery and a great number of laborers, who have cut and transported to market great quantities of the timber, and threaten to continue to do so--that before the action can be tried upon its merits, the plaintiffs will have cut and taken from the land all the valuable timber on it, and thus leave them without adequate remedy.

Some of these allegations were made in a supplemental answer and in a petition filed in the action, in which they demand that the plaintiffs be restrained by injunction from cutting any more of the timber on the land, and forbidden to remove such timber as may be cut and remaining on it pending the action.

The plaintiffs filed their replication, in which they denied that the defendants had any title or right to or in the land--aver their title to the same--they admit that the land is mainly valuable for the timber on it--admit that they have cut and removed large quantities of it, and aver their purpose to continue to do so--they aver that they are abundantly solvent and able to answer in damage for any supposed wrong they have or may do the defendants in any degree.

The defendants moved before the Judge at Chambers for an injunction as prayed for in their answer, and supported their motion by their verified answers and petition and sundry affidavits--the plaintiffs opposed their motion and supported their opposition by numerous affidavits.

The Court, at the hearing of the motion, granted an injunction as prayed for, requiring the defendants to give bond in that respect; the plaintiffs excepted, and appealed to this Court. They contended:

“1. That the facts set out in the supplemental answer did not constitute a counter-claim under The Code, and that the motion for an injunction on the part of the defendants could not be maintained in this action.

2. That the pleadings fail to disclose such apparent title, right of property or possession, as would justify the interposition of the equitable powers of the Court, and that the defect could not be aided by the separate affidavit of Wallace or others.

3. That upon the whole case made out by the pleadings, affidavits and counter-affidavits on both sides, the injunction ought to be refused.”

Mr. John Gatling, for plaintiff .

Mr. George H. Brown, Jr., for the defendants .

MERRIMON, J., (after stating the case as above).

Under the Code system of procedure as it prevails in this State, equitable relief may be granted in every civil action wherein it appears by proper averments and proofs that the parties, or any of them, are entitled to it. The Constitution (Art. IV, §1) provides that, “the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits, shall be abolished; and there shall be in this State but one form of action, for the enforcement or protection of private rights or the redress of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action,” &c.

This provision does not imply that the distinctions between law and equity are abolished, or that the principles and doctrines of law and equity are so blended as to constitute one embodiment of legal science, without the differences that have heretofore existed between them and been recognized by courts of judicature in their application. Principles of law, principles and doctrines of equity, remain the same they have ever been--the change wrought is in the method of administering them, and in some degree, the extent of the application of them.

Under the common law method of procedure, the principles of law were applied and enforced in courts of law according to methods and forms of action peculiar to them--the principles of equity were applied and administered in courts of equity according to forms and methods of procedure peculiar to them.

Such differences were distinctive, well understood and treated as essential. The constitutional provision cited abolishes such distinctions as to actions and their forms, and to a very large extent--not wholly--the method of procedure in directly applying principles both of law and equity.

Causes of action distinctively legal in their nature, and like causes purely equitable in their nature, although in respect to the same matter in different aspect of it, need not necessarily be united in the same action, though they may be, if they come within any of the classifications prescribed in The Code, §267. Gregory v. Hobbs, decided at the present term.

But, when a single cause of action has both legal and equitable elements, and also, when the equitable relief sought is merely incidental, or ancillary in the action--in such cases, the principles both of law and equity must be applied in the same action--as in case of application for relief by injunction, or the appointment of a receiver in the course of the action. And this is so as well, when two or more causes of action are united in the same action.

The purpose and effect of the constitutional provision is to abolish the distinctions between actions of law and suits in equity, and the forms of such actions--not the difference in respect to principles--and to establish a single form of action applicable in all cases, whether the cause of action be legal, or equitable, or both. The end sought to be attained is to obviate circuity and multiplicity of actions, variety of forms of action and complication incident thereto, and to facilitate the application of the principles of law and equity where they apply to a greater or less extent to the same causes of action.

The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes the method of applying both law and equity in one form of action. By it is established a system of pleading, the purpose of which is to effectuate the intention of the constitutional provision under consideration.

This method of procedure is, in some respects, imperfect, particularly in respect to the trial of issues of fact arising in cases purely equitable, and that...