The Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Huff.

• Decision Date: 11 December 1933
• Citation: 48 Ohio App. 412,194 N.E. 429
• Parties: The Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Huff.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

194 N.E. 429

48 Ohio App. 412

The Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Huff.

Court of Appeals of Ohio

December 11, 1933

Negligence - Wife injured by husband's negligence while acting within scope of his employment - Cannot recover against husband for injuries caused by his negligence - Employer and employee - Not precluded from maintaining action against husband's employer, when.

The fact that in Ohio a wife cannot maintain an action against her husband to recover damages for personal injuries caused by his negligence, does not preclude her from maintaining an action against her husband's employer to recover damages for personal injuries caused by her husband's negligence while engaged in the prosecution of the business of said employer and acting within the scope of his employment.

Court of Appeals for Summit county.

Messrs Musser, Kimber & Huffman, for plaintiff in error. Messrs Benner, McGowan & Lombardi, for defendant in error.

WASHBURN P. J. Madelyn Huff, while riding with her husband in his automobile, was injured in a collision between said automobile and a truck upon the highway.

She sued and recovered a judgment against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, her claim being that she was a passenger in her husband's automobile; that her husband was an employee of said insurance company; that at the time of her injury he was using his automobile with said insurance company's knowledge and consent, while engaged in the business of said company and acting within the scope of his employment; that the duties of her husband, prescribed by the company, were of such a nature as to render the use of his automobile reasonably necessary in said business; and that her injuries were proxi- mately caused by the negligence of her husband in the operation of said automobile.

At the close of the evidence in her behalf, said company rested without the introduction of any evidence, and asked the court to direct a verdict in its favor, which request was refused and exception noted.

At the conclusion of the argument, the company asked the court to charge the jury that "Mrs. Huff, at the time she entered her husband's car, was a trespasser, in so far as the defendant's rights are concerned, and that for any negligence of Huff she could not recover under such circumstances"; which request was refused and exception noted.

Said company also asked the court to charge that if her acceptance of the invitation of her husband to ride in his car "was not in the furtherance of the defendant's business, then she cannot recover in this cause"; and that request was refused and exception noted.

Three propositions have been urged in this court:

First that the court erred in the admission of evidence over the objection of said company.

Second that the court erred in refusing to direct a verdict for the company, because Mrs. Huff, in so far as concerned the company, was a trespasser, to whom the company owed no duty except not to wilfully injure her.

Third, that the wife, not being permitted to maintain an action in tort against her husband to recover damages for injuries sustained by her through his alleged negligence, cannot recover from her husband's employer for such injuries when the employer is not present and does not in any manner participate in the negligent conduct of such husband.

The evidence which it is claimed was incompetent is to the effect that the assistant district manager of the company, who had authority to and did supervise Mr. Huff's accounts and checked up on his collections, and who did assist and direct him in the discharge of his duties, was present at various times when Mrs. Huff was with her husband in said automobile while he was in the discharge of his duties; that said assistant manager encouraged Mrs. Huff to ride with her husband on his trips in the transaction of the business of the company; and that he advised Mr. Huff to take his wife along instead of staying home with her evenings, thus inducing Mr. Huff to work more nights.

We think that the evidence in the record, which was in no wise denied, is sufficient to prima facie establish the authority of such assistant manager to do what it was testified he did in the supervision and prosecution of the business of the company, and that the evidence about which complaint is made was competent.

With that evidence in the record, we do not think that, on the whole record, the trial judge would have been justified in deciding as a matter of law that Mrs. Huff was in said automobile solely for her own pleasure, or that, as against the company, Mrs. Huff, while in said automobile, was a trespasser, to whom the company owed only the duty due a trespasser.

The uncontradicted evidence referred to establishes that the company consented to Mrs. Huff's riding in the automobile as a guest of her husband, and it seems to us might justify the inference that her going with her husband was to some extent in furtherance of the business of the company; but in any event we are of the opinion that the mere fact that Mrs Huff's acceptance of her husband's invitation to ride was not in furtherance of the business of the company...