The Ohio And Mississippi Railway Co. v. Trowbridge
| Decision Date | 19 December 1890 |
| Docket Number | 14,661 |
| Citation | 26 N.E. 64,126 Ind. 391 |
| Parties | The Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company v. Trowbridge, by Next Friend |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Lawrence Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed.
--- Ramsey, L. Maxwell Jr., -- Ramsey, M. F. Dunn and G. G. Dunn for appellant.
J. W Buskirk and J. Giles, for appellee.
The facts pleaded as the appellee's cause of action are, in brief, these: The railway of the appellant crosses a highway known as the Huron and Mitchell road. For a distance of one-half mile west of the crossing the highway and the railway run on parallel lines, the space between them being one hundred feet; for this distance the view of one travelling upon the highway is unobstructed, and persons in the service of the appellant, engaged in work upon the railway, could plainly see any one travelling along the public road. On the 4th day of August, 1887, the appellee was riding along the road on horseback, and the horse she was riding was a gentle one. On that day the employees of the appellant were using a hand-car upon the railway, and they moved it over the rails to the crossing in the direction in which the appellee was going, passing her on their way. When they reached the crossing they negligently removed the hand-car from the track and placed it upon the highway in such a position as to frighten the horse which the appellee was riding, knowing at the time that she was approaching. As there was no way for the appellee to go save by passing the hand-car she kept on along the highway. When near the hand-car standing on the highway her horse took fright at the hand-car and she was thrown to the ground and injured. A general verdict was returned in her favor, but with the general verdict were returned answers to special interrogatories. The facts as they are exhibited in these answers are these: The hand-car was about ten feet from the center of the public highway, and it constituted an obstruction. The appellee could have seen the hand-car at a distance of sixty feet from the place where it was standing, and she did see it. The highway was forty-five feet in width. There was nothing unusual in the appearance of the hand-car, and it had been standing on the highway about two minutes before the appellee was thrown from her horse and injured.
The appellant brings this case before us upon the facts stated in the answers of the jury to the special interrogatories, and upon those facts plants its claim to a judgment of reversal.
A general verdict necessarily covers the whole issue, and determines every material fact against the unsuccessful party; while answers to special interrogatories do not necessarily do more than determine special questions of fact. Town of Poseyville v. Lewis, ante, p. 80. Prima facie, therefore, the general verdict declares the right of the case, since, if all the material facts are established by the party for whom the jury decides, special facts do not necessarily override the general verdict. As the effect of the general verdict is as stated, it is reasonable to uphold it in all cases where the special answers do not constitute an insurmountable barrier to a recovery. Hence, it is correctly held that a general verdict will be upheld, unless the facts stated in the answers to special interrogatories are so antagonistic as to preclude reconciliation. Town of Poseyville v. Lewis, supra; Graham v. Payne, 122 Ind. 403, 24 N.E. 216; Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Lewis, 119 Ind. 218, 21 N.E. 660; Grand Rapids, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ellison, 117 Ind. 234, 20 N.E. 135, and cases cited.
It is reasonable to ascribe to a general verdict a fair and full effect, and to that end it is necessary to give it a very liberal construction, aiding it, if necessary, by fair intendment. It would, on the other hand, not be reasonable to give a liberal construction to special facts, or to aid special answers by intendment, since that would be to break down the decision of the jury on the whole issue as manifested by their general verdict. Every judgment pronounced on special facts necessarily defeats the main decision embodied in a general verdict by a jury. This general doctrine we have outlined is asserted in many cases. Smith v. Heller, 119 Ind. 212, 21 N.E. 657; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ostrander, 116 Ind. 259, 15 N.E. 227; Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Clifford, 113 Ind. 460, 15 N.E. 524; Redelsheimer v. Miller, 107 Ind. 485, 8 N.E. 447.
The rules to which we have referred require us to determine whether the special facts, strictly construed and unaided by intendment, can prevail against a general verdict liberally construed, and by fair intendment aided and fortified. It is obvious, therefore, that the question comes to us hedged in by strong fences.
The broad claim that a railroad company may use a highway for general railroad purposes can not be sustained. Neither authority nor principle sanctions or supports it. Railroad companies have one right that, properly exercised, is superior to that of the public, the right of passage for its trains. All other rights are subordinate to the paramount public right. They have, no doubt, a right to repair their tracks at crossings, but this right, subordinate in its nature, must be exercised with due regard to the public safety and convenience, and care, skill, and diligence must be used to prevent injury to travellers. Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co. v. Clem, 123 Ind. 15, 23 N.E. 965. But the right of using a highway for the storage of cars, or even as a place for the temporary deposit of cars, is not possessed by any railroad company. Possibly an emergency might arise excusing, or justifying, the temporary use of a highway for such a purpose; but a permanent or temporary occupancy of a highway by the cars of a railroad company is, prima facie, unlawful.
It is, therefore, incumbent upon a railroad company which places a car upon a highway, to explain or excuse the act. The act of the appellant in placing the hand-car on the highway was, in this instance, unlawful, and calls for an explanation from the authors of the wrong. We find no satisfactory explanation, nor any reasonable excuse, in the facts exhibited by the answers to special interrogatories. Finding neither explanation nor excuse in the special facts, we must adjudge that none exists, for so the general verdict affirms.
We assume, because we believe it proved by what we have said that the obstruction of the highway by the hand-car was unlawful, and it remains to ascertain and declare whether it was a wrong of such a...
To continue reading
Request your trial