The People of State v. Harrah's North Kansas City Corp.
| Decision Date | 04 April 2000 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. W.D. 2000) The People of the State of Missouri ex rel. Stephen B. Small, et al., Appellant, v. Harrah's North Kansas City Corporation, Missouri Gaming Commission d/b/a Argosy Riverside Casino, Kansas City Station Corporation, Flamingo Hilton Partnership, Jeremiah 'J' Nixon, Attorney General., Respondents. WD56917 0 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Cole County, Hon. Thomas J. Brown, III
Counsel for Appellant: Stephen B. Small
Counsel for Respondent: Thomas W. Rynard and Steven D. Wolcott
Opinion Summary: Appellant Stephen B. Small filed suit in federal court alleging various area casinos were operating under invalid licenses and were therefore in violation of the RICO statute. Subsequently, Small filed suit in state court seeking declaratory judgment as to the arguments he presented in his federal suit. That petition was dismissed by the state court.
Court holds: The court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Small's petition because he had an adequate alternative remedy available to him by way of the federal suit he had filed.
Harold L. Lowenstein
The issue in this appeal is whether or not Appellant Stephen Small could, after filing suit in federal court, file for declaratory judgment in state court as to primarily the same issues. Small filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, alleging various arguments relating to the validity of Respondents' various area gaming facilities and gaming licenses and seeking recovery of Small's gambling losses. After the federal court dismissed his claim, Appellant filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court of Cole County, making allegations substantially similar to those made in federal court. The trial court dismissed Small's petition with prejudice, and this appeal followed.
Small also filed one count in mandamus against the Missouri Attorney General to compel the state's chief law enforcement officer to institute a quo warranto action to remove the members of the Missouri Gaming Commission from office and to have Small appointed a special assistant attorney general to investigate criminal activities under Chapter 572. This point is deemed abandoned by failure to cover it in a point relied on. Jones v. Eagan, 715 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. App. 1986).
FACTS
The following is a chronology of events, deduced from the trial court's findings of facts and the record itself. For the benefit of the reader, and to avoid confusion due to the duplicity of actions in federal and state courts, the events are presented in timeline form. A more detailed description of key events follows this table.
DATE FEDERAL COURT STATE COURT
November 28, 1997 Appellant filed suit in federal
district court
June 22, August 21
and September 1, 1998 The district court granted
Respondents' motions to dismiss
Appellant's complaint
September 16, 1998 Appellant filed a motion to
alter or amend and for relief
from the district court's judgment
November 20, 1998 Appellant filed this
suit in circuit court
February 3, 1999 The district court denied
Appellant's motion to alter or
amend and for relief from the
judgment.
February 8 and 9, 1999 The circuit court dismissed
Appellant's petition with prejudice.
February 16, 1999 Appellant filed a notice of
appeal from the district court's
judgment.
February 19, 1999 Appellant filed a notice of
appeal to this court.
On November 28, 1997, Appellant Stephen B. Small filed suit (the "federal suit") on behalf of himself and "all others similarly situated" against Harrah's North Kansas City Corporation ("Harrah's"), Kansas City Station Corporation ("Station"), Flamingo Hilton Riverboat Casino ("Flamingo"), and the Missouri Gaming Corporation d/b/a Argosy Riverside Casino ("Argosy") (collectively the "Casinos"), in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri (the "federal district court"). In that action, Appellant alleged (1) Respondents' gaming licenses were invalid in that the Missouri Gaming Commission lacked constitutional authority to issue them because the facilities were not located exclusively on the Missouri River. Small requested the court to declare the gaming licenses invalid and the gaming operations illegal under sections 572.030 and 572.070, RSMo. 19941; (2) Respondents, by operating under invalid licenses pursuant to Chapter 572, RSMo., were in violation of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") statute, 18 U.S.C. section 1961, et. seq. Appellant requested the court award him actual damages as measured by his gambling losses, which were over $95,000, as well as treble damages, attorney fees, and costs; (3) Appellant was entitled to recovery of his gambling losses under section 434.030, RSMo.
At various times between January and mid-August 1998, all four of the defendants in Small's federal suit moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under the RICO statute. The federal district court granted the dismissal motions as to all four defendants in orders dated June 22, August 21, and September 1, 1998, holding that Small had failed to allege a violation of either section 572.020 or section 572.030. The court wrote:
Missouri law states that a "person commits the crime of gambling if he knowingly engages in gambling." Mo.Ann.Stat. section 572.020 (West 1995). The law additionally prohibits a person from knowingly advancing or profiting from unlawful gambling. Mo.Ann.Stat. section 572.030 (West 1995). The term "gambling" does not include any licensed activity. Mo.Ann.Stat. section 572.010 (West 1995). Small admits that defendants' gambling casinos were licensed. Because "gambling" as defined and prohibited by the statute does not include a licensed activity, Small has failed to allege a violation of sections 572.020 and 572.030. Thus, Small has failed to allege a violation of Missouri statutes.
The court dismissed Small's claim because it failed to allege a violation of Missouri statutes or federal law. Therefore, Small had not alleged a basis for a RICO violation. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims and dismissed those claims. On September 16, 1998, Small filed a motion to alter or amend the federal court's judgment and for relief from the judgment.
On November 3, 1998, the people of Missouri approved Constitutional Amendment Nine. Amendment Nine provides that gaming licenses issued to gaming facilities located in certain artificial spaces near the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers are deemed authorized by the general assembly, whether the gaming license was issued before or after the adoption of Amendment Nine.
On November 20, 1998, Small filed a petition for declaratory judgment under section 527.010, et. seq., RSMo 1994, and mandamus (the ) in the Circuit Court of Cole County (the "state circuit court" or "the trial court").2 In count one of the petition, Small alleged (1) The Gaming Commission lacked constitutional authority to grant Respondents' gaming licenses because the gambling facilities were not located exclusively on the Missouri River. Small requested a declaratory judgment stating that the licenses were invalid when issued; (2) The Respondents' "unconstitutionally licensed" gaming operations constituted illegal gambling in violation of sections 572.030 and 572.070. In count two of Small's state suit he requested the trial court issue a writ of mandamus compelling Missouri Attorney General Jay Nixon to investigate and prosecute the Respondents for illegal gambling. Count three asked the trial court to declare that Amendment Nine had prospective effect only, or alternatively, was invalid.
On February 3, 1999, the federal district court denied Small's motion to alter or amend the judgment and for relief from the judgment.
The trial court on February 8 and 9, 1998, dismissed with prejudice Small's petition. The court held declaratory judgment was inappropriate since Small had an adequate remedy in federal court, and Small's petition for mandamus failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted.
On February 16, 1999, Small filed a notice of appeal from the federal district court's judgment in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
On February 19, 1999, Small filed a notice of appeal from the state circuit court's judgment to this court. In this suit, Small asserts four points, the most significant being that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for declaratory judgment because relief was not precluded by the availability of an alternative remedy in the federal court system.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court is afforded wide discretion in applying the Declaratory Judgment Act. Raskas Foods v. Southwest Whey, Inc., 978 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Mo. App. 1998). "The trial court's exercise of discretion in applying the provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Act must be sound, based on good reason, and calculated to serve the purposes for which the legislation was enacted." Preferred Physicians Mut. Management Group, Inc. v. Preferred Physicians Mut. Risk Retention Group, 916 S.W.2d 821, 824-25 (Mo. App. 1995).
ANALYSIS
Small's first point on appeal details the trial court's error in dismissing his petition for declaratory judgment...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Donnelly
...and "[a]llowing two suits with the same purpose would run contrary to the purpose of the Act." People ex rel. Small v. Harrah's N. Kansas City Corp., 24 S.W.3d 60, 66 (Mo.App. W.D.2000) (holding that plaintiff who filed suit in federal court could not later file a declaratory judgment petit......
-
Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vulgamott
...rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.'" People ex rel. Small v. Harrah's N. Kansas City Corp., 24 S.W.3d 60, 64 (Mo.App. W.D. 2000). In order to maintain a declaratory judgment action, a petitioner must establish the following: (1) t......
-
Van Dyke v. Lvs Building Corp.
...further relief is or could be claimed." The trial court is afforded wide discretion in using this power. Small v. Harrah's N. Kansas City Corp., 24 S.W.3d 60, 63 (Mo.App. W.D.2000). An action pursuant to this section "is sui generis, neither legal nor equitable, but its historical affinity ......
-
Crown Diversified Holdings, LLC v. St. Louis Cnty.
...court is granted broad discretion in deciding whether to maintain a declaratory judgment action. State ex rel. Small v. Harrah's North Kansas City Corp., 24 S.W.3d 60, 63 (Mo.App.W.D.2000). “The trial court's exercise of discretion in applying the provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Act ......