The People Of The State Of N.Y. v. Stroman
| Decision Date | 30 September 2010 |
| Docket Number | 2010CN004317 |
| Citation | 2010 NY Slip Op 20422 |
| Parties | The People of the State of New York v. Nathaniel Stroman, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Criminal Court |
For the Defendant: Robert Briere, Esq
For the People: Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York County (Richard Freud, of Counsel)
The defendant, Nathaniel Stroman, is charged with Aggressive Begging in a Public Place (Administrative Code [AC] 10.136[b][1]. He moves for an order dismissing the accusatory instrument pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 170.30(1)(a) and 170.35(1)(c) as brought under a statute which is unconstitutionally void for vagueness and over-breadth and for other relief addressed below.
The self-authenticating complaint presents, in pertinent part, the following factual allegations:
On May 19, 2010, between 12:00 hours and 12:58 hours, in front of 711 Seventh Avenue, in the County and State of New York, deponent [Police Officer Garrett Pearsall] observed defendant Nathaniel Stroman, defendant Quintin Smith, defendant Christopher Martinez, separately charged defendant Frank Delgado (M10644889), separately charged defendant Christophe Biu (M10644908), and separately charged defendant Roland Benjamin (M10644905) each do all of the following multiple times throughout the 58 minute observation by deponent: (i) stand in the middle of the sidewalk with the above-named individuals at the above location, to wit a public place, in a horizontal line across the sidewalk; (ii) each hold a CD out in front of them [sic] in their [sic] hand; (iii) each approach pedestrians who are passing by and push the CD in front of the pedestrian's face; (iv) each ask the pedestrian if they [sic] want a CD; (v) each then ask for money in exchange for the CD while blocking the pedestrians [sic]path; (vi) each sign a CD when a pedestrian provided money for the CD; and (vii) each grab the CD back from the pedestrian's hands if that pedestrian did not give them money.
Deponent further states that during the 58 minute observation this group approached more than twenty-five (25) pedestrians.
Deponent further states that deponent recovered at least one (1) marker and at least twenty (20 to thirty (30) CDs from defendant Stroman, defendant Martinez, separately charged defendant Delgado, separately charged defendant Biu and separately charged defendant Benjamin.
The defendant is charged with Aggressive Begging in a Public Place, AC 10-136(b)(1), which provides that:
[n]o person shall solicit, ask or beg in an aggressive manner in any public place.
"Aggressive manner" is defined, in pertinent part, in the statute (AC10-136[a][1]) as follows:
(a) Approaching or speaking to a person, or following a person before, during or after soliciting, asking or begging, if that conduct is intended or is likely to cause a reasonable person to (I) fear bodily harm to oneself or to another, damage to or loss of property, or the commission of any offense as defined in section ten of the penal law upon oneself or another, or (ii) otherwise be intimidated into giving money or other thing of value, or (iii) suffer unreasonable inconvenience, annoyance or alarm;
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(c) Intentionally blocking or interfering with the safe or free passage of a pedestrian or vehicle by any means....
"Solicit, ask or beg" is defined in the statute (AC 10-136[a][2]) as follows:
"Solicit, ask or beg" shall include using the spoken, written, or printed word, or bodily gestures, signs or other means with the purpose of obtaining an immediate donation of money or other thing of value or soliciting the sale of goods or services.
Defendant Stroman argues that AC 10-136 is void for vagueness because, he contends," a person of common intelligence would have to guess when they [sic] were unreasonably inconveniencing or annoying someone while soliciting, asking, or begging' from them in a public place." The Court disagrees. "A proscriptive statute must afford reasonable notice of the conduct prohibited by the statute, otherwise it is unconstitutionally vague and therefore void...." People v. Romano, 29 Misc 3d 9 (App Term, 1st Dept 2010). AC 10-136(b)(1) gives such reasonable notice. The defendant appears to have focused his attention only on the definition of "aggressive manner" found in AC10- 136(a)(1)(a). He overlooks the alternative definition contained in AC10-136(a)(1)(c), which prohibits soliciting, asking or begging by "[i]ntentionally blocking or interfering with the safe or free passage of a pedestrian or vehicle by any means...." This subsection does not require the would-be solicitor to ponder whether his actions would somehow unreasonably inconvenience or annoy someone. Nor does it make such blocking or interference a strict liability offense; for conviction, the People must prove that the defendant "intentionally blocked or interfered with the safe or free passage" of a pedestrian....(emphasis added)" Id.
The accusatory instrument alleges that the defendant and the others arrested with him — numbering six individuals altogether — formed a line across the sidewalk along a major thoroughfare and thrust their CDS into the faces of passersby. It stands to reason that positioning themselves in such a manner would likely interfere with the free passage of pedestrians along that sidewalk. A "person...
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