The People Of The State Of Ill. v. Bonds
| Decision Date | 12 May 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-08-0509.,2-08-0509. |
| Citation | 401 Ill.App.3d 668,341 Ill.Dec. 227,930 N.E.2d 437 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Mahogany T. BONDS, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Lawrence M. Bauer, Deputy Director, Gregory L. Slovacek, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, for the People.
Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, Bruce Kirkham, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for Mahogany T. Bonds.
The State appeals the trial court's order dismissing indictments filed against Mahogany T. Bonds for the State's violation of her right to a speedy trial under sections 103-5(b) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the speedy-trial statute) (725 ILCS 5/103-5(b), (c) (West 2006)). We determine that a written demand filed with the clerk of the court but not provided to the State was insufficient to provide notice under section 103-5(b) when the only indication of notice to the State was an oral, in-court statement from Bonds' attorney that he “believed” he would file a demand. We further determine that the trial court properly allowed an extension of time for DNA testing under section 103-5(c), though it properly attributed that delay to the State. Therefore, because the trial court discharged Bonds before the speedy-trial period had run, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
On December 15, 2006, Bonds was indicted on charges of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(a) (West 2006)) and mob action (720 ILCS 5/25-1(d) (West 2006)). The charges alleged that Bonds and three other women hit a fourth woman with glass objects, causing injury. On February 8, 2007, Bonds was released on bond without making a written speedy-trial demand.
On August 15, 2007, Bonds appeared for a status hearing, and trial was set for November 13, 2007. The following colloquy then occurred:
On August 16, 2007, a written speedy-trial demand was filed, and the court noted the demand in a docket entry, but Bonds did not provide the demand to the State.
On November 8, 2007, the trial court continued the trial on the State's motion without objection from Bonds. At the hearing, Bonds' counsel indicated, in the presence of the State, that he did not recall filing a speedy-trial demand. Bonds' counsel was then corrected on that matter by counsel for a codefendant. The court also allowed joinder of the codefendants and granted a motion requiring them to submit DNA samples. The DNA motion arose because a codefendant, Jeri Malone, indicated the intent to raise self-defense based on the presence of blood on a knife found in the victim's purse; she believed the blood would prove to be from one of the codefendants. The State told the court: “Obviously-I think it would be relevant to perhaps all of them if it's a codefendant's blood on the knife versus the victims [ sic ].” Trial was set for January 22, 2008.
On January 2, 2008, a status hearing was held. The State informed the court that it had negotiated a plea agreement with Jeri Malone. The State also told the court that it had not yet sent samples for DNA testing, and it made an oral motion to continue without any mention of section 103-5(c). Bonds objected, noted the previous speedy-trial demand, and asked for a trial date to preserve the speedy-trial right. The State acknowledged that it knew of the previous trial demand, stating: “The speedy trial demand was actually only recently filed * * * I believe on the last court date.” The court granted the motion over Bonds' objection.
On February 28, 2008, the State filed a written motion to continue under section 103-5(c), alleging that DNA test results were not yet available. By that time, Jeri Malone was no longer a codefendant in the case. The motion provided a time line as to when samples were obtained and sent, but did not make any specific allegations about how they were material to the case except to state that there were reasonable grounds to believe that results of DNA testing material to the case might be obtained at a later date. At a hearing on the matter, the State said that the lab reported in early February that the normal processing time was approximately three months, but the State added that it could have the results by April 7, 2008, should the court grant a continuance. The State suggested setting trial for April 21, 2008, to allow the defense time to go over the DNA results after they came in. Bonds objected and asked for the earliest possible trial date in order to preserve the speedy-trial right. The court granted the motion over Bonds' objection. When discussing a trial date for April, Bonds requested April 7, but the court set the date for April 21. Bonds did not present any evidence or argument to dispute the materiality of the DNA evidence or to show that the State did not act with due diligence.
On April 15, 2008, Bonds filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the State failed to bring her to trial within the time required by the speedy-trial statute. On April 17, 2008, a hearing was held, and the State asked to continue because a witness was out of town for the month. There was no mention of section 103-5(c), and no written motion was filed. The court expressed concerns about the speedy-trial issue, stated that it would need to look at transcripts of previous hearings to determine the matter, and granted the State's motion to continue over Bonds' objection, with a specific finding that the delay would be attributable to State. Trial was set for June 2, 2008.
On May 8, 2008, a hearing was held on the speedy-trial issue. The trial court found that the demand filed on August 16, 2007, was effective based on the August 15, 2007, in-court statements of Bonds' attorney. The court found that the State exercised due diligence such that it was entitled to additional time for DNA testing, but the court did not make specific findings about whether the evidence was material to the case. The court then found that the running of the time was not tolled and that the State did not get an automatic 120 extra days. Instead, the court determined that, because the State offered April 7, 2008, as the date that DNA results would be available, it had 39 additional days. The court then determined that the June 2, 2008, trial date fell outside of the time allowed to bring Bonds to trial. Thus, the court granted the motion to dismiss. The State appeals under Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(1)).
The State first contends that Bonds' speedy-trial demand was ineffective because it was not served on the State's Attorney and the statements by Bonds' attorney on August 15, 2007, were not sufficient to provide notice of the demand.
().” People v. Staten, 159 Ill.2d 419, 426, 203 Ill.Dec. 230, 639 N.E.2d 550 (1994). A criminal defendant in Illinois also has a statutory right to a speedy trial. 725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2006). The speedy-trial statute enforces the constitutional right to a speedy trial and its protections are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant. People v. Buford, 374 Ill.App.3d 369, 372, 312 Ill.Dec. 551, 870 N.E.2d 995 (2007). Our supreme court has held that “the statutory right to a speedy trial is not the precise equivalent of the constitutional right.” Staten, 159 Ill.2d at 426, 203 Ill.Dec. 230, 639 N.E.2d 550. Therefore, “[p]roof of a violation of the statutory right requires only that the defendant has not been tried within the period set by statute and that defendant has not caused or contributed to the delays.” Staten, 159 Ill.2d at 426, 203 Ill.Dec. 230, 639 N.E.2d 550.
We review the trial court's ultimate determinations for an abuse of discretion. Buford, 374 Ill.App.3d at 372, 312 Ill.Dec. 551, 870 N.E.2d 995. On a legal question, however, the standard of review is de novo. People v. King, 366 Ill.App.3d 552, 554, 304 Ill.Dec. 309, 852 N.E.2d 559 (2006). Here, the issue of whether the demand was effective does not depend on the trial court's discretion. Instead, the question is whether the August 15, 2007, in-court statements by Bonds' counsel put the State on notice of the demand as a matter of law. Accordingly, we review the issue de novo. See People v. Dockery, 313 Ill.App.3d 684, 685, 246 Ill.Dec. 432, 730 N.E.2d 112 (2000).
Section 103-5(a) of the speedy-trial statute provides an automatic 120-day speedy-trial right for a person held in custody on the pending charge and does not require the person to file a demand to exercise that right. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2006). Section 103- 5(b) of the speedy-trial statute contains a 160-day speedy-trial right for a person released on bond or recognizance, and the period begins to run only when the accused files a written speedy-trial demand. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2006).
Section 103-5(b) does not specifically require the defendant to serve the written demand on the State. However, interpreting an earlier version of section 103-5(b) that did not specify the form of the demand, our supreme court held that, although the statute contains no explicit requirement of notice, the term “demand” itself implies that the defendant's stated desire to be tried within 160 days must be conveyed to those persons who are in a position to fulfill that desire. People v. Jones, 84 Ill.2d 162, 167, 49 Ill.Dec. 287, 417 N.E.2d 1301 (1981). Thus, to be effective, the demand must be “communicated” to the State. Jones, 84 Ill.2d at 167, 49 Ill.Dec. 287...
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