The People v. Christensen, A125919

Decision Date24 January 2011
Docket NumberA125919,No. SCR-524410,SCR-524410
PartiesTHE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CAMILLE LEA CHRISTENSEN, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

Defendant Camille Christensen was charged with brandishing and firing a rifle from her car. After her arrest, defendant exhibited symptoms of mental illness and was eventually examined at her attorney's request by a psychologist, who concluded she was psychotic and not competent to stand trial. When defendant's behavior improved after her antipsychotic medications were changed, her attorney elected not to seek a hearing on her competence. In addition, after consultation with defendant, he withdrew her request to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and defendant testified coherently in her own defense at trial. Following her conviction, the court denied defendant's motion for a new trial on grounds she was incompetent and her attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek a competency hearing. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged in an information filed January 23, 2008, with discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 246), assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)), brandishing a firearm at the occupant of a motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 417.3), and possession of a firearm in violation of a probation condition (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (d)(1)). The charge of discharging a firearm was alleged to be a serious felony under Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c), and defendant was alleged to have personally used a firearm under Penal Code sections 12022.5, 1192.7, subdivision (c), and 667.5, subdivision (c) in connection with the assault charge.

At a hearing on June 9, 2008, the day before trial began, defendant's attorney informed the court defendant wanted to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to all charges. The trial court then informed defendant that if she was successful in obtaining the plea, she could be committed to a mental hospital for 17 to 20 years, with the possibility of additional two-year extensions until she is certified sane. Counsel withdrew defendant's request without explanation.

At trial, the first victim testified that on the morning of November 27, 2007, he noticed defendant's car ahead of him, driving erratically. When he pulled his car over to make a left turn, defendant's car slowed to come alongside, and a shot was fired from defendant's car, shattering the rear window of his vehicle. The second victim testified that, shortly after the first incident, defendant's car pulled up next to his. When he looked over, he saw the barrel of a gun pointing at him from her car, and he sped away. During a subsequent interview with police, defendant admitted discharging a rifle from inside her car, but she claimed to have been shooting at game while the car was stopped.

At trial, defendant testified that she awoke early on the morning of the incident with the intention of hunting wild turkey, although she had never hunted game before. She took along her husband's rifle. Her car had a mechanical problem that caused her to drive erratically. In addition, the rifle was laying on the passenger-side floorboard, where it interfered with her driving. When she pulled alongside the first victim's car, defendant was attempting to transfer the rifle to the backseat. As she did so, the gun discharged, shooting out the victim's window. She attempted to flag him down to apologize, but he drove away. Although she was now disoriented by the rifle's loud discharge, defendant continued to maneuver the rifle into the backseat. As she did so, the barrel poked from the car window, where it could have been seen by the second victim. Defendant said shedid not tell the investigating officer the correct story at the time of her arrest because she was frightened.

Defendant was convicted on all four counts, the jury also finding true the allegation she had personally used a firearm. She was sentenced to a seven-year prison term.

Defendant filed a motion for a new trial on grounds she was not competent at the time of trial and her attorney provided ineffective assistance by allowing her to proceed to trial despite knowledge of her incompetency. The motion explained that defendant's trial counsel, Walter Moreno, had concerns about her psychological condition prior to trial. In December 2007, shortly after defendant's arrest, Moreno sought a continuance of trial, noting defendant "has not been able to assist me in any meaningful way as [to] what transpired before or after the events referred to in the complaint." In March 2008, counsel sought another continuance, informing the court he had learned defendant had been diagnosed with a psychiatric condition that might exculpate her. The same month, defendant had been examined by a psychologist, Dr. John Podboy, who concluded on the basis of two interviews with defendant, a review of her records, and interviews with her mother, that defendant was "actively psychotic, and is not competent to stand trial." Podboy's report states that during the first interview, defendant, who at the time was taking antipsychotic medication, claimed she felt as if she had lost contact with reality and was having hallucinations. At the second interview, 20 days later, defendant claimed to be hearing voices. Defendant's medical records showed a history of mental problems.

At a hearing on the new trial motion, Moreno testified defendant fell asleep during an early jail interview, which caused him concern about her mental state. He then retained Podboy to examine defendant, but Moreno did not confer with the staff doctor at the jail or any other expert regarding her mental state. After Podboy rendered his report, defendant was placed on a different type of medication. According to Moreno, during a series of interviews thereafter defendant "seemed to be much more lucid, much more understanding." By the time of trial, Moreno found defendant "completely lucid...

[she] seemed to be completely normal."1 On the basis of her changed affect, Moreno concluded defendant was competent to stand trial.

When asked by counsel whether defendant was able at trial to assist in her defense in a meaningful way, Moreno answered, "I've got to say yes." Moreno believed defendant had testified successfully in her own defense at trial, although he noted that when she took the stand, "it was a completely different person.... [¶]... [¶]... I couldn't get her to focus on me. And I was walking around the courtroom to see if I could—and she was just like frozen." Despite defendant's state, Moreno agreed she had answered all his questions without providing any bizarre answers.

Podboy's direct testimony at the hearing expanded upon his March 2008 report to Moreno. When he met defendant, she was "obviously psychotic," exhibiting very troubling behavior that the jail's staff doctor had diagnosed as "dissociative identity disorder." At that time, she was incompetent because she was "not able to focus on her current circumstances" and "didn't understand what it was that she was involved in, in terms of the gravity of the charges." Podboy told Moreno in no uncertain terms that defendant was not competent to stand trial and was not sane at the time she committed the crimes.

Although Podboy had not met with defendant since his March 2008 report, in preparation for the hearing he had reviewed defendant's mental health records from April through the time of trial and was prepared to opine, on the basis of the review, that defendant continued not to be competent at the time of trial because her condition worsened during that period. The court excluded the records and his opinion, ruling them irrelevant. Podboy was, however, subsequently permitted to testify that there was no way defendant could have regained her competency between the date of his report and trial.

Asked about her testimony at trial, he said, "[I]t is a very high probability that she was engaged in listening to auditory hallucinations at that time, because she typically did when I worked with her, and her responses would have been partially correct and partially inaccurate, partially wrong, because that was my experience with her."

When defense counsel sought to call the jail's staff doctor, Dr. Winters, who essentially concurred with Podboy's diagnosis, the court sustained an objection to her testimony as cumulative.

On cross-examination, Podboy rejected the suggestion defendant was malingering, stating her symptoms were too severe to have been fabricated. He did, however, acknowledge he had been fooled "a number of times" in the past by persons fabricating mental illness. He also acknowledged that a transcript of prison telephone calls made by defendant demonstrated "some partial understanding" of the charges against her and admitted that a person "can be mentally ill and [yet] competent." Finally, he acknowledged his report contained no information on defendant's perception of the legal proceedings, although he claimed to have questioned her on this topic.

The trial court denied defendant's motion. Explaining the standard was not whether defendant was mentally ill but whether she was able to understand the nature of the proceedings and assist counsel, the court noted that during trial, defendant "seemed to be participating intelligently and actively in her defense.... She did not testify in a way that would indicate she was incompetent. Quite the contrary. [¶]... [¶]... [T]hroughout these proceedings I've never had a doubt as to her...

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