The People v. Maxon

• Decision Date: 01 January 1870
• Citation: 1 Idaho 330
• Parties: The People, Respondents, v. Edward Maxon And Charles Stone, Appellants.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

1 Idaho 330

The People, Respondents, v. Edward Maxon And Charles Stone, Appellants.

Supreme Court of Idaho

January 1, 1870

CRIMINAL LAW JURISDICTION - JUSTICES' COURTS - LEGISLATIVE POWER.-The legislature has no power, under the organic act to authorize a justice of the peace to try a criminal case in which the fine or penalty exceeds, or may exceed, one hundred dollars.

IDEM-DISTRICT COURTS.-In cases of prosecution for misdemeanors, where the fine or penalty does not exceed one hundred dollars, the district courts and justices' courts have concurrent jurisdiction.

TRESPASS-PUBLIC LANDS.-It is no defense to an action or prosecution for trespass committed upon public land, that such land is the property of the United States.

APPEAL from the Second Judicial District, Ada County.

J. R McBride and Joseph Miller, for the Appellants. H. E Prickett, District Attorney, for the Respondents.

Opinion by KELLY, J.;

NOGGLE C. J., concurring. LEWIS, J., dissented.

At the November term of the district court for the second judicial district, Ada county, the defendants were indicted for malicious mischief in cutting, tearing down, and destroying a certain gate, the property of one Robie and Rossi. To this indictment the defendants interposed their demurrer to the jurisdiction of the court, on the ground that the offense charged in the indictment is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the justices of the peace. The demurrer was overruled, and the defendants tried and convicted, and a motion in arrest of judgment having been overruled, and judgment having been pronounced, the defendants appeal to this court for its decision.

It is contended by appellants' counsel that the six hundred and thirty-fifth section of the Civil Practice Act, defining the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, confers jurisdiction over all offenses punishable by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment; that section 144 of the act defining crimes and punishments, under which this offense is

charged, imposes a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars and six months' imprisonment in the county jail, or both; and for this reason the offense charged in the indictment is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, and is not indictable, and cannot be tried in the district court. The appellants' counsel admit that the organic act of our territory limits the jurisdiction of justices of the peace to one hundred dollars in civil actions; but, on the other hand, they contend there is no limitation in criminal actions, except such limitations as the legislature shall prescribe.

That part of section 9 of the organic act, which refers to the jurisdiction of the several courts of the territory, reads as follows: "The jurisdiction of the several courts herein provided for, both appellate and original, and that of the probate courts and of justices of the peace, shall be limited by law; provided, that justices of the peace shall not have jurisdiction of any matter in controversy when the title or boundaries of land may be in dispute, or when the debt or sum claimed shall exceed one hundred dollars; and the supreme and said district courts, respectively, shall possess chancery as well as common-law jurisdiction."

It is so well understood and so generally conceded that the organic act takes the place of, and performs the office of a constitution for a territory, we shall not make any argument in support of this question. Taking it as admitted that the organic act is the constitution of our territory, subject to such alterations as Congress may, from time to time, provide, the question addresses itself with more force to the judiciary than ordinary legislative acts; and we are to apply those rules applicable to the construction of constitutional questions. Statutes prescribe minute directions for those affected by them, and can and do enter into the details of our daily transactions. Constitutions go but little beyond the enunciation of general principles, and it would be an absurdity to apply to a declaration of principles the same rules of construction that are proper in regard to an enactment of details.

In regard to a statute, the general duty of the judge is that of a subordinate power to ascertain and to obey the will of

of a superior. In regard to a constitution, his functions are those of a co-ordinate authority, to ascertain the spirit of the fundamental law, and so to carry it out as to avoid a sacrifice of those interests which it is designed to protect. No absolute rules can be framed for the interpretation of constitutions; nor can we adhere to the written letter of the constitution, because any such system would render constitutions practically intolerable; and, on the contrary, a loose and careless interpretation would be attended with serious danger.

With the application of these general principles we will endeavor to consider what power was conferred upon justices of the peace under the constitution or organic act of the territory, and whether the acts of the legislature giving jurisdiction to the extent of five hundred dollars in criminal cases are incompatible with said organic act.

It is contended by counsel for appellants, that the proviso in section 9 of the organic act, restraining the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, has no general significance, and must be limited to civil jurisdiction, because the words, "debt or sum claimed shall not exceed one hundred dollars," cannot refer to a fine in criminal cases; and the preceding words of the act, "the jurisdiction of the several courts herein provided for, appellate and original, and that of the probate court, and justices of the peace, shall be limited by law," authorize the legislature to fix the limit or jurisdiction of justices of the peace in criminal cases without reference to the provisions of the organic act; and the limit of five hundred dollars, fixed by the legislature, or any amount the legislature might see proper to fix, cannot be in conflict with the provisions of the organic act.

Judge McBride, our former chief justice, in the case of Landon v. Bartley, in the second judicial district, October term, 1865, reported in Cummins' Supreme Court Reports, page 219, has made an elaborate argument upon the jurisdiction of the several courts of this territory, including those of justices of the peace, and I think his law is well grounded, and ought to govern this case. That case was a question of juris-

diction of the probate courts, but in the argument the jurisdiction of justices of the peace is so well defined I shall take the liberty to borrow the main portion of his argument. Justice McBride says: "The entire territorial organization is the creation of congressional legislation. To say that its creation, the territorial legislature, cannot be governed, controlled, and limited by the authority which created it, is to assume that the creature is superior to the creating power. It is sufficient to say that Congress has always assumed to govern the territories; and its authority has been frequently affirmed by every department of the government; and as it is the source of our entire system of government in the territories, it would be pulling down the very foundation beneath us to question it."

Speaking of probate powers, Judge McBride says: "If the legislature can confer probate jurisdiction upon those courts, then they may confer probate power upon justices of the peace; and if common-law and chancery jurisdiction may be distributed among these various courts, as the argument insists, then we may have a justice of the peace performing the functions of an English chancellor. For while the inhibition of the organic act declares that justices' courts shall not have cognizance of cases involving the title of boundaries of lands, nor of cases where the sum demanded exceeds one hundred dollars, this would still leave the most delicate and important equity cases, and an unlimited criminal jurisdiction within the limits of justices' courts.... The various courts provided in the organic act of this territory were known to the jurisprudence of America as distinct classes of courts, having each its general powers and duties, and were constituted with reference to a complete judicial system for the people of the territories, and the jurisdiction of each was intended to be confined and expressed in the known meaning and legal names of each."

When an American lawyer speaks of a "district court" the general jurisdiction of that court is at once suggested to the mind. When one speaks of a "probate court" its office and powers have a different meaning; and courts of justices of the peace the same. I assume, therefore, that by the organic act

each of the courts named was invested with peculiar jurisdiction pertaining to each, pro re nata, and while it was made the duty of the territorial legislature to define by law the bounds of that jurisdiction, and while in some instances as in the probate and justices' courts, they might limit the jurisdiction, it could confer none on any of these courts. Who would contend that an act empowering a justice of the peace to impanel a grand jury, and...