The People v. Segars
| Decision Date | 10 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | F058595,No. CRF22381,CRF22381 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRENT LELAND SEGARS, Defendant and Appellant. |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINIONAPPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tuolumne County. Eric L. DuTemple, Judge.
Barbara A. Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Lloyd G. Carter and Louis M. Vasquez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo- Appellant Brent Leland Segars contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his Romero1 motion to strike a prior conviction. Respondent counters that appellant waived his right to appeal as part of his plea bargain and that in any case the trial court did not abuse its discretion. We will affirm.
The following facts are taken from the probation officer's report, which was filed with the trial court on September 22, 2009.
Appellant was the owner of a company called Green Energy Consulting that installed home solar panels. Between 2004 and 2006, many homeowners signed contracts with appellant and paid deposits of several thousand dollars for the installation of solar panels, but appellant failed to do the work. The victimized homeowners (some of whom were elderly) called appellant, but appellant failed to respond or put them off with empty promises. A number of these homeowners contacted law enforcement agencies, while others filed civil lawsuits. Additionally, although appellant had no electrical contractor's license, he signed agreements with customers using the letterhead and signature of Matthew Anderson (who was licensed) without Anderson's consent. Before formal charges were filed against appellant in Tuolumne County in 2007, he made full restitution plus interest to the six victims named in the criminal allegations, and was apparently paying the civil judgments against him. Appellant received other complaints of a similar nature from customers in 2006, and told the sheriff's investigator that he intended to send letters to them offering to refund their deposits as well.
When investigators asked appellant about his own conduct, he maintained that the problems and delays arose solely because of a global shortage of solar panels and the embezzlement of funds by other people in his company.
On September 14, 2007, the Tuolumne County District Attorney filed a first amended criminal complaint against appellant, which pleading the trial court deemed to be an information. The charges against appellant for which he was bound over for trial included multiple counts of the following offenses: first degree residential burglary (Pen.Code, § 459), 2 theft from an elder or dependent adult (§ 368, subd. (d)), diversion of construction funds (§ 484, subd. (b)) and grand theft of personal property (§ 487, subd. (a)).3 The information further alleged that appellant had a prior felony conviction in 2003 for violation of section 422 (), which constituted a "strike" conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) of the Three Strikes law.
At a pretrial conference held on September 29, 2008, pursuant to a negotiated plea bargain, appellant withdrew his previous plea of not guilty and entered a new plea of guilty to three discrete counts—namely, count V (§ 368, subd. (d)), theft from an elder or dependent person), count XVI (§ 484, subd. (b)), diversion of construction funds) and count XX (§ 459, first degree residential burglary). Appellant also admitted the truth of the alleged prior strike conviction. Although the maximum sentence under the terms of the plea agreement was eight years, the trial court indicated it would not impose a sentence of more than four years, and it was further agreed that appellant would be entitled to argue for a term of less than four years (i.e., by seeking dismissal of the prior strike). On September 29, 2008, in connection with the plea bargain, appellant read, initialed and signed an Advisement and Waiver of Rights form that included a waiver of his appeal rights. In consideration for appellant's plea of guilty to the three counts and his admission of the prior strike conviction, the prosecutor moved to dismiss all the other charges, which was so ordered by the trial court.
On September 22, 2009, the trial court denied appellant's Romero motion to strike his prior "strike" conviction. Appellant was then sentenced by the trial court to a total of four years in state prison and probation was denied. The sentenced was comprised of the following: As to count XX (§ 459), the lower term of two years was doubled to four years pursuant to section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i); as to count XVI (§ 484, subd. (b)), a 16-month term was doubled to 32 months, to be served concurrently with the term in count XX; and as to count V (§ 368, subd. (d)), a two-year term was doubled to four years, to be served concurrently with the term in count XX. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.
A defendant's express waiver of the right to appeal made pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement is valid provided that the waiver is knowing, intelligent and voluntary. (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80.)4 Here, in connection with his plea bargain in this case, appellant entered a written waiver of his right to appeal wherein he stated as follows: "I understand that I will be waiving my right to appeal and I will not be able to appeal from this Court's sentence based on the plea that I enter into in this matter." Respondent argues this express waiver by appellant of his right to appeal "from this Court's sentence" clearly applies to the matters raised in appellant's present appeal. Appellant responds that his waiver did not extend to the trial court's exercise of discretion in ruling on the Romero motion because the parties agreed that he would be entitled to argue for a sentence of less than the four-year cap indicated by the trial court— i.e., by seeking to strike the prior conviction pursuant to Romero. Appellant argues the Romero motion was a reserved issue that was intended to be outside the scope of the waiver.
It is clear from the above summary of the parties' arguments that the key issue before us is the scope of appellant's waiver. The scope of a defendant's express waiver of appeal rights, entered as part of a plea agreement, is approached like a question of contract interpretation—"to what did the parties expressly or by reasonable implication agree?" (People v. Uriah R. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1157.) Using the paradigm of contract law, we consider the specific language of the plea agreement to ascertain the expressed intent of the parties, and we seek to carry out the parties' reasonable expectations under the circumstances. (People v. Nguyen (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 114, 120.)
Some basic principles have emerged from the case law in this area. Because a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right (People v. Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 85), a defendant's general waiver of appeal rights (i.e., "I waive my right to appeal")5 in connection with a negotiated plea agreement does not apply to future error that was outside of the defendant's contemplation and knowledge at the time the waiver was made. (People v. Mumm (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 812, 815; People v. Panizzon, supra, at p. 85; People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1661-1663.) Similarly, a general waiver of appellate rights does not apply to future sentencing matters that were unaddressed or left open by the plea bargain if those matters were outside of the defendant's contemplation at the time of the express waiver. (See People v. Panizzon, supra, at pp. 85-86; People v. Uriah R., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159.)6
If, however, a defendant agrees to a plea bargain that includes a specified or indicated sentence, and that sentence is actually imposed, the defendant's waiver of the right to appeal from the sentence will foreclose appellate review thereof. (People v. Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 85-86.) In People v. Panizzon, the Supreme Court explained why the defendant's specific waiver applied to the appeal in that case: "Not only did the plea agreement in this case specify the sentence to be imposed, but by its very terms the waiver of appellate rights also specifically extended to any right to appeal such sentence)7 Thus, what [the] defendant seeks here is appellate review of an integral element of the negotiated plea agreement, as opposed to a matter left open or unaddressed by the deal. Since both the length of the sentence and the right to appeal the sentence are issues that cannot fairly be characterized as falling outside of [the] defendant's contemplation and knowledge when the waiver was made, the reasoning [of other cases] is inapposite." (Id. at pp. 85-86, italics added.)
We now turn to the particular waiver at issue in the present case. Although the plea agreement provided a maximum sentence of eight years, the trial court indicated it would not impose a sentence of greater than four years. It was agreed that appellant would be entitled to argue for a sentence of less than four years, presumably by means of a Romero motion to ask the trial court to strike his prior strike conviction. In entering his guilty plea on these terms, appellant expressly gave up his right to appeal the sentence, stating "I will be waiving my right to appeal and...
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