The Putnam Investment Company v. Titus

• Decision Date: 07 April 1928
• Docket Number: 27,721
• Parties: THE PUTNAM INVESTMENT COMPANY et al., Appellees, v. W. P. TITUS et al., Appellants
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

266 P. 55

125 Kan. 623

THE PUTNAM INVESTMENT COMPANY et al., Appellees, v. W. P. TITUS et al., Appellants

No. 27,721

Supreme Court of Kansas

April 7, 1928

Decided January, 1928

Appeal from Saline district court; DALLAS GROVER, judge.

Judgment affirmed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. EXEMPTIONS--Necessary Tools and Implements--What Constitutes. Twelve or more comparatively heavy and expensive pieces of machinery designed for and capable of doing and finishing different kinds of woodwork for cabinet and building purposes, assembled in a shop and propelled by a 15-horsepower electric motor, used and operated by the owner and three or more employees of the owner, are not such "necessary tools and implements" as were contemplated and intended to be exempt to a resident head of a family by the provisions of R. S. 60-3504.

2. CHATTEL MORTGAGES--Necessity for Wife's Signature. A chattel mortgage covering personal property as above described and used is not void because it was not signed by the wife of the owner.

3. EXEMPTIONS--Evidence. The evidence considered and held as fully supporting the general finding of the court.

A. F McCarty, of Salina, for the appellants.

C. W. Burch, B. I. Litowich and La Rue Royce, all of Salina, for the appellees.

Hutchison J. Burch, J., not sitting.

OPINION

HUTCHISON, J.:

We have here two cases, one by the Putnam Investment Company, the other by the Putnam Trust Company, both against W. P. Titus, the first being based upon a contract and account, later secured by a chattel mortgage, and the latter upon a note secured by a chattel mortgage. Replevin proceedings were resorted to in both cases, redelivery bond being given in the first case but not in the second. The personal property covered by the chattel mortgages was, with a few exceptions, the same in each, and the mortgage of the investment company was subject to that of the trust company. The wife was permitted to interplead, and she and her husband both pleaded exemption of the personal property involved on account of the husband being a resident head of a family and her not having signed either of the mortgages. The cases were consolidated and tried to the court. Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs and the personal property involved was held to be not exempt. The defendants appeal.

The only question here is whether or not the personal property covered by the chattel mortgages is exempt to a resident head of a family; if it is, the appellants claim the mortgages are void because they were not signed by the wife. The description of the personal property included in the mortgage to the trust company is as follows:

"One sticker, one band saw, one lathe, one tenoner, one mortiser, one rip saw, one planer, one jointer, one shaper, one emery grinder, one cut-off saw, one frame machine, one sander, one 15-horsepower motor, all line shafting, all pulleys, all counter shafts, all belting, all clamps, all office equipment, and all other tools and articles located in the building at the corner of Second street and Elm street used in the business of the Titus Mill Work Company, and one Ford truck."

This mortgage was signed by "W. P. Titus, doing business as the Titus Mill Work Company." The mortgage given to the investment company about eight months later was signed in the same way and covered substantially the same property, concluding with the following statement: "Subject only to a mortgage now of record in favor of The Putnam Trust Company." The exemption is claimed under the eighth subdivision of R. S. 60-3504, which is as follows:

"The necessary tools and implements of any mechanic, miner or other person, used and kept in stock for the purpose of carrying on his trade or business, and in addition thereto, stock in trade not exceeding four hundred dollars in value."

It will be observed, in the first place, that this provision for exemption has not been changed or modified since its enactment in 1868, and, in the second place, it is and always has been different from similar provisions in some other states in that it contains a limitation or restriction as to the character and use of the tools and implements--they must be "necessary tools and implements." (See 2 A. L. R. 818.)

It has been the inclination of nearly all courts in considering exemption statutes to place a liberal construction on them--and the Kansas courts have always been in harmony with others in this respects--so as to effectuate the beneficent purposes of the law and at the same time keep the interpretation within the apparent and evident intention of the legislature. (25 C. J. 10; Rasure v. Hart, 18 Kan. 340; Bequillard v. Bartlett, 19 Kan. 382, 386; Donmyer v. Donmyer, 43 Kan. 444, 23 P. 627; Millinery Co. v. Round, 106 Kan. 146, 186 P. 979.)

"As often stated by this court, the exemption laws must receive a liberal construction for the purpose of carrying out their object and design, and one of the main objects of exemption laws is that every person shall have the means of carrying on some useful business, and thereby of obtaining an honest livelihood." (Davidson v. Sechrist, 28 Kan. 324, 326.)

In the earlier Kansas cases the tools and implements held to be exempt were only those worked by hand. It was said concerning cheese vats, presses and knives that they were exempt tools and implements because "the evidence does not show that they, or any of them, constituted complicated and expensive machinery; nor does it show that they were not instruments or implements which could not be used by hand . . . or that they had the use of any other power than their own personal energy, force and strength." (Fish v. Street, 27 Kan. 270, 273.)

The first and general definition of tools given by text-writers is that they are such as are used by hand; but then they go further to show the modified application of the term to include simple and inexpensive machinery. (25 C. J. 49; 11 R. C. L. 512.) It was apparently the original thought on the subject that the tools were for the exclusive use of the owner, but a broader view has since been followed, and they may be exempt even if used by others in his employ. However, running through most of the Kansas decisions is the very evident requirement that the owner in the use of the tool or implement must perform a considerable portion of the work himself. For instance, in the case of Fish v. Street, supra, it is stated, "It does not appear that any one else assisted them"; in Bequillard v. Bartlett, supra, they "were so used with respect to the goods manufactured by the plaintiff himself"; in Bliss v. Vedder, 34 Kan. 57, 7 P. 599, "he performs a considerable portion of the work himself"; in Miller v. Weeks, 46 Kan. 307, 26 P. 694, "the proceeds of such work performed by himself were his sole means of support"; in Reeves v. Bascue, 76 Kan. 333, 91 P. 77, he "performs a considerable portion of the work himself."

The following cases show the development and change in the construction of this statute in this state as applied to machines or machinery being considered as tools and implements exempt from execution: The lamp, table, and other articles of the watchmaker in his trade, decided in 1877 ( Bequillard v. Bartlett, supra); the cheese vats, presses, knives, etc., used in making cheese where the owner performed the work, decided in 1882 ( Fish v. Street, supra); the printing press, type and job-printing outfit, where most of the mechanical work was done by others in the owner's employ, decided in 1885 ( Bliss v. Vedder, supra); the threshing machine, tractor engine, belts, etc., used by the owner, with other necessary help, in threshing grain for his neighbor for hire, decided in 1905 (Jackman v. Lambertson, 71 Kan. 138, 80 P. 55); the tractor engine and portable sawmill used by the owner and other necessary help in sawing lumber for others for hire, decided in 1907 (Reeves v. Basque, supra). In all these cases the instruments or machinery were held to be tools or...