The State ex inf. Thompson v. Scott

• Decision Date: 16 July 1924
• Docket Number: 25353
• Citation: 264 S.W. 369,304 Mo. 664
• Parties: THE STATE ex inf. JASPER THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, ex rel. J. A. KENEPPE et al., Appellants, v. W. D. SCOTT et al., Directors of Armstrong Consolidated School District
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

264 S.W. 369

304 Mo. 664

THE STATE ex inf. JASPER THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, ex rel. J. A. KENEPPE et al., Appellants, v. W. D. SCOTT et al., Directors of Armstrong Consolidated School District

No. 25353

Supreme Court of Missouri

July 16, 1924

Appeal from Howard Circuit Court; Hon. A. W. Walker, Judge.

Affirmed.

J H. Denny and Lionel Davis for appellants.

(1) Section 11252 provided a way for uniting an adjacent rural district to a town district. This method was specific and exclusive and is the only method provided by law for consolidating a single rural district and a town district. Sec. 11252, R. S. 1919. Section 11252 was a part of Article IV long before the Act of 1913 was passed; and the Act of 1913 (Sec. 11257, R. S. 1919) provided that all laws applicable to the organization and government of town and city school districts as provided in Art. IV, chap. 106, R S. 1909, should apply to districts formed under that act. This was equivalent to a re-enactment of all the previous sections of Article IV of the school law, and negatives any idea of express or implied repeal. The new was made subordinate to the old, and in case of conflict or doubt the old would control. (2) That construction is favored which gives effect to every clause and every part of the statute thus producing a consistent and harmonious whole. A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language used, should be rejected if an interpretation can be found which will give it effect. 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.) p. 618; St. Louis v. Lane, 110 Mo. 258. (2) Both the title and the emergency clause of the Act of 1913 clearly show that this act had reference only to rural consolidated schools and rural high schools. Laws 1913, p 724. The title of the act is the most important part of it. The act itself could not go beyond the scope of its title. The Constitution requires that the act shall include but one subject, and that this subject shall be clearly expressed in its title. Sec. 28, Art. 4, Mo. Constitution. The whole act relates to but one subject, namely, consolidated and rural high schools. State ex rel. v. Gordon, 261 Mo. 639; State ex inf. v. Morgan, 268 Mo. 265. Article IV had already provided for elementary and high schools in towns and cities, and the testimony shows Armstrong had both. Sec. 11241, R. S. 1919; Sec. 10869, R. S. 1909. The Act of 1913 was intended to provide rural high schools -- high schools in the country -- and there was only one way to create them -- that was by consolidating rural territory, with the rural high school the central feature, and one or more elementary schools in the same district. The district formed under this act was to furnish both elementary school and high school. Sec. 11257, R. S. 1919; Sec. 1, Laws 1913, p. 722. And it was to be a rural high school formed of rural territory, with a central high school on a five-acre site. Such areas are not required for town schools. Sec. 11263, R. S. 1919; Sec. 7, Laws 1913, p. 724. Section 4, Laws 1913, now Sec. 11260, R. S. 1919, provided for transportation of pupils. The whole act was intended for the rural districts, just as its title says it was.

R. M. Bagby and Richard K. Bridges for respondents.

The provisions of Secs. 11201, 11252 and 11255 are not in harmony and are inconsistent with the Act of 1913. The act undertakes to provide for consolidated school districts which are essentially different from any school district previously known in the State. State ex inf. Bothwell v. Schuster, 285 Mo. 399.

David E. Blair, J. All concur, except White, J., absent.

OPINION

BLAIR

Quo warranto proceeding to test the validity of the organization of Armstrong Consolidated School District No. 4 in Howard County and to oust respondents as directors thereof. The trial court found for respondents and denied the ouster. Relators below appealed to this court.

As we understand the record and briefs, there is no contention made by appellants that any of the statutory steps and proceedings to perfect a valid organization were omitted, if the alleged organization was otherwise effected under the appropriate sections of our statutes. This obviates the necessity of stating the pleadings and evidence at length.

The information was in conventional form and charged that respondents usurped and still usurp the pretended authority of school directors of said alleged consolidated school district and prayed for judgment to that effect and for ouster of respondents from their said pretended offices.

Respondents filed a return setting up all the facts in connection with the steps taken in the organization of said consolidated school district, including petition to the county superintendent of schools, preliminary in vestigation by him, determination of the boundaries of said consolidated district by him and preparation of a plat by him, the posting of notices of election and copies of such plat, and holding of the election and announcement that the proposition to organize as a consolidated school district had carried, the election of the respondent members of the board of directors (two of whom were afterwards elected as their own successors), and all the subsequent steps provided for by Section 11259, Revised Statutes 1919, as supplemented by Section 11237. Respondents therefore prayed to be discharged with their costs.

Appellants filed a demurrer to said return, and the same was overruled by the trial court. Thereupon appellants filed a reply, consisting of a general denial and an admission that the alleged consolidated school district comprised all the territory previously included in Common School District No. 43 and Town School District No. 42 in Howard County.

Evidence was offered by respondents which established beyond any dispute all the facts set out in their return. The trial judge made a finding of facts in full accord with the facts alleged in said return. The correctness of such finding of facts is not challenged here. The contention is that such facts constitute no defense in this case.

The sole issue before us then is one of law, and that issue is whether the consolidated school district was properly organized under Sections 11257, 11258 and 11259, Revised Statutes 1919. Section 11259 was amended in 1921 (Laws 1921, p. 654), but such amendment affects no question here involved.

The city of Armstrong is situated in Howard County and has a population variously estimated from six hundred to eight hundred. Sometime prior to February 15, 1923, the high school building in the Armstrong school district, which apparently included some territory outside of the city of Armstrong, was destroyed by fire. For reasons not here important, a movement was started to consolidate some of the adjoining common-school districts with said Armstrong town district. A petition to that end was filed with the Superintendent of Schools of Howard County, and he called a meeting at Armstrong, which was largely attended by qualified voters from the several districts proposed to be affected. The Armstrong voters favored consolidation. The voters of Liberty District opposed it, apparently with unanimity. But the boundaries were fixed by the superintendent of schools, the election was called and the proposition to consolidate the Armstrong and Liberty districts carried by a substantial majority. The town folks evidently outnumbered the country folks and action desired by the town folks was taken. The consolidated school district comprised exactly the same territory previously embraced within the boundaries of the Armstrong and Liberty districts. No parts of other districts were taken into such consolidated school district.

Appellants contend that the organization could not be effected under Sections 11257, 11258 and 11259, and contend that other sections of the statutes, to be noticed hereafter, covered the situation. As such other sections were not followed, it is contended that the attempted organization was ineffective and void and that respondents should be ousted from their pretended offices.

We find nothing in Sections 11257, 11258 and 11259 forbidding such organization of two districts thereunder. Section 11257 provides that the qualified voters of any community may organize a consolidated school district for the purpose of maintaining both elementary schools and a high school. The Armstrong and Liberty districts certainly constitute a community within the meaning of such section. In State ex inf. v. Jones, 266 Mo. l. c. 196, the word "community" was considered by this court and it was there said: "The word community in this act is not employed in any technical or strictly legal sense, but is a sort of synonym of 'neighborhood' or 'vicinity' (Berkson v. Railroad, 144 Mo. l. c. 220, 221) or may be said to mean the people who reside in a locality in more or less proximity. [Keech v. Joplin, 157 Cal. l. c. 11.] So defined, a community may include several districts and parts of districts. There is no requirement that the petitioners shall reside here or there in the community. That they are resident citizens of it is enough." The inhabitants of Armstrong School District and of the adjoining Liberty School District clearly live in the same community, as thus defined.

Section 11258 provides that no such consolidated school district shall be formed unless it contains an area of at least twelve square miles or an enumeration of at least two hundred children of school age. The evidence shows that there were more than the requisite children of school age within the Armstrong Consolidated School District No. 4, and the plat in evidence shows that the area thereof is approximately nineteen square miles. The same section provides that no such district shall include within...