The State Ex Rel. Carnail v. Mccormick
| Decision Date | 16 June 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2009-1635.,2009-1635. |
| Citation | 931 N.E.2d 110,126 Ohio St.3d 124 |
| Parties | The STATE ex rel. CARNAIL, Appellant, v. McCORMICK, Judge, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
E'Yen Carnail, pro se.
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and James E. Moss, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
{¶ 1} Appellant, E'Yen Carnail, appeals from a judgment dismissing his complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel appellee, Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Timothy McCormick, to conduct a new sentencing hearing pursuant to R.C. 2929.191 by adding the proper requirements of postrelease control or, in the alternative, to compel Judge McCormick to issue a final, appealable order by including postrelease control in his sentence.
{¶ 2} In November 1999, Judge McCormick convicted Carnail, upon his guilty plea, of two counts of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02, a felony of the first degree, and sentenced him to concurrent life terms in prison, with parole eligibility after ten years. Judge McCormick failed to include in the sentencing entry any term of postrelease control.
{¶ 3} Nine years later, in 2008, Carnail filed a motion in the common pleas court to correct the “illegal sentence.” Shortly thereafter, Judge McCormick denied the motion. The court of appeals dismissed Carnail's appeal based on res judicata.
{¶ 4} In June 2009, Carnail filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County for a writ of mandamus to compel Judge McCormick 1 to conduct a new sentencing hearing to add the proper requirements of postrelease control or, in the alternative, to issue a final, appealable order. Judge McCormick filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss Carnail's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and Carnail filed a memorandum in opposition. The court of appeals granted the judge's motion and dismissed Carnail's complaint. The court held that the claimed sentencing error could not be remedied by extraordinary writ and that Carnail had adequate remedies by appeal and postconviction relief to raise his claims.
{¶ 5} This cause is now before us upon Carnail's appeal as of right.
{¶ 6} Carnail asserts that the court of appeals erred in dismissing his mandamus complaint. “A court can dismiss a mandamus action under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if, after all factual allegations of the complaint are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made in relator's favor, it appears beyond doubt that he can prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested writ of mandamus.” State ex rel. Russell v. Thornton, 111 Ohio St.3d 409, 2006-Ohio-5858, 856 N.E.2d 966, ¶ 9.
{¶ 7} To be entitled to the writ, Carnail must establish a clear legal right to the requested relief, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of Judge McCormick to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 1215, ¶ 8.
{¶ 8} Carnail's mandamus claim is predicated upon his contention that his sentence is void because it did not include postrelease control for his rape convictions.
{¶ 9} Judge McCormick initially claims on appeal, as he did in his motion to dismiss Carnail's complaint in the proceedings below, that “because [Carnail] was sentenced to a mandatory life sentence for rape, which is an indefinite sentence, the trial court was not required to advise [him] of post-release control.” Although the court of appeals did not rely on this argument to dismiss Carnail's mandamus complaint, “[r]eviewing courts are not authorized to reverse a correct judgment on the basis that some or all of the lower court's reasons are erroneous.” State ex rel. McGrath v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 100 Ohio St.3d 72, 2003-Ohio-5062, 796 N.E.2d 526, ¶ 8. Therefore, we first determine whether postrelease control was required for Carnail's rape convictions.
{¶ 10} R.C. 2967.28 provides:
{¶ 11} “(B) Each sentence to a prison term for a felony of the first degree, for a felony of the second degree, for a felony sex offense, or for a felony of the third degree that is not a felony sex offense and in the commission of which the offender caused or threatened to cause physical harm to a person shall include a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control imposed by the parole board after the offender's release from imprisonment.
* * * Unless reduced by the parole board pursuant to division (D) of this section when authorized under that division, a period of post-release control required by this division for an offender shall be of one of the following periods:
{¶ 12} “(1) For a felony of the first degree or for a felony sex offense, five years.”
{¶ 13} In construing this statute, “our paramount concern is the legislative intent” in enacting it. State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21. To discern this intent, we must “read words and phrases in context according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” State ex rel. Lee v. Karnes, 103 Ohio St.3d 559, 2004-Ohio-5718, 817 N.E.2d 76, ¶ 23.
{¶ 14} After applying the rules of grammar and common usage to R.C. 2967.28(B)(1), we find that the statute's plain, unambiguous language expressly requires the inclusion of a mandatory postrelease-control term of five years for each prison sentence for felonies of the first degree and felony sex offenses. Carnail was convicted of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02, which is both a felony of the first degree and a felony sex offense. R.C. 2907.02(B) and 2967.28(A)(3). Therefore, R.C. 2967.28(B) required that a five-year term of postrelease control be included in his sentence.
{¶ 15} In arguing against this result, Judge McCormick cites R.C. 2967.28(F)(4), our opinion in State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, and two Eighth District Court of Appeals cases.
{¶ 16} R.C. 2967.28(F)(4) provides:
{¶ 17} “Any period of post-release control shall commence upon an offender's actual release from prison. If an offender is serving an indefinite prison term or a life sentence in addition to a stated prison term, the offender shall serve the period of post-release control in the following manner:
{¶ 18} “(a) If a period of post-release control is imposed upon the offender and if the offender also is subject to a period of parole under a life sentence or an indefinite sentence, and if the period of post-release control ends prior to the period of parole, the offender shall be supervised on parole. The offender shall receive credit for post-release control supervision during the period of parole. The offender is not eligible for final release under section 2967.16 of the Revised Code until the post-release control period otherwise would have ended.
{¶ 19} (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 20} R.C. 2967.28(F) is inapplicable to Carnail because it applies only to cases in which an indefinite prison term or life sentence is imposed in addition to a stated prison term. Carnail did not receive a stated prison term in addition to his concurrent life sentences for his rape convictions. Furthermore, under R.C. 2967.28(F), the presence of an indefinite and a definite sentence does not eliminate the postrelease-control requirement; it merely provides a procedural mechanism in which either supervision on parole or postrelease control is required to satisfy both sentences. Although it could be implied from this section that postrelease control is unnecessary for indefinite or life sentences, there is no specific language in either this or other provisions that modifies the express language in R.C. 2967.28(B)(1) requiring postrelease control. That is, R.C. 2967.28(B)(1) is not expressly limited to definite sentences; instead, it applies broadly to “[e]ach sentence to a prison term for a felony of the first degree * * * [or] for a felony sex offense.” Because R.C. 2967.28(B)(1) is phrased in broad, sweeping language, we must accord it broad, sweeping application. See State ex rel. Mager v. State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio, 123 Ohio St.3d 195, 2009-Ohio-4908, 915 N.E.2d 320, ¶ 16.
{¶ 21} Our decision in Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, is also inapposite. In that case, we merely held that a trial court was not required to discuss postrelease control or parole in a colloquy with a defendant seeking to plead guilty to aggravated murder, because postrelease control was not required for persons convicted of unclassified felonies like aggravated murder. Id. at ¶ 36 (). By contrast, the plain language of R.C. 2967.28(B)(1) requires that persons convicted of rape, which is both a felony of the first degree and a felony sex offense, be subjected to postrelease control for five years.
{¶ 22} Insofar as Judge McCormick also cites decisions from one court of appeals that hold to the contrary, they are inapposite because they fail to apply the manifest language of R.C. 2967.28. See State v. Jordan, Cuyahoga App. No. 91413, 2009-Ohio-4037, 2009 WL 2462702, ¶ 38 (); ...
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