The State Ex Rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Henry County Court Of Common Pleas

Decision Date13 April 2010
Docket NumberNo. 2010-0161.,2010-0161.
Citation125 Ohio St.3d 149,2010 Ohio 1533,926 N.E.2d 634
PartiesThe STATE ex rel. TOLEDO BLADE COMPANYv.HENRY COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS et al.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

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Fritz Byers and Scott Ciolek, Toledo, for relator.

Rayle, Matthews & Coon and Max E. Rayle, Bowling Green; and Ronald J. Kozar, for respondents.

Lucy A. Dalglish, Gregg P. Leslie, and Mara E. Zimmerman, urging granting of the writ for amicus curiae Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.

Michael T. Honohan, Carrie L. Davis, and Angela Barstow, urging granting of the writ for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc.

Stephen P. Hardwick, Columbus, urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Arthur, O'Neil, Mertz, Michel & Brown Co., L.P.A., and Clayton J. Crates, urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae David E. Knepley.

PER CURIAM.

{¶ 1} This is an original action for a writ of prohibition to prevent a common pleas court and its judge from enforcing a gag order prohibiting the media from reporting about the trial proceedings in one criminal case until a jury is impaneled in a separate criminal case. Because prohibition is an appropriate action to challenge the propriety of the gag order and that order was not supported by sufficient evidence to overcome its presumed unconstitutionality, we grant the writ.

Facts

{¶ 2} In State v. Jayme Schwenkmeyer and David E. Knepley, Henry Cty. C.P. No. 08-CR-0033, the state of Ohio charged the defendants with involuntary manslaughter and child endangering after the death of a child. Schwenkmeyer was the child's mother, and Knepley was Schwenkmeyer's boyfriend. The cases arose from a joint indictment, but respondent Judge Keith P. Muehlfeld of respondent Henry County Court of Common Pleas granted the defendants' motions and ordered that they be tried separately.

{¶ 3} Judge Muehlfeld originally scheduled Knepley's jury trial to begin on July 20, 2009, with Schwenkmeyer's jury trial to begin on July 27, 2009. On July 20, Judge Muehlfeld granted Schwenkmeyer's motion to prohibit print and broadcast media from reporting about the trial proceedings in Knepley's case until the jury is impaneled for Schwenkmeyer's trial, although he permitted members of the media to have access to the Knepley trial. The judge stated in the entry that he considered the order necessary to prevent the tainting of the jury pool in the second case.

{¶ 4} Both cases were subsequently rescheduled, and the order of the trials was reversed, with Schwenkmeyer's trial to begin on December 7, 2009, and Knepley's trial to follow a couple months later, on February 8, 2010. On December 2, Knepley moved for an order to, inter alia, “prevent the jury pool in his case from being tainted by hearing or reading any published or broadcast media report of the State v. Schwenkmeyer trial currently scheduled to begin on Monday, December 7, 2009.” On December 4, in an order consented to by both the state and Schwenkmeyer, Judge Muehlfeld issued the following gag order:

{¶ 5} “Whereas, this Court considers it necessary to issue such an order to prevent the tainting of the jury pool in State v. Knepley ; * * *

{¶ 6} “ * * *

{¶ 7} “IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that members of the print and broadcast media shall be permitted access to the trial proceedings in Case number 08CR0033 State v. Schwenkmeyer pursuant to Superintendence Rule 12, HOWEVER any and all print or broadcast media shall be PROHIBITED from the published or broadcast reporting of such trial proceedings until a jury is impaneled for the trial in State v. Knepley.”

{¶ 8} That same day, Judge Muehlfeld telephoned the local newspapers and local radio station that had sent representatives to earlier proceedings to inform them of the gag order. The judge did not contact the Toledo Blade.

{¶ 9} Schwenkmeyer's trial began on December 7, but Judge Muehlfeld declared a mistrial and rescheduled it for February 1, 2010, with Knepley's trial remaining scheduled for February 8. The mistrial was unrelated to publicity or similar concerns. On December 11, the judge amended his December 4 gag order to “permit the print or broadcast media to report that a defense motion for mistrial was granted by the Court in the State v. Schwenkmeyer trial on December 10, 2009,” but reiterated that the gag order remained in effect for Schwekmeyer's rescheduled February 1 trial.

{¶ 10} In mid-January 2010, relator, the Toledo Blade Co., a newspaper publisher, learned of the order, and in a letter e-mailed on January 19, the Blade, through counsel, requested that Judge Muehlfeld reconsider his December 4 gag order prohibiting the media from reporting on the Schwenkmeyer trial before a jury is impaneled in Knepley.

{¶ 11} On January 26, Judge Muehlfeld held a hearing on the Blade's request for reconsideration at which the Blade and the defendants presented argument but no evidence. Knepley's counsel asserted that the gag order issued by the court upon his motion “was absolutely necessary for [his] client to receive a fair trial in his case.” He added, “This is a small town with a very interesting case,” and if the media were allowed to report on Schwenkmeyer's trial before a jury was impaneled for his trial, “it would taint the jury pool that's already small.” The state and Schwenkmeyer noted that they did not object to the court's gag order, and the state opined that Knepley's motion was “fairly compelling.”

{¶ 12} Judge Muehlfeld specified at the hearing that “it is the narrowness of that window between these trials, that makes this a truly unique case.” More particularly, the judge concluded that the press and public's First Amendment rights are “derivative in nature” and “abstract,” whereas the defendants' fair-trial rights are “very real interests” that “have a direct impact” upon them. The judge questioned how important the Blade's interest was in reporting the first trial's proceedings when the Blade did not report about the December 7 trial, and his order only briefly delayed its ability to report about the trial.

{¶ 13} In ratifying the December 4 gag order, the judge made the following findings: “The Court finds that there is a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial in this case will be prejudiced by the publicity that the Court's orders in this case [were] designed to prevent. The Court further finds that no reasonable alternatives can adequately protect the defendant[']s right to a fair trial under the circumstances unique to this case.”

{¶ 14} The judge noted that the cases had generated “considerable public curiosity * * * and media attention,” that voir dire in the first Schwenkmeyer case established that a good portion of the population knew about the circumstances of the cases, and that it took the court two days and 40 prospective jurors to impanel a jury in the first case. In addition, the judge determined that (1) the option of selecting two juries and sending the second jury home until the start of the second trial would not adequately protect the second defendant's right to a fair trial, because the court could not adequately instruct and control the second jury, (2) a continuance of the second trial was not a reasonable alternative, because Knepley's counsel had moved for the gag order when the trials had previously been scheduled two months apart, and (3) a change of venue would be too costly and would ignore the defendant's and the public's right to have the cases tried in the local venue.

{¶ 15} The next day, on January 27, 2010, the Blade filed this action for a writ of prohibition to prevent respondents, the common pleas court and Judge Muehlfeld, from restraining it “from speaking or publishing information that [it] has lawfully obtained or will lawfully obtain in the course of the criminal proceeding.” On January 28, Judge Muehlfeld issued an order denying the Blade's motion for reconsideration and ratifying the December 4 gag order “for the reasons fully stated by the Court from the bench at the conclusion of the January 26, 2010 oral argument.” On that same day, we granted an alternative writ on the Blade's prohibition claim, which stayed the challenged portion of the judge's December 4 and January 28 orders pending our resolution of the case.

{¶ 16} The parties have submitted evidence and briefs, and this case is now before the court for our consideration of the merits. Various amici curiae have also submitted briefs.1

Legal Analysis
Request for Oral Argument

{¶ 17} We deny respondents' request for oral argument because they do not specify any reasons supporting it, and the parties' briefs are sufficient to resolve this case. See State ex rel. Lorain v. Stewart, 119 Ohio St.3d 222, 2008-Ohio-4062, 893 N.E.2d 184, ¶ 18; State ex rel. Scioto Downs, Inc. v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 24, 2009-Ohio-3761, 913 N.E.2d 967, ¶ 25.

Prohibition

{¶ 18} The Blade requests a writ of prohibition to prevent the common pleas court and its judge from enforcing their orders preventing the media from reporting on one criminal trial until the impaneling of a jury in a related, second criminal trial.

{¶ 19} “Prohibition is the appropriate action to challenge trial court orders restricting public access to pending litigation.” State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Geauga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Div. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 79, 82, 734 N.E.2d 1214. More pertinently, “prohibition is the only remedy available to nonparties who wish to challenge an order which restricts the rights of free speech and press of such nonparties,” including gag orders that prohibit the media “from publishing certain information lawfully gathered by them in proceedings which are open to the public.” (Emphasis sic.) State ex rel. News Herald v. Ottawa Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Div. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 40, 43-44, 671 N.E.2d...

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