The State ex rel. Miller v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railroad Co.
| Decision Date | 29 June 1901 |
| Parties | THE STATE ex rel. MILLER, Collector, v. MISSOURI, KANSAS & TEXAS RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant. THE STATE ex rel. MILLER, Collector, v. BOONVILLE BRIDGE COMPANY, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Cooper Circuit Court. -- Hon. H. A. Hutchinson, Special Judge.
Affirmed.
Geo. P B. Jackson for appellants.
(1) The tax sued for in these cases being in excess of fifty cents on the $ 100 valuation, which was the ordinary rate authorized in Boonville, is void because it is in violation of section 11 of article 10 of the Constitution of this State, and is not authorized by the provisions of section 12 of the same article. The reasoning of the opinions denying the validity of such tax is not overcome by the majority opinion In Banc in the Lamar case. State ex rel. v. Columbia, 111 Mo. 365; Water Co. v. Lamar, 128 Mo. 209. (2) In any event, the limitations contained in sections 11 and 12, of article 10, are self-enforcing, but the provisions for increase of the rates of taxation are not self-enforcing and require legislation to authorize an election to increase the rate of tax wherever it is intended to be authorized by those sections. State ex rel. v. Van Every, 75 Mo. 530; State ex rel. v. Railroad, 74 Mo. 163; School Board v. Patten, 62 Mo. 444. As there was no law providing for an election to authorize the making of the contract in question, nor to increase the rate of taxes above the constitutional limit, the tax in question must be held void. (3) Even if the Constitution permitted the incurring of the indebtedness and the increasing of the tax, and even if the necessary legislation had been enacted authorizing the holding of an election, yet the taxes sued for in this case were not authorized by any vote. There was but one election held, namely, that in October, 1882. That did not have the effect of incurring an indebtedness or imposing upon the city the burden of a debt equal to the aggregate amount to be paid in the course of the twenty years contemplated by the contract between the city of Boonville and Mr. Perkins. It did not have the effect of imposing a burden upon the city for the whole of the twenty successive payments, but only created an indebtedness equal to the proposed payment for one year, and only authorized an increased rate of taxes for that year. Saleno v. Neosho, 127 Mo. 627; Water Co v. Lamar, 128 Mo. 223; Water Co. v. Neosho, 136 Mo. 507. (4) The city of Boonville was not authorized, either by its charter, or by any general statute, to enter into the contract with Mr. Perkins, as attempted by the ordinance of October 18, 1882.
W. M Williams and C. D. Corum for respondents.
(1) The indebtedness, for the payment of which the tax sued for was levied, was duly authorized by two-thirds of the qualified voters of said city, voting at an election held for that purpose, and the annual debt created by the ordinance together with the existing indebtedness, did not exceed five per cent of the taxable value of the property in said city. The limitation contained in section 11, of article 10, of the Constitution, has no application, therefore, in this case. This question was settled by a decision of the Court In Banc, and should not now be again reopened. The rule of stare decisis is applicable. Lamar W. & E. L. Co. v. City of Lamar, 128 Mo. 209; Water Co. v. City of Aurora, 129 Mo. 574. (2) Section 952, Revised Statutes 1879, page 174, which contains the same provisions as section 1589, Revised Statutes 1889, empowered the city of Boonville, with the assent of two-thirds of the qualified voters, to enter into the contract with the water company set out in the ordinance. This is sufficient legislative authority for that purpose. Lamar W. & E. L. Co. v. City of Lamar, 128 Mo. 188; Aurora Water Co. v. City of Aurora, 129 Mo. 540. All of the objections raised by the defendants to the validity of this tax were necessarily involved in and passed upon by the Court In Banc in the Lamar case. The ordinance in the case was similar to the Boonville ordinance. It provided for a special tax of forty cents on the hundred dollars valuation. An ordinance similar to the one under consideration, authorizing a contract with the water company by which the city was to rent sixty hydrants, for twenty years, at an annual rental of $ 3,000, and to be paid for by a special annual tax of forty cents on the hundred dollars was adopted by a two-thirds vote of the qualified voters of said city. The rental sued for was for a year subsequent to the first year of the contract. Yet this court held that the city was bound by that contract, and that a tax in excess of fifty cents on the hundred dollars valuation could be levied and collected under said ordinance and the vote adopting the same. Every question submitted in this case is concluded by that decision, and the respondent respectfully asks that the judgment of the court below be affirmed.
OPINION
In Banc
These causes were consolidated for trial in the lower court and resulted, in each instance, in a judgment for the collector. They involve the same principle as that determined in the Lamar case, 128 Mo. 188, decided in 1895, afterward recognized as settled in the Aurora case, 129 Mo. 540, and the reopening of its discussion denied, and subsequently the Lamar case came again to this court in 1897, when the court again refused to consider the constitutional question involved in the former appeals.
We still adhere to our former rulings in this regard. Six years have elapsed since our first ruling on the point in hand was made; meanwhile, in...
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