The State ex rel. Hayes v. Snyder

• Decision Date: 08 June 1897
• Citation: 41 S.W. 216,139 Mo. 549
• Parties: The State ex rel. Hayes, Appellant, v. Snyder
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

41 S.W. 216

139 Mo. 549

The State ex rel. Hayes, Appellant, v. Snyder

Supreme Court of Missouri, Second Division

June 8, 1897

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. -- Hon. J. H. Slover, Judge.

Affirmed.

H. H Meriwether for appellant.

(1) The assessment of the taxes against the real estate owned by the defendants created a personal liability against them for the taxes. R. S. 1889, sec. 7569; Burrows on Taxation, sec. 7, p 4; Cooley on Taxation [2 Ed.], p. 354; 2 Desty on Taxation p. 706. (2) The State can collect said taxes by a suit, as in this case. R. S. 1889, sec. 6508; Cooley on Taxation [2 Ed.], p. 435; Burrows on Taxation, sec. 105, p. 253; Ib., p. 272; Perry County v. Railroad, 58 Ala. 563; State of Texas v. Williams, 8 Tex. 384; Sherwin v. Wigglesworth, 129 Mass. 64; State ex rel. Collector v. Tittmann, 103 Mo. 553; In re Life Association of America, 12 Mo.App. 40.

Scarritt, Griffith & Jones for respondents.

(1) There can be no personal judgment for land taxes. No means can be resorted to to coerce the payment of taxes other than those pointed out in the statute. City of Carondelet v. Picot, 38 Mo. 125. The method usually resorted to for the collection of taxes against land is that required by sections 7681 to 7684 inclusive, Revised Statutes 1889, which provide for the enforcement of the State's lien against the land itself by suit against the owner of the land. Sec. 7682. No personal judgment is allowed in this proceeding. Sec. 7683. Section 7608, Revised Statutes 1889, provides another method for the collection of delinquent personal or land taxes, viz.: The seizure and sale after October 1, of goods and chattels of the person liable for the taxes, in the same manner as goods and chattels are required to be seized and sold under execution issued on judgments at law, but under this proceeding no personal judgment is authorized for the amount of taxes due. These are the only methods prescribed by law for the collection of taxes against land. (2) Section 7626, Revised Statutes, expressly provides that a personal judgment may be had for the collection of personal taxes. Section 7626 was passed April 6, 1887. And this court in State ex rel. v. Hoyt, 123 Mo. 356, held that a personal judgment could not be rendered for personal taxes prior to the passage of said act. If the legislature had intended that a personal judgment might be rendered for real estate taxes against the person liable to pay the same, they would have made that intention plain by some such direct and positive enactment as section 7626 respecting personal taxes. In re Life Association of America, 12 Mo.App. 40; Blevins v. Smith, 104 Mo. 583; State ex rel. v. Sargent, 76 Mo. 560; Mathews v. City of Kansas, 80 Mo. 236; Carondelet v. Picot, 38 Mo. 125; State ex rel. v. Goodnow, 80 Mo. 275; State v. Railroad, 13 Mo.App. 53; Jaicks v. Sullivan, 128 Mo. 184. (3) The land against which the taxes in controversy are claimed, having been acquired by the United States for government purposes on July 31, 1891, on that date became exempt from all taxes and assessments. Session Acts 1883, p. 129; R. S. 1889, secs. 6556-6560; Acts 1891, p. 181; R. S. 1889, sec. 7504. (4) And having become exempt before the taxes in controversy were levied and payable, there was nothing on which a tax could be levied, and there being no tax levied, there is no tax, nor debt, for which plaintiff can sue. Southern Hotel Co. v. County Court, 62 Mo. 134; Bannon v. Burnes, 39 F. 898; Overall v. Ruenzi, 67 Mo. 203; City of Mexico to use Col. v. Cauthorn, 25 Mo.App. 285; Ketchum v. Railroad, 3 Cent. Law Journal, 725; Westport ex rel. v. McGee, 128 Mo. 158; Black on Tax Titles [2 Ed.], secs. 120 and 121; State ex rel. Wheat v. Railroad, 36 S. Rep. 211. (5) This is a suit brought under the statutes for alleged taxes, and is brought against parties who it is admitted were not the owners of the property described in the tax bill at the commencement of the suit. If the contention of plaintiff be correct, this is an action for debt, and if so, the petition fails to state a cause of action. State ex rel. v. Hoyt, 123 Mo. 357.

Burgess, J. Gantt, P. J., and Sherwood, J., concur.

OPINION

Burgess, J.

This is an action at the relation of Hayes, collector of Jackson county, begun in the circuit court of that county to recover personal judgment against defendants for the amount of taxes assessed against certain real estate in Kansas City, of which they were the owners on the first day of June, 1891.

The case was tried upon the following agreed statement: "It is agreed and admitted by the parties to this action that the defendants were the owners of the real property described in the petition at the time the assessment for the taxes in question was made, that is, on the first day of June, 1891; that the defendants sold and conveyed said property on the thirtieth day of July, 1891, to the United States of America, for the purpose of erecting a building thereon for the use of the United States court, post office, internal revenue and other government offices. It is also admitted that the taxes appear on the tax books as set forth in the petition of plaintiff, and that said taxes have not been paid. It is further admitted that said tax was not levied until April 1, 1892, and was not payable until September 1, 1892."

There was judgment for defendants, from which plaintiff appeals.

The first question presented by this record for our consideration is as to whether or not the assessment of taxes against the real estate owned by defendants at that time, created a personal liability against them for the taxes? It is insisted by plaintiff that it did, both by reason of section 7569, Revised Statutes 1889, which provides that "every person owning or holding property on the first day of June, including all such property purchased on that day, shall be liable for taxes thereon for the ensuing year," and irrespective of the statute. We quite agree with plaintiff with respect to the meaning of the statute and that by its provisions a personal liability exists against defendants for the amount of the taxes levied upon the land which they owned on the first day of June, 1891. But, aside from the statute, the same rule seems to be generally, if not universally, announced by the text writers upon the subject.

Thus in Burroughs on Taxation, sec. 7, p. 4, it is said: "The tax is a contribution required of its citizens by the State, and when it is measured, as to its amount, by the value of the productiveness of the property, it is still a tax on the person, and there is a personal liability on the person assessed with the tax. 'The individual, and not his property, pays the tax. The property is resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of the tax with which the owner must be charged.' The tax is imposed upon the person of the owner on account of his ownership of the property. . . . There is an exception to this general rule in local assessments, or taxation on the benefits conferred. This is a species of taxation in rem." The same rule is announced in Cooley on Taxation [2 Ed.], p. 354.

But it does not necessarily follow that plaintiff can maintain this action for a personal judgment against defendants for such tax. This depends altogether upon whether or not any other exclusive provision for their collection has been provided for by statute.

A tax is not a debt in the ordinary sense of that term, as it is not founded upon contract, and as a general thing a debt can not be created in any other way. "Tax proceedings are in invitum. The tax is an impost levied by the authority of the government for the support of the State, and has none of the characteristics of a contract, the essence of which is an agreement expressed or implied." Burroughs on Taxation, sec. 105, p. 253; City of Carondelet to use, etc., v. Picot, 38 Mo. 125. Therefore, if the statutes of this State make special provisions for the collection of taxes against real estate, and do not apparently contemplate that any others will be necessary, the mode of collection prescribed by statute is exclusive.

Cooley on Taxation [2 Ed.], 16, says: "But in general,...