The State ex rel. Connecticut Fire Insurance Company of Hartford v. Cox

• Decision Date: 31 December 1924
• Docket Number: 25322
• Citation: 268 S.W. 87,306 Mo. 537
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. CONNECTICUT FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD v. ARGUS COX et al., Judges of Springfield Court of Appeals
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

268 S.W. 87

306 Mo. 537

THE STATE ex rel. CONNECTICUT FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD v. ARGUS COX et al., Judges of Springfield Court of Appeals

No. 25322

Supreme Court of Missouri

December 31, 1924

Record Quashed.

John Schmook for relator; Roy F. Britton of counsel.

(1) Respondent's opinion substitutes for the cleancut unmistakable wording and language of Section 18, something entirely foreign thereto, at war therewith, not found therein, which could not as applied to this case, have been in the mind of the lawmaker, and at cross purposes with the clearly expressed intent of the Legislature as applied to the buyer and seller of a motor vehicle, other than dealers and manufacturers. (2) In addition, non-conformity to the requirements of said Section 18 is made unlawful, subject to fine or imprisonment, or both. Heller v. Lutz, 254 Mo. 704; Hope v. Flentge, 140 Mo. 390; Feccheimer Co. v. Palmer, 282 Mo. 82; Cement Co v. Kreis, 261 Mo. 160; Johnson v. Fecht, 185 Mo. 335; Liggett v. Bank, 233 Mo. 590; White v Watkins, 23 Mo. 423; Drowning v. Ringer, 7 Mo. 585.

Jesse W. Barrett, Attorney-General, and Wm. L Vandeventer, Special Assistant Attorney-General, amici curiae.

The primary rule for the interpretation of statutes is that the legislative intention should be ascertained from the language used, and the clear meaning of unequivocal language in a statute cannot be overthrown by the construction of the court so that said act can be interpreted according to their own notion of what ought to have been enacted. Grier v. Railway, 286 Mo. 523; Lincoln University v. Hackmann, 243 S.W. 320.

L. H. Musgrave and C. W. Hamlin for respondents.

This court will not interfere and quash an opinion rendered by the Court of Appeals unless said opinion shows upon its face that it is in conflict with the last previous ruling of the Supreme Court on the same or similar proposition involved. State ex rel. Am. Exp. Co. v. Allen, 256 S.W. 1041; State ex rel. Henry v. Allen, 263 S.W. 190. A merely erroneous construction, by the appellate court, of a statutory provision, on which the Supreme Court has not passed, vests no superintending jurisdiction in the latter by writ of certiorari. State ex rel. Elec. Co. v. Allen, 251 S.W. 917. Upon certiorari the Supreme Court is not concerned with anything except whether the opinion in the case under review conflicts with its last decision upon the same or similar proposition and in determining that fact will look only to the decision under review. State ex rel. Am. Packing Co. v. Reynolds, 230 S.W. 642; State ex rel. Cont. Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 290 Mo. 363; State ex rel. Calhoun v. Reynolds, 289 Mo. 506. In a certiorari proceedings to have a decision of the Court of Appeals declared void for the reason that it conflicts with the last previous ruling of the Supreme Court upon the same or similar proposition the Supreme Court is not called upon to determine and will not determine whether the views as expressed by the Court of Appeals are correct or incorrect, but is only to decide whether they conflict with the last controlling decision of its own on the proposition involved in the case. State ex rel. Wahl v. Reynolds, 272 Mo. 588; State ex rel. Theological Seminary v. Ellison, 216 S.W. 969.

Railey, C. Higbee, C., concurs.

OPINION

RAILEY

This is an application by relator to quash the record of the Springfield Court of Appeals, in the case of Howell, Respondent, v. Connecticut Fire Insurance Company, Appellant, reported in full at pages 178 and following of 257 S.W. Reporter. As a matter of convenience, in considering the case, we will refer to same as published in the Reporter, supra, and will refer to Howell as plaintiff or respondent, and to the insurance company as defendant or appellant. After the case reached this Division by assignment, the Attorney-General and his assistant were permitted to file a brief, and appear as amici curiae in behalf of relator and the State.

It appears from the decision of the Springfield Court of Appeals, as reported in 257 S.W. at pages 178 and following, that plaintiff, Howell, sued this relator in the justice's court of Howell County, Missouri, on a policy of insurance for $ 200, which had been taken out to cover the loss by fire on a Chevrolet car. The case reached the circuit court on appeal, and there a judgment was rendered for the defendant, from which an appeal was taken by Howell to the Springfield Court of Appeals. The latter reversed and remanded the cause and, hence, this application for a writ of certiorari by the above named defendant.

Respondents, in their opinion, assert that: "The sole question to be determined here is, did the plaintiff have an insurable interest in the automobile at the time the policy was issued and at the time of the fire? If it be determined that he had, then the plaintiff should recover, and, if he had no insurable interest, then the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed."

A motion for rehearing was filed and overruled in the Court of Appeals and, hence, its decision is final, unless quashed in this proceeding.

The determination of the issue presented by the Court of Appeals involves the application and construction of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Law, passed by the Fifty-first General Assembly (Extra Session), and reported in Laws 1921, Ex. Sess., at pages 76 to 107 inclusive.

It appears from the facts, as stated in the opinion of respondents, that on December 22, 1922 (257 S.W. p. 179), one S. G. Robertson was the owner of the automobile which is the subject of the insurance. He had paid the premium for a $ 200 policy of insurance to this relator's agent, but the policy had not been delivered. On said December 22nd, Robertson sold the automobile to the plaintiff, and the policy, instead of being issued to Robertson, was made directly to Howell, the purchaser of the car. On the same date above mentioned, Robertson delivered to the plaintiff the policy sued on, the certificate of title, which had been issued to him by the Secretary of State, a bill of sale which gave the purchaser and seller's name and address, set forth the consideration paid for the car, and described the car in the exact words and figures as it is described in the face of the state certificate, covenanted that it was free from incumbrance, that he had a legal right to dispose of same, and that it contained a warranty to defend the title against all claimants. The bill of sale was signed by S. G. Robertson and it was not acknowledged. On the 23rd of December, 1922, the car burned, and, after some negotiation with the insurance adjuster, liability was denied on the ground that the seller, S. G. Robertson, and the purchaser, J. P. Howell, had not conformed to the requirements of the law as set forth in the chapter on motor vehicles, found on page 76 and following, Laws 1921, Ex. Sess., and particularly that portion of the law which relates to the transfer of cars and the certificates of title, found on page 90 (Section 18) of said act which provides, among other things:

"In the event of a sale or transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle or trailer for which a certificate of ownership has been issued the holder of such certificate shall endorse on the same an assignment thereof, with warranty of title in form printed thereon, and prescribed by the commissioner, with a statement of all liens or encumbrances on said motor vehicle or trailer, and deliver the same to the buyer at the time of the delivery to him of said motor vehicle or trailer. The buyer shall then present such certificate, assigned as aforesaid, to the commissioner, at the time of making application for the registration of such motor vehicle or trailer, whereupon a new certificate of ownership shall be issued to the buyer, the fee therefor being $ 1. If such motor vehicle or trailer is sold to a resident of another state or country, or if such motor vehicle or trailer is destroyed or dismantled, the owner thereof shall immediately notify the commissioner. Certificates when so assigned and returned to the commissioner shall be retained by the commissioner and all certificates shall be appropriately indexed so that at all times it will be possible for him to expeditiously trace the ownership of the motor vehicle or trailer designated therein. Four months after this law takes effect and thereafter, it shall be unlawful for any person to buy or sell in this State any motor vehicle or trailer registered under the laws of this State, unless, at the time of the delivery thereof, there shall pass between the parties such certificate of ownership with an assignment thereof, as herein provided and the sale of any motor vehicle or trailer registered under the laws of this State, without the assignment of such certificate of ownership, shall be fraudulent and void. . . . The commissioner shall determine the form in which application for such certificate of ownership and assignments shall be made, in case forms differing from those used for individuals are in his judgment, reasonably required; . . .

"The commissioner shall co-operate with the commissioners or the officials of other states and countries having supervision of the registration of motor vehicles and shall exchange information with them relative to the registration, ownership, sale and theft of motor vehicles, for the purpose of suppressing the stealing and unauthorized use of motor vehicles."

Section 29 of said act, after providing a number of penalties for a violation of said law, contains paragraph (d), which reads as follows:

"Any person who violates any of the other provisions of this act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not less than five dollars or more than five hundred dollars...