The State ex rel. Burnes National Bank of St. Joseph v. Duncan
| Decision Date | 04 January 1924 |
| Docket Number | 24208 |
| Citation | 257 S.W. 784,302 Mo. 130 |
| Parties | THE STATE ex rel. BURNES NATIONAL BANK OF ST. JOSEPH v. A. B. DUNCAN, Judge of Probate Court of Buchanan County |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Peremptory writ denied.
John C. Landis and R. M. Duncan for petitioner.
(1) National banks are authorized to exercise fiduciary powers where not in contravention of state law. Par. K, Sec. 9709 U.S. Comp. Stat. 1919 Supp., known as The Federal Reserve Act. (2) The act of Congress conferring fiduciary powers on national banks is constitutional. First Natl. Bank v Fellows, 244 U.S. 416, 61 L.Ed. 1233. (3) Congressional action within its constitutional sphere is paramount, and state law or state policy must yield to it. McCulloch v Maryland, 4 Wheat. 315; Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 728; Farmers' Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29; Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 29; Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220; VanReed v. Peoples Bank, 198 U.S. 554; Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1; No. Pac. Ry. Co. v. No. Dakota, 250 U.S. 135. (4) Trust Companies are authorized to exercise fiduciary powers under the laws of Missouri. Sec. 11801, par. 3, R. S. 1919. (5) Trust companies in Missouri are authorized to and actually do a banking business and are in competition with national banks. Denny v. Jefferson County, 272 Mo. 436; Chap. 108, R. S. 1919; Secs. 11799, 11810, R. S. 1919. (6) The exercising of fiduciary powers by national banks in Missouri is not in contravention of the laws of Missouri. Sec. 11801, R. S. 1919; Amendment Par. K, Sec. 9709, U.S. Comp. Stat. 1919 Supp.; Bank v. Fellows, 244 U.S. 416, 61 L.Ed. 1233; People v. Russell, 283 Ill. 520; In re Mollineaux, 179 N.Y.S. 90; Stanchfield Estate, 171 Wis. 552; Hamilton v. State, 94 Conn. 648. (7) Relator is entitled to relief sought. Sec. 11, Art. I, R. S. 1919; Amendment Par. K, Sec. 9709, U.S. Comp. Stat. 1919 Supp.; Bank v. Fellows, 244 U.S. 416, 61 L.Ed. 1233; People v. Russell, 283 Ill. 520; In re Mollineaux, 179 N.Y.S. 90; Stanchfield Estate, 171 Wis. 552; Hamilton v. State, 94 Conn. 648.
Chas. H. Mayer for respondent.
(1) Trust companies organized under the laws of Missouri are authorized to act as executors, administrators, etc. Sec. 11779, R. S. 1919. (2) The statutes of Missouri authorize no other corporation to act as an executor, administrator, etc. Secs. 7, 9, 11, R. S. 1919. (3) The original act of Congress authorized national banks to act as executors only when such action was not in contravention of state or local law. Par. K, Federal Reserve Act. (4) The amendment of September 26, 1918, made to the Federal Reserve Act, was a mere legislative construction which Congress placed upon its original act for the guidance of Federal officers and was not intended to be and could not be a construction of state laws. Aquidneck National Bank of Newport v. Jennings, 117 A. (R. I.) 743. (5) The appointment of a national bank as an executor in Missouri would be in contravention of state law. Subdivisions 5, 8, 9, Sec. 11801, R. S. 1919; Secs. 11802, 11803, R. S. 1919; Sec. 11838, R. S. 1919, and Sections 6223, 6225, 6226, 6341, 6342, 6344, 6345 and 6346 therein made applicable; Aquidneck National Bank of Newport v. Jennings, 117 A. (R. I.) 743.
Justin D. Bowersock, William T. Jones, Henry L. McCune, Armwell L. Cooper, I. P. Ryland and Samuel McReynolds, amici curiae.
(1) An act of Congress, within a field covered by its constitutional power, fully appropriates that field and is made by the terms of the Constitution the supreme law of the land. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U.S. 135; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465; Mondou v. Ry. Co., 223 U.S. 1. (2) Congress has complete constitutional power to establish and regulate national banks. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738; Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275; Farmers Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29; Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220; Van Reed v. Peoples National Bank, 198 U.S. 554. (3) The act of Congress granting trust powers to national banks is constitutional and cannot be nullified or controlled by state authority. First National Bank v. Fellows, 244 U.S. 416. (4) Such grant is not in contravention of the laws of Missouri. Farmers' & Traders' Bank v. Harrison, 57 Mo. 503, 513; Shockley v. Fisher, 75 Mo. 498, 501; In re Mollineaux, 179 N.Y.S. 90; Stanchfield's Estate, 171 Wis. 553, 178 N.W. 310; Hamilton v. State, 94 Conn. 648; Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. v. Enright, 264 F. 236; Fellows v. First National Bank, 192 Mich. 640, 159 N.W. 335; Denny v. Jefferson County, 272 Mo. 436; Muth v. Trust Co., 88 Mo.App. 596, 602. (5) Apparently adverse decisions are distinguishable. People v. Brady, 271 Ill. 100; People v. Russell, 283 Ill. 520; Appeal of Woodbury, 78 N.H. 50; Aquidneck National Bank v. Jennings, 117 A. (R. I.) 743.
The relator filed its petition in this court setting forth its organization as a national bank and alleging that one Mary E. Bird, a citizen of the State of Missouri and resident of the city of St. Joseph, died November 27, 1922, leaving a will which was duly admitted to probate in the Probate Court of Buchanan County, in which will she named the relator as executor; that the Federal Reserve Act, Section 9704, paragraph K, in granting certain powers to national banks, included the right to act as executors of estates; that the Federal Reserve Board, under the rules and regulations prescribed by the Federal Reserve Act, granted the petitioner the right to exercise its privileges so granted in so far as such exercise of that right was not in contravention of the state or local law; that under the Revised Statutes of Missouri for 1919, trust companies of this State are authorized to act as executors, and in fiduciary capacities; that subsequent to the probate of said will the petitioner made application to the Probate Court of Buchanan County for appointment as executor, and for the issuance of letters testamentary under the terms of the will; that January 29, 1923, the respondent, judge of said probate court, entered an order declining to appoint the petitioner on the grounds that under the laws of the State of Missouri said petitioner was not authorized to act as executor. The proceedings of the probate court in that connection were set out in full, including the order declining to appoint the Burns National Bank as executor, and the appointment of Mary E. Williams, to be administratrix, with will annexed, of said estate. The petition thereupon prays this court for an alternative writ of mandamus, directing the respondent judge of the probate court to set aside said order appointing Mary E. Williams, and to appoint the petitioner as executor of said estate, or show cause why he had not done so.
Upon the filing of such petition this court caused an alternative writ to be issued March 3, 1923.
The respondent then for return to the alternative writ demurred on the ground that the aforesaid petition did not state facts which would authorize the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus. The case, then, is to be determined upon the facts stated in the petition for an alternative writ.
I. The petitioner calls attention to Section 11, Revised Statutes 1919, providing that after the probate of a will, letters testamentary shall be granted to the persons therein appointed executors, arguing that "persons" mentioned in the section includes corporations as well as natural persons. There can be no force in this argument unless petitioner means that this and other sections of the chapter relating to Administration, authorize any and every corporation to act as executor or in other fiduciary relation as provided for in that chapter. It is true that in many instances where the word "person" is used in a statute, it is construed to include corporations. The use of the term applies particularly to criminal statutes where a criminal act affects the property of a person. But that construction is by no means universal; it depends upon the context and the intent with which the term is employed. [30 Cyc. 1526; Words & Phrases, title "Person."] The entire purpose and context of Article 1 on Administration excludes the idea that "person" means corporation. Section 7, relating to persons who may administer on estates; Section 6, excluding certain persons from acting as administrator or executor; Section 36, providing the form of letters issued to an executor; in fact, all the provisions of that article show that the Legislature was dealing with and granting powers to natural persons.
It must be remembered that there was no common-law right to make a will or appoint an executor. It is purely a matter of statutory regulation. The statute authorizing certain persons to act as executor is an enabling statute, and it must be construed according to the intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting it. The intent of the Legislature to include only natural persons in the authority granted in that article appears not only in the terms of the article, but is shown by the actual grant, in another statute, of authority to trust companies to act as executors, and in other fiduciary relations. There would have been no need of such affirmative act if this chapter on Administration had granted such authority to all corporations. Before any corporation in this State can have a right to act in a fiduciary relation in administering estates there must be express authority given that kind of a corporation and that statutory authority must be construed in pari materia with the chapter relating to Administration. Certainly there is no warrant for a contention that any corporation which might be named as executor in the will would have authority to act as such...
To continue reading
Request your trial