The State v. Bailey

• Decision Date: 29 October 1901
• Docket Number: 19,370
• Citation: 61 N.E. 730,157 Ind. 324
• Parties: The State v. Bailey
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

61 N.E. 730

157 Ind. 324

The State v. Bailey

No. 19,370

Supreme Court of Indiana

October 29, 1901

From Jay Circuit Court; J. M. Smith, Judge.

Sheridan Bailey was convicted before a justice of the peace for violation of the compulsory education law. From a judgment of the circuit court quashing the affidavit, the State appeals.

Reversed.

W. L Taylor, Attorney-General, C. C. Hadley, Merrill Moores, D. E Griner and Rowland Evans, for State.

F. H Snyder and G. W. Bergman, for appellee.

OPINION

Dowling, J.

The appellee was charged upon affidavit before a justice of the peace with having neglected, omitted and refused to send his child, Vory Bailey, to school, in violation of the provisions of the compulsory education law of this State, of March 8, 1897 (Acts 1897, p. 248), as amended by the act of March 6, 1899 (Acts 1899, p. 547). He was convicted before the justice, and, upon an appeal from that judgment to the circuit court, the affidavit was quashed. The State appeals.

The constitutionality of the act of March 6, 1899, is assailed by the appellee upon the following grounds: (1) Because it is in conflict with § 19, article 4, of the Constitution of Indiana; (2) because it is in conflict with § 21, article 4, of the Constitution; (3) because it invades the natural right of man to govern and control his own children.

The additional point is made by counsel for the appellee that the facts stated in the affidavit are not sufficient to constitute a public offense.

The title of the act of March 6, 1899, is: "An act entitled an act amending an act concerning the education of children, approved March 8, 1897, and declaring an emergency." It is contended that this title does not conform to that provision of the Constitution which prescribes that every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, and that such subject shall be expressed in the title. It is also objected that the title of the act is so vague and uncertain as to render it nugatory. It is said that the subject of the act is declared to be the education of children, but that the provisions of the statute relate to subjects of an entirely different nature, such as the duties of parents and guardians concerning the attendance of children at school, the creation of an office, the appointment of a truant officer, and the definition of a misdemeanor.

The law of the case seems to be well settled by the decisions of this court. Such a title as "An act to promote the general welfare of the State;" or "an act to promote good morals," would give no indication of the character of the subject of the statute, and, therefore, would fail to meet the requirement that the subject of the act must be expressed in the title. Indiana, etc., R. Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681; Gillespie v. State, 9 Ind. 380; Henderson v. London, etc., Ins. Co., 135 Ind. 23, 20 L. R. A. 827, 41 Am. St. 410, 34 N.E. 565; State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439, 33 L. R. A. 313, 44 N.E. 469; Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind. 223.

But the title, "An act concerning drainage", properly embraces legislation authorizing the appointment of a board of drainage commissioners. It is sufficient also to include provisions for the making and collecting of assessments upon the lands benefited by the work, and the recovery of attorney's fees. Ross v. Davis, 97 Ind. 79; Wishmier v. State, 97 Ind. 160.

The title, "An act to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors", was held a sufficient expression of the subject of the act, and to authorize provisions prohibiting the sale of liquor, and imposing penalties for violation of the statute. Williams v. State, 48 Ind. 306; Kane v. State, 78 Ind. 103.

"An act defining felonies, and prescribing punishment therefor", and "An act defining certain felonies, and prescribing punishment therefor", were held sufficiently certain to embrace all felonies mentioned in them with the punishments for the same. Peachee v. State, 63 Ind. 399.

The title of a statute was: "An act to provide for the incorporation of railroad companies"; held a sufficient statement of the subject to embrace a provision for the individual liability of the stockholders. Shipley v. City of Terre Haute, 74 Ind. 297.

"An act concerning bank officers, brokers, etc., receiving deposits after insolvency, repealing all laws in conflict herewith" was decided to be "comprehensive enough, omitting the 'etc.' to express the subject of the act." State v. Arnold, 140 Ind. 628, 38 N.E. 820.

Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind. 223, contains a luminous and forcible explanation of the meaning of § 19 of article 4 of the Constitution: "The Constitution does not assume to divide the general scope of legislation, and classify the parts under particular heads or subjects, but, of necessity, has left that power to be exercised by the legislature, as it, in its wisdom and discretion, shall deem proper. The Constitution assumes that different subjects of legislation do exist, and requires that each act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title. The purposes of the provision, in view of the evils intended to be guarded against, can only be effected by requiring that the subject expressed should be reasonably specific, or, in other words, should be such as to indicate some particular branch of legislation, as a head under which the particular provisions of the act might reasonably be looked for. With this restriction, the subject of an act may be enlarged or restricted at the will of the legislature, and the subject must be determined by reference to the language used in the title. It sometimes occurs that the draughtsman, intending to provide a title sufficiently comprehensive to cover various provisions, all, however, relating to a common subject, instead of selecting a subject which is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all the provisions of the act, and expressing it in general terms, attempts to accomplish the desired object by stating in the title, in detail, the character or purpose of the various provisions of sections, thereby often limiting the subject expressed to the particular matters thus specified. But it should be borne in mind that the Constitution only requires that a proper subject of legislation should be expressed in the title, and not the particular features or details of the law. If these relate to the subject expressed, it satisfies the constitutional provisions. The words 'an act concerning highways,' would express but a single subject, and yet would constitute a comprehensive title, under which almost any desired provision relating to highways might be enacted, and every effort to express in the title the details of the act would only tend to limit the subject." See, also, Gustavel v. State, 153 Ind. 613, 54 N.E. 123; Maule Coal Co. v. Partenheimer, 155 Ind. 100, 55 N.E. 751; Clarke v. Darr, 156 Ind. 692, 60 N.E. 688.

We think the title of the statute in question specific enough to guard against the evils intended to be prevented by the Constitution. It sufficiently indicates "some particular branch of legislation as a head under which the particular...