The State v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 11 February 1890
• Citation: 44 N.W. 813,79 Iowa 568
• Parties: THE STATE v. GRIFFIN
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

44 N.W. 813

79 Iowa 568

THE STATE v. GRIFFIN

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

February 11, 1890

Decided January, 1890.

Appeal from Warren District Court.--HON. O. B. AYRES, Judge.

DEFENDANT was indicted, tried and convicted of the crime of larceny and he appeals.

AFFIRMED.

Powell & McGarry and H. McNeil, for appellant.

John Y Stone, Attorney General, for the State.

OPINION

ROTHROCK, C. J.

I.

The body of the indictment is in these words: "The said William H. Griffin, on the ninth day of August, A. D. 1886, in the county of Warren aforesaid, took, stole and carried away one horse of the value of one hundred and fifty dollars, the said property belonging to one James Wheeler, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, against the peace and dignity of the state of Iowa." It is claimed by counsel for defendant that the indictment is fatally defective, in that it is not alleged therein that the horse was feloniously taken by the defendant. It is true that under our practice it is usually averred that the act was feloniously done. But we do not think such an averment is essential to the validity of an indictment. When, as in this indictment, it is alleged that the defendant "stole" the horse, and that he was of the value of one hundred and fifty dollars, it is as plain and unmistakable an averment that the act was "feloniously" done as if that word had been used. It is further claimed that the indictment is defective because it does not charge that Wheeler was the owner of the horse when he was stolen. This objection is without merit. It is founded on the fact that the indictment does not contain the words "then and there" before the averment of ownership. This was not necessary. To the common understanding, it is plain that the averment means that Wheeler owned the horse when he was stolen. It is further urged that the indictment does not charge the intent to convert the horse to the defendant's use, and deprive the owner thereof. The averment that the defendant "took, stole and carried away" the animal was sufficient to show the animus with which the act was done.

II. There is no real dispute on the facts of the case. The defendant went to a barn in Warren county on the night of the ninth day of August, 1886, and took the horse, and rode or led him to the city of Des Moines, where he arrived at about seven o'clock the next morning. He put him in a livery or sale stable, and offered to sell him for two hundred dollars. The proprietor of the stable suspected that the horse was stolen, and called in an officer, who pretended to buy the animal of defendant. The sale was made at an agreed consideration of one hundred and fifty dollars; and the officer went...