The State v. Hill
| Decision Date | 07 November 1898 |
| Parties | The State v. Hill, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Platte Circuit Court. -- Hon. R. E. Culver, Special Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
James W. Coburn, James H. Hull and James W. Boyd for appellant.
(1) The Honorable Romulus E. Culver, judge of the criminal court of Buchanan county, had no jurisdiction or authority of law or qualification to try said case. He was, at the time of the trial, judge of the criminal court of Buchanan county. That court was established in 1885. The act establishing it is found in the Revised Statutes at page 2208. The amendment to that act, approved March 1, 1897, is unconstitutional and void. Acts of 1897, p. 79; Constitution of Missouri, art. 4 sec. 53, subdiv. 17; art. 6, sec. 23; State v Kring, 74 Mo. 612; Ex parte Allen, 67 Mo. 534; State v. Hayes, 14 Mo.App. 173; Acts of 1881, p. 119; State v. Daniels, 66 Mo. 192; State ex rel. v Laughlin, 73 Mo. 443.
Edward C. Crow, Attorney-General, and Sam. B. Jeffries, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.
(1) It is the accepted rule of all courts that the right of the judiciary to declare a statute void and thereby arrest its execution is one which is coupled with responsibilities so grave that it is never to be exercised except in a very clear case. State ex rel. v. Pond, 93 Mo. 606; Edwards v. Lesueur, 132 Mo. 410; State ex rel. v. Railroad, 92 Mo. 137. (2) And unless the statute appears unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt the court will not undertake to declare it so. State v. Able, 65 Mo. 357; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64; Kelly v. Meeks, 87 Mo. 396. (3) Every statute will be presumed to be constitutional until the contrary plainly appears, and it is only where it manifestly infringes some province that it can be declared void. Railroad v. Shambaugh, 106 Mo. 557; Deal v. Miss. Co., 107 Mo. 464; State ex rel. v. Wofford, 121 Mo. 61; State ex rel. v. Yancy, 123 Mo. 391. In fact, no legislative act will be declared unconstitutional unless clearly shown, and every reasonable intendment should be made to sustain it. State v. Hope, 100 Mo. 347; State ex rel. v. Jackson, 102 Mo. 531; State ex rel. v. Simmons Hardware Co., 109 Mo. 118; Murnane v. St. Louis, 123 Mo. 479; Kenefick v. St. Louis, 127 Mo. 1. (4) The question as to whether a law is local or general is to be determined by the generality with which it affects the people as a whole rather than by the extent of territory over which it operates. State ex rel. v. Yancy, 123 Mo. 391; State ex rel. v. Stratton, 136 Mo. 423. (5) The Constitution of the State of Missouri, article 4, section 53, clothes the Legislature with authority to establish criminal courts in counties of over fifty thousand people, and it has been held that this authority can be exercised by general legislation, and that it does not require that form of proceedings necessary in legislation special and local in character. No law can be either special or local within the meaning of the Constitution, which results, directly or indirectly, from a specific constitutional requirement. State ex rel v. Hughes, 104 Mo. 470. (6) There is no doubt but that the establishment of a criminal court in Buchanan county was a power granted the Legislature by the Constitution, and such power is exercisable in a general way and not as special or local acts. No law is special or local within the meaning of the constitutional inhibition when the Constitution contains a specific grant of power to pass the same. State ex rel. v. County Court, 50 Mo. 317; State ex rel. v. Watson, 71 Mo. 470; State ex rel. v. Tolle, 71 Mo. 645.
The powers and jurisdiction of the judge of the criminal court of Buchanan county are defined in section 3, page 2209, 2 Revised Statutes 1889. That section as it was originally, and the amendment thereto, approved March 1, 1897, are as follow, the amendment being indicated by the brackets: Acts 1897, p. 79.
If the foregoing amendment is valid, then the judge of the criminal court of Buchanan county had the right to sit in the trial of this cause on the bench of the circuit court of Platte county, having been called upon so to do by the judge of that court.
In order to determine the question thus presented, it is necessary to examine the provisions of section 53 of article IV of the Constitution, so far as applicable to the case before us.
The General Assembly is prohibited from passing any local or special law, "regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in any judicial proceeding or inquiry before courts," etc. Is the amendment of 1897 then "a local or special law?"
In Ex parte Allen, 67 Mo. 534, it was held that "an act making provision for supplying the place of a criminal judge in the event of his sickness, absence or inability to hold court" was one regulating the criminal practice and proceedings in courts of record.
And in State v. Kring, 74 Mo. 612, it was decided that the act approved March 26, 1881 (Laws of 1881, p. 119), in relation to, and which changed, the method of procedure only in the criminal court of St. Louis, was a special law, inasmuch as it was confined in its operation to that one court, and was therefore violative of section 53 of article IV of the Constitution aforesaid. In the light of these authorities, and in the light of the plain provisions of the Constitution already cited, the law before us can not escape the condemnation of being a local or special law, one which regulates the practice and jurisdiction of courts.
The law under consideration is invalid for another reason, even if concession be made that the legislature could validly pass a local or special law for the purpose indicated; ...
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