The State v. Reifsteck

• Decision Date: 03 June 1927
• Docket Number: 27817
• Citation: 295 S.W. 741,317 Mo. 268
• Parties: The State v. Vernie Reifsteck, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

295 S.W. 741

317 Mo. 268

The State v. Vernie Reifsteck, Appellant

No. 27817

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 3, 1927

Appeal from Cole Circuit Court; Hon. Henry J. Westhues Judge.

Affirmed.

North T. Gentry, Attorney-General, and A. B. Lovan Assistant Attorney-General, for respondent.

(1) The appellant makes no complaint against the information. It is in a form that has been approved by this court. State v Pike, 278 S.W. 725. (2) There was substantial evidence offered by the State to the effect that the defendant was in an intoxicated condition and while in such condition was operating a motor vehicle. In the second place, such a general assignment is too indefinite to require consideration. State v. Concelia, 250 Mo. 424; State v. Field, 262 Mo. 164; State v. Renfro, 279 S.W. 704. (3) The fourth assignment in appellant's motion for a new trial is that "the court erred in admitting incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial testimony offered by the State through the witnesses West and Rollins." The answer to this is that in all the testimony of the witnesses, not one single objection was made by the defendant. (4) The fifth assignment of appellant's motion for new trial is that "the verdict of the jury showed upon its face that they were not moved by the evidence, but upon the contrary, were moved by such passion and prejudice as to raise the presumption that they were biased and prejudiced against the defendant at the outset of the trial." This is but another way of stating that the evidence was not sufficient. There is no ground for stating that the jury was ruled by passion and prejudice. The record showing that there was substantial evidence, this court will not interfere with the verdict of the jury. Moreover, this assignment comes under the condemnation of the law as being too indefinite. State v. McBrien, 265 Mo. 604. (5) The second assignment in appellant's motion for a new trial is that "the court failed to instruct the jury upon the law pertaining to the case." The court did instruct on all the law. If any other instruction was necessary, it was the duty of the defendant to call the court's attention to it. This assignment is too indefinite. It does not comply with the Act of 1925. It is not sufficient under the old Sec. 4079, R. S. 1919. State v. Stevens, 281 Mo. 648. (6) The third assignment in appellant's motion for new trial is that "the court erred in failing to define in its instructions to the jury the meaning of the words 'intoxicating condition,' in connection with the operation of a motor vehicle." The words used in the information and instructions are "intoxicated condition." The words are in every-day use and have a common and well-understood meaning. 4 Words & Phrases, p. 3734; State v. Walker, 232 Mo. 261; State v. Wiseman, 256 S.W. 741.

Davis, C. Higbee and Henwood, CC., concur.

OPINION

DAVIS

The prosecuting attorney of Cole County on November 16, 1925, filed a verified information in the circuit court charging that defendant, on June 25, 1925, feloniously operated a motor vehicle in said county while in an intoxicated condition. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, assessing three years' punishment. Defendant appealed from the sentence and judgment entered thereon.

The evidence on behalf of the State tends to show that on June 25, 1925, the defendant at a certain highway corner in Jefferson City, accosted two boys about seventeen years of age, whom he knew, offering to drive them to the Jefferson Theatre. On their way to their destination in his Ford touring car, defendant suggested to the boys that they accompany him to Loose Creek, several miles east of the city, to which they assented. Arriving at Loose Creek, defendant entered a certain house, emerging with a half-gallon jug of wine. Defendant gave of the wine to the boys to drink, the boys taking two or three and the defendant six or more drinks. Shortly thereafter defendant beheld a man along the road tippling whiskey from a bottle. Coveting his neighbor's possessions, defendant negotiated an exchange of commodities, bartering the wine for the whiskey, and did drink copiously thereof. His thirst being quenched, defendant began a tortuous course in the Ford homeward, mistaking a ditch for the pavement. The many travelers of the road proved to be Samaritans rather than Pharisees, for besides stopping, offering assistance and extricating his car from the ditch, they were present at the trial in large numbers, their testimony as to his happy and loquacious condition materially aiding in providing him with free lodging and board for a term of three years. The car was afterwards driven from the ditch by a boy scout, and defendant operated it in a serpentine trail along the road. A half dozen or more witnesses testified that he was drunk, among whom was a physician. The defendant admitted to the travelers that he was drunk. Other pertinent facts, if any, will later appear.

I. The information is grounded on Section 27, Laws 1921, First Extra Session, page 103, paragraph "G," as follows: "No person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition, or when under the influence of drugs." We deem it unnecessary to set out the information in haec verba. It follows the statute in substance and form and has been approved in State v. Pike, 278 S.W. 725, to which we refer as a precedent.

II. We have examined the remaining portions of the record proper as required by statute and find no irregularity therein unless such complaint can be made of the verdict. It is as follows "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged in the information, and assess his punishment at State prison for a term of three years." Reviewing it, we find no room for doubt that by their verdict the jury found defendant guilty of...