The State v. Willis

• Decision Date: 30 June 1868
• Citation: 63 N.C. 26
• Parties: THE STATE v. ALEXANDER WILLIS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

63 N.C. 26

THE STATE

v.ALEXANDER WILLIS.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June Term, 1868.

Upon a trial for murder, the fact of killing with a deadly weapon being admitted or proved, the burden of showing any matter of mitigation, excuse or justification is thrown upon the prisoner.

It is incumbent upon the prisoner to establish such matter, neither beyond a reasonable doubt nor according to the preponderance of testimony but, to the satisfaction of the jury.

( State v. Ellick, 2 Win. 56, cited and approved. Language used in State v. Peter Johnson, 3 Jon. 226, in regard to degree of proof of matters of excuse, & c., modified.)

MURDER, tried before Buxton, J., at Spring Term 1868 of the Superior Court of WAKE.

Upon the trial it was shown by the State, and admitted by the prisoner, that the latter killed the deceased by intentionally stabbing him with a knife, which was exhibited, and admitted to be a deadly weapon.

The Court was asked by the prisoner to charge the jury that the State was required to establish to the satisfaction of the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, the commission by the prisoner of the particular act for which it asked his conviction. This the Court declined to do, and the prisoner excepted.

Upon this point the Court instructed the jury, that when it is proved or admitted that one killed another intentionally, with a deadly weapon, the burden of showing justification, excuse or mitigation is on him, and all the circumstances of such justification, excuse or mitigation are to be satisfactorily proved by him, unless they appear in the evidence against him; that the fact of killing being proved or admitted, nothing more appearing, the law presumes such killing to have been done in malice, and so to be murder; that the circumstances of justification, excuse or mitigation, are to be satisfactorily proved, not proved as the State is required to prove an essential fact, that is beyond a reasonable doubt, for the doctrine of reasonable doubt is never applied to the condemnation of a prisoner, but to his acquittal; and that the jury must be satisfied by the testimony offered in the case on either side that the matter in justification, excuse or mitigation is true.

To this the prisoner excepted.

Verdict, Guilty; Rule for a new trial; Rule discharged; Judgment and Appeal.

Haywood and Fowle & Badger, for the prisoner .

Attorney General, for the State .

BATTLE, J.

The exception of the prisoner raises fairly and distinctly the question, whether upon the trial of an indictment for murder, the fact of killing with a deadly weapon being admitted or proved, the burden of showing any matter of mitigation, excuse, or justification, is thrown upon the prisoner, or whether it still remains upon the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt that the act of killing was done with malice prepense, express or implied. It has, as we think, always been considered as the rule in this State, that from the fact of killing with a deadly weapon, the law will imply malice, and then the onus of the proof to remove it, is devolved upon the slayer. It was so held by this Court in the case of the State v. Peter Johnson, 3 Jon. 266, in which it was said that the rule that the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, of the prisoner's guilt, before they could convict him, applied only to the fact of the homicide, for if the jury found that fact against him, every matter of excuse, mitigation or justification, ought to be shown by him. The burden of proof in such case being shifted from the State to the prisoner, it was incumbent on him to establish the matter of excuse or justification, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Again, in the State v. Ellick, 2 Win., 56, which was ably argued and well considered, the Court say: “The position that the principle, on which the doctrine of reasonable doubt is grounded, is as much applicable to the grade of the homicide, as it is to the fact of the homicide, is not true. The error consists in not attending to the distinction, that the fact of the homicide must be proved by the State, but if found or admitted, the onus of showing...