The Strabo

• Decision Date: 07 November 1898
• Citation: 90 F. 110
• Parties: THE STRABO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

90 F. 110

THE STRABO.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

November 7, 1898

This is a libel by John J. King against the steamship Strabo for personal injuries. Heard on exceptions raising the question of jurisdiction in admiralty.

ADMIRALTY-- JURISDICTION-- PERSONAL INJURY.

Where the libelant, a workman on a vessel lying at a dock attempted to leave the ship by means of a ladder, by reason of the master's negligence not secured properly to the ship's rail, whereupon the ladder fell, and the libelant was thrown to the dock, and injured, it is inferable that the master's breach of duty took effect upon the libelant while he was upon the ship; and, although his physical injury was completed by his fall upon the dock, a court of admiralty has jurisdiction.

William C. Beecher, for libelant.

Owen &amp Sturges, for claimant.

THOMAS District Judge.

The exceptions to the libel concede the following facts for the purpose of raising the question of the jurisdiction of this court: The libelant, employed in loading a ship lying at a dock, attempted to leave the ship by means of a ladder, by reason of the master's negligence not secured to the ship's rail, whereupon the ladder fell, and the libelant was thrown to the ground, and injured. From this statement is inferred (1) that the injured person was on the ship; (2) that the negligent omission, viz. to fasten the ladder to the ship, was suffered on the ship; (3) that the causal influence was brought to bear and took effect upon the libelant while he was on the ship; (4) that a physical injury was caused to the libelant by his fall, which was increased by his striking the dock.

Several classes of cases exist which have relevancy to the subject under consideration. The first class is where the primal cause arises on the ship, and is communicated to property on the land. Such are cases of fire, originating on the ship and carried or spreading to the shore. The Plymouth, 3 Wall 20; In re Phoenix Ins. Co., 118 U.S. 610, 7 Sup.Ct. 25. In this class also fall the cases of missiles sent from the ship, and taking effect elsewhere. U.S. v. Davis, 2 Sumn. 482, Fed. Cas. No. 14,932; The Epsilon, 6 Ben. 378, Fed. Cas. No. 4,506. Also, cases are included where some part of the ship comes in contact with the land, to the injury of persons or property thereon (Johnson v. Elevator Co., 119 U.S. 388, 7 Sup.Ct. 254; The Maud Webster, 8 Ben. 547, Fed. Cas. No. 9,302); and herein should be gathered instances where the vessel does damage to wharves (The C. Accame, 20 F. 642; Homer Ramsdell Transp. Co. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 63 F. 845, 848). Also, cases fall within this class where material discharged from a ship comes in contact with persons on land. Anderson v. The Mary Garrett, 63 F. 1009. See, also, Price v. The Belle of the Coast, 66 F. 62. In all cases arising under this first class, the injured person or thing is on land when the negligent act operates upon him or it, and a court of admiralty has no jurisdiction. Another class includes cases where the primal cause arises on land, and is injuriously communicated to the ship on the water. Herein are included structures wrongfully maintained, and interrupting navigation. Atlee v. Packet Co., 21 Wall. 389; The Maud Webster, 8 Ben. 547, Fed. Cas. No. 9,302; Greenwood v. Town of Westport, 60 F. 560; Oregon City Transp. Co., v. Columbia St. Bridge Co., 53 F. 549; City of Boston v. Crowley, 38 F. 202, 204; The Arkansas, 17 F. 383. And herein fall cases where material discharged from land into the ship does injury to persons on the ship. Hermann v. Mill Co., 69 F. 646. In this class of cases, the ship and hence a person or thing thereon, is on the water, and it has been considered that the court had jurisdiction. The H. S. Pickands, 42 F. 239, is different. There, a person descending from the ship by means of a ladder was thrown upon the wharf, and it was adjudged that this court was without jurisdiction. In that instance the causative negligent omission was on land, but operated upon the libelant while he was on the ship, provided the ladder be deemed an incident or attachment of the ship. It differs from the cases under the first class in this; that a negligent condition initiated on shore was set in operation by the libelant attempting to leave the ship by the ladder.

It may be considered whether these decisions have been made pursuant to some rule of general application. All cases for ultimate authority refer to The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20. There it was said:

'The wrong and injury complained of must have been committed wholly upon the high seas or navigable waters, or, at least, the substance and consummation of the same must have taken place upon the waters to be within the admiralty jurisdiction. In other words, the cause of damages, in technical language, whatever else attended it, must have been there complete.'

Again, 'the whole, or at least the substantial cause of action, arising out of the wrong, must be complete within the locality upon which the jurisdiction depends,-- on the high seas or navigable waters .'

What construction has been placed upon these expressions in subsequent opinions? In The Mary Stewart, 10 F. 137, where the entire transaction was in fact on a wharf, it is said:

'There are two essential ingredients to a cause of action, viz. a wrong, and damage resulting from the wrong. Both must concur. To constitute a maritime cause of action, therefore, not only the wrong must originate on water, but the damage-- the other necessary ingredient-- must also happen on water.' This holding was criticised in City of Milwaukee v. The Curtis, 37 F. 705, where it is stated that:

'It suffices if the damage-- the substantial cause of action arising out of the wrong-- is complete upon navigable waters.'

Also, in Hermann v. Mill Co., 69 F. 646, the rule stated in The Mary Stewart is regarded as too broad, and the learned judge interprets the law as follows:

'I think that the only true and rational solution of the jurisdictional question, where the tort occurs partly on land and partly on water, is to ascertain the place of the consummation and substance of the injury. This latter element of the wrong is necessarily the only substantial cause of action; otherwise, it would be damnum absque injuria.'

In The H. S. Pickands, supra, it was considered that, to confer jurisdiction on this court, the injury must have been consummated and the damage received upon the water, although the wrongful act may have been done on the ship.

In The Maud Webster, supra, the court said:

'In a case of tort, there can be no jurisdiction in the admiralty unless the substantial cause of action, arising out of the wrong, was complete upon navigable waters.'

In Johnson v. Elevator Co., supra, it is held...