The Wabash Railroad Co. v. Engleman
| Citation | 66 N.E. 892,160 Ind. 329 |
| Decision Date | 31 March 1903 |
| Docket Number | 20,017 |
| Parties | The Wabash Railroad Company v. Engleman |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
From Wabash Circuit Court; H. B. Shively, Judge.
Suit by Marquis L. Engleman to enjoin the Wabash Railroad Company from entering upon and inclosing a strip of land with a fence. From a decree in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under § 1337u Burns 1901.
Reversed.
E. P Hammond, W. V. Stuart, D. W. Simms and J. D. Conner, Jr., for appellant.
John Mitchell and W. B. McClintic, for appellee.
This action was instituted by appellee to enjoin appellant railroad company from entering upon and enclosing with a fence a strip of land of about thirteen acres situated in Wabash county, Indiana, near to appellant's right of way. The trial court upon the verified petition granted a temporary injunction restraining appellant, together with its servants and employes, from trespassing upon or interfering with the plaintiff's possession of the described real estate. Issues were joined between the parties on the complaint and answer, and on the final hearing the court found in favor of the plaintiff, and awarded him a perpetual injunction, from which decree or judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
The errors assigned and relied upon for a reversal relate to overruling the demurrer to the complaint, and in denying a motion for a new trial.
Counsel for appellant argue that the judgment below should be reversed upon the grounds: (1) Insufficiency of the complaint on demurrer; (2) that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the finding awarding a perpetual injunction, for the reason that it appears that appellant only threatened to commit a mere trespass upon the land in question, for which appellee would have an adequate remedy at law.
The complaint is in one paragraph, and therein it is alleged that the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the described premises; that he and his grantors have been in the open notorious, and exclusive possession of the land in dispute exercising acts of ownership thereover, for more than twenty years last past. The complaint then charges: "That said defendant company is threatening to and is about to enclose said tract of ground, commencing on the west line of said fractional quarter section, on the north line of the defendant's land, six rods from its right of way, thence running eastwardly 1,300 feet with the right of way of said company, and thirty feet wide, in a northerly and southerly direction, immediately north of the said right of way, and to exclude the plaintiff from the possession of the same, all without right; that the company has had said strip of land surveyed, and has placed stakes marking the boundary of the ground which it threatens to enclose, and has instructed its employes to build a fence around said strip; that said threatened occupation by said defendant of said land is in derogation and violation of the right of plaintiff, and, if not prevented, will work irreparable damage to him; that said defendant's employes are ready so to fence said land and to exclude plaintiff from possession, and, if not at once by this court prevented, will have the same fenced before notice can be given and an application for an injunction heard in this court." The complaint concludes with a prayer for a temporary injunction, restraining appellant from in any manner fencing or trespassing upon said land, and that on final hearing the railroad company be perpetually enjoined from in any manner claiming ownership or possession of said land, and that plaintiff's title thereto be quieted as against the defendant.
The complaint only professes to state a cause of action for an injunction, and if the facts therein averred are not sufficient to entitle plaintiff to such relief, it is certainly insufficient for any other purpose. It is a well settled proposition that not every trespass will entitle the injured party to relief by the extraordinary remedy of injunction, for the rule is elementary and where there is a complete or adequate remedy at law for the wrong complained of, a court of equity will not interpose, but will leave the complainant to seek relief through the proper or appropriate legal remedy. Therefore, by virtue of this rule, an action for an injunction can not be successfully maintained to restrain or prevent the commission of a mere trespass, unless it is made to appear that the injury apprehended therefrom will be great or irreparable, and consequently can not be adequately compensated in an action for damages against the trespasser. This principle has been recognized and well affirmed by many decisions of this court, among which are the following: Miller v. Burket, 132 Ind. 469, 32 N.E. 309, and cases there cited; McQuarrie v. Hildebrand, 23 Ind. 122; Indianapolis Rolling Mill Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 29 Ind. 245.
Section 1162 Burns 1901 of our statutory law pertaining to injunctions authorizes the granting of an injunction where it is made to appear that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and that such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission of some act, the commission or continuance of which would produce great injury to the plaintiff. The construction placed upon this statute by the decisions of this court is that it does not warrant an injunction in cases where the commission of the act can be readily and fully compensated in damages, and where there are no reasons to apprehend a multiplicity of suits on account of the wrong as threatened. Clark v. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co., 44 Ind. 248; Indianapolis Rolling Mill Co. v. City of Indianapolis, supra; Whitlock v. Consumers Gas Trust Co., 127 Ind. 62, 26 N.E. 570.
Of course, the right to invoke the jurisdiction of a court of equity must depend upon the peculiar or particular facts in each case, and one of the questions to be decided is whether the legal remedy under the particular circumstances of the case is adequate, or, in other words, is such remedy as practicable and efficient to promote the interests of justice and its prompt administration as is the remedy in equity? Denny v. Denny, 113 Ind. 22, 14 N.E. 593; Champ v. Kendrick, 130 Ind. 549, 30 N.E. 787; Allen v. Winstandly, 135 Ind. 105, 34 N.E. 699; Xenia Real Estate Co. v. Macy, 147 Ind. 568, 47 N.E. 147.
The authorities affirm that the inadequacy of the legal remedy is the very foundation or indispensable prerequisite for the interposition of a court of equity, for the plain or evident reason that inasmuch as the law has provided a complete or adequate remedy for the redress of the particular wrong, therefore a court of chancery is not authorized to interpose its prerogative. The strict rule, however, as expressed by Chancellor Kent in Jerome v Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315, 11 Am. Dec. 484, that in order to entitle a complainant to an injunction to restrain the commission of a trespass it must be a strong and peculiar case of trespass going to the destruction of the inheritance, or where the mischief is remediless, has been to an extent relaxed by modern or later decisions of the higher courts. Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp. (2d ed.), § 1357. The general rule, as asserted, is that in order to give a court of equity the right to enjoin a wrong about to be committed against or upon the property of another, in addition to the fact that the threatened injury must be of such a nature as not to be susceptible of complete pecuniary compensation, the title of the complaining party to the property must be admitted or established by legal adjudication. Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp. (2d ed.), § 252; High, Injunctions (3d ed.), § 701. At the close of the last-cited section the author says: ...
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