The Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick

• Decision Date: 17 October 2001
• Docket Number: 9
• Citation: 783 A.2d. 667,366 Md. 295
• Parties: The Whiting-Turner Contracting Company v. Joe Fitzpatrick
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

The Whiting-Turner Contracting Company

v.Joe Fitzpatrick

No. 9, September Term, 2001

COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

366 Md. 295

783 A.2d 667

October 17, 2001, Filed

Whiting-Turner v. Fitzpatrick, 363 Md. 661, 770 A.2d 169, (2001). Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. John O. Hennegan, JUDGE.

Judgment was reversed and case was remanded.

ARGUED BY C. Carey Deeley, Jr. (Daniel W. China of Venable, Baetjer and Howard, LLP, on brief) of Towson, MD FOR PETITIONER.

ARGUED BY Allen G. Windsor (Hickey & Windsor, P.A., on brief) of Edgewood, MD FOR RESPONDENT.

ARGUED BEFORE Bell, C.J., Eldridge, Raker, Wilner, Cathell, Harrell, and Battaglia, JJ. Opinion by Bell, C.J.

Bell

[298] Opinion by Bell, C.J.

The issue presented by this case is whether a bonus payment that is not a part of the compensation promised and agreed to be paid an employee, but that has been recommended and approved for payment, yet not delivered to the employee before the employee voluntarily terminated employment, is a wage under the Maryland Wage Payment and [299] Collection Act, Maryland Code (1991,1999 Repl. Vol.) § 3-501 et. seq. of the Labor and Employment Article. The District Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore County, held that it is and, therefore, ordered Whiting-Turner Contracting Company, the petitioner, to pay the bonus to Joe Fitzpatrick, the respondent. The petitioner unsuccessfully appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, which, finding that the District Court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous, affirmed. n1 Still dissatisfied, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court, which we granted. Whiting-Turner v. Fitzpatrick, 363 Md. 661, 770 A.2d 169 (2001). We shall reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court.

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n1 The respondent sued the petitioner in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore County, for $ 5000.00, as "money due him as profit sharing/bonus that was due to [him] as an employee of the [petitioner] at the time the bonus was issued," citing as authority Maryland Code (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol.) § 3-501 of the Labor and Employment Article. Although the court rejected the respondent's argument that the "bonus" was profit sharing to which he was entitled, it awarded him judgment for the amount of the bonus, $ 2000.00, plus an additional $ 3000.00, because it concluded that it had discretion, pursuant to § 3-507 of the Labor and Employment Article, to award up to three times the amount in controversy. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County reversed the latter ruling and the respondent has not challenged that decision in this Court. Consequently, that is not before us and we will not address it.

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The facts surrounding this controversy are largely undisputed. The respondent was hired by the petitioner as a full time employee in 1997. His compensation, it was agreed, would consist of a weekly salary and, after two years of employment and depending upon the profitability of the company, profit sharing. The respondent left the petitioner's employ on November 20, 1998. Earlier in that month, he met with Tim Stevens, a vice president of the petitioner and the project manager of the New Haven, Connecticut project on which the respondent was project engineer, and informed Mr. Stevens that he was considering leaving the company, in favor of a job that did not require as much travel and out of state work. Before that meeting, the respondent had learned that several people in his group had received bonus checks and, so, he asked about his bonus check. Mr. Stevens responded, "I have [300] a profit sharing[n2 ] check for you in my pocket. All you have to do is tell me you are staying." After considering the matter over the weekend, the respondent gave his notice that he was resigning. The petitioner did not give the respondent the bonus check, prompting the respondent to file this action against the petitioner.

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n2 There is no dispute that the reference is to the bonus check.

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The District Court ruled that a "bonus" is a wage under the Maryland Wage law, noting that § 3-501 (c) includes "bonus" in the definition of "wage." The court reasoned that the "Court's focus should be on the question of whether a bonus was earned by the [respondent] prior to the time that he tendered his resignation." Proceeding on that premise, the court found, based on the testimony of the respondent and Mr. Stevens and the petitioner's answer to interrogatories indicating that the bonus check made payable to the respondent was drawn on November 5 1998, that, prior to the respondent's resignation, "there was a final decision made by [the petitioner] to give [the respondent] a bonus" and "that the bonus was in fact earned." Although conceding, as the petitioner had argued, that whether to give or pay a bonus is a discretionary matter, the court nevertheless opined:

"It was discretionary, but once the decision was made that the [respondent] had earned the bonus ... which I find was made on or about October of 1998 after it [was] sent up the chain of command, following Mr. Stevens' recommendation to senior management... I find that [the respondent] had in fact earned that bonus."

As indicated, the Circuit Court affirmed. Although the issue of the proper interpretation of § 3-501 (c) n3 was raised by the petitioner in its Memorandum in Opposition to the Decision [301] of the District Court, the Circuit Court did not address it. Instead, the court reasoned:

"In the case sub judice, the trial judge based her conclusion on the testimony and evidence presented to her. Whenever conflicting opinions are presented at trial, the trial judge is faced with determining which witnesses are most credible and must then make the decision accordingly. The credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trier of facts, and a determination as to credibility will only be overruled when it is clearly erroneous ... This Court does not find the District Court's judgment that the $ 2,000 payment was a bonus and wages pursuant to Maryland law was clearly erroneous."

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n3 The interpretation of § 3-501 (c) was before this Court quite recently, see Baltimore Harbor Charters, Ltd. v. Ayd, 365 Md. 366, 780 A.2d 303, (2001), but on a wholly different issue. In that case we were concerned with determining who is an employee for purposes of the statute. Baltimore Harbor Charter, Ltd, at *14-16

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Resolution of this case requires that we construe a legislative enactment, § 3-501 (c), which, in turn, involves the application of the canons of statutory construction. Both the petitioner and the respondent recognize that this is so. The principles that guide us in the pursuit of the statute's meaning and the Legislature's intention in enacting it have been stated numerous times and, therefore, are well settled.

The paramount object of statutory construction is the ascertainment and effectuation of the real intention of the Legislature. Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass'n v. PSC, 361 Md. 196, 204, 760 A.2d 1087, 1097 (2000); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128, 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000); Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 115, 753 A.2d 41, 49 (2000); Handy v. State, 357 Md. 685, 704, 745 A.2d 1107, 1117 (2000); Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653, 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998); Gordon Family P'ship v. Gar on Jer, 348 Md. 129, 137, 702 A.2d 753, 757 (1997). The pursuit of that goal begins with the words of the statute, which we give their ordinary and common meaning, see Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335, 748 A.2d 478, 483 (2000), and, when they are clear and unambiguous, ends there, as well. Chase, 360 Md. at 128, 756 A.2d at 991; Adamson v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 359 Md. 238, 251, 753 A.2d 501, 508 (2000); Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Md. [302] v. Dir. of Fin. for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 578, 683 A.2d 512, 517 (1996). Only if the words of the statute are ambiguous need we seek the Legislature's intent in the legislative history or other extraneous sources. Marsheckv. Bd. of Tr. of Fire & Police Employees' Retirement Sys. of City of Baltimore, 358 Md. 393, 403, 749 A.2d 774, 779 (2000); Resper v. State, 354 Md. 611, 619, 732 A.2d 863, 867 (1999). We neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature chose to use or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute's meaning. Taylor v. Nationsbank, 365 Md. 166, 181, 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001); Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass'n, 361 Md. at 203, 760 A.2d at 1090-91. Moreover, whenever possible, the statute should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory. Taylor, 365 Md. at 181, 776 A.2d at 654; Chesapeake Amusements, Inc. v. Riddle, 363 Md. 16, 29, 766 A.2d 1036, 1042 (2001); Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass'n, 361 Md. at 204, 760 A.2d at 1091. And a statute is to be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is illogical or incompatible with common sense. State v. Brantner, 360 Md. 314, 322, 758 A.2d 84, 88-89 (2000); D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538, 578 A.2d 1177, 1179 (1990); Blandon v. State, 304 Md. 316, 319, 498 A.2d 1195, 1196 (1985); Erwin and Shafer, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 304 Md. 302, 315, 498 A.2d 1188, 1194 (1985).

When the statute to be interpreted is part of a statutory scheme, it must be interpreted in that context. GEICO v. Ins. Comm'r, 332 Md. 124, 131-32, 630 A.2d 713, 717-18 (1993). That means that, when interpreting any statute, the statute as a whole must be construed, interpreting each...