Thede v. Kapsas

• Decision Date: 21 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. 3-07-0757.,3-07-0757.
• Parties: Rebecca THEDE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Helen KAPSAS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

897 N.E.2d 345

Rebecca THEDE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Helen KAPSAS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 3-07-0757.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

October 21, 2008.

William F. Martin, Hilfman, Martin & Barr, P.C., Chicago, IL, for Appellant.

Richard J. Hickey, Christopher R. Zink, Anne C. Hopkins, Hickey, Melia & Associates, Chtd., Chicago, IL, for Appellee.

Justice SCHMIDT delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Rebecca Thede sued defendant Dr. Helen Kapsas for medical malpractice. The trial court granted Kapsas summary judgment on her affirmative defense that the suit was untimely. Thede appeals. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Rebecca Thede engaged the services of Dr. Helen Kapsas to remove a mole from her shoulder. She became a patient of Kapsas's, at the CGH Prophetstown Family Medical Center, after the only previous doctor in Prophetstown and a second doctor in Sterling left private practice. Thede had been to see Kapsas at least five times before scheduling this surgery. She was aware that the clinic was operated by Community General Hospital of Sterling and that Kapsas had not independently billed her for services on previous occasions.

Thede and Kapsas intended this particular procedure to be an outpatient surgery conducted at the clinic. Kapsas gave Thede the choice of having the surgery seated or lying down; Thede chose to have the mole removed while seated. Kapsas administered a local anesthetic and proceeded to operate on Thede. During the surgery, Thede fainted and fell off the examination table, striking her face on a chair, breaking her front teeth and injuring her jaw and nose. Thede was then admitted to Community General Hospital for treatment of her injuries.

One year and eleven months after Thede was injured, she sued the hospital and Kapsas for malpractice. The complaint against Kapsas alleged that she was a hospital employee.¹ Kapsas admitted this allegation. Within two months, Thede amended her complaint for reasons unrelated to this appeal. She again alleged Kapsas was an employee of Community General Hospital.

The hospital moved for dismissal, establishing that it is a municipal corporation and personal injury suits against it were, at the time, subject to a one-year limitations period. 745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West 1998). The hospital's motion for dismissal was granted. Thede amended her complaint against Kapsas again, this time alleging that Kapsas was a physician in private practice and the applicable limitations period was two years.

Kapsas moved for summary judgment on the affirmative defense that she was a hospital employee, the applicable limitations period for her was also one year, and it had expired. The trial court first denied summary judgment because the limitations period for public employees accused of medical malpractice had recently been changed from one year to two years, and there was doubt about whether the old rule or the new rule applied. It was later determined that the one-year rule would apply if Kapsas was a hospital employee. Kapsas then asked the court to reconsider summary judgment. The trial court refused a second time, this time believing there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Kapsas was an independent contractor and not protected by the one-year limitations period. Discovery was ordered. At the close of discovery, Kapsas made a second motion to reconsider summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment, finding there was no genuine question of material fact with respect to Kapsas's status as an employee of Community General Hospital.

ANALYSIS

Thede makes two claims on appeal. First, that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact still exists regarding Dr. Kapsas's employment relationship with the hospital. Second, that the trial court erred by not giving Thede equitable relief from the statute of limitations.

We review trial court's decision to grant Kapsas's motion for summary judgment de novo. Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 Ill.2d 179, 185, 262 Ill.Dec. 815, 766 N.E.2d 1118, 1123 (2002). We review the trial court's decision to refuse equitable relief for the abuse of discretion. Babcock v. Martinez, 368 Ill.App.3d 130, 142-43, 306 Ill.Dec. 512, 857 N.E.2d 911, 921 (2006).

I. Employment Relationship Between Defendant and Community General Hospital

The trial court found that Thede offered no evidence inconsistent with Kapsas's evidence establishing that she was an employee of Community General Hospital. Thede contends that both Kapsas's employment agreement and the universal consent form Thede signed create a genuine issue of material fact as to Thede's status as a hospital employee. We disagree.

Summary judgment is available to a defendant "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2006). Pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits must be construed strictly against the movant and in favor of the opponent. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill.2d 32, 43, 284 Ill.Dec. 302, 809 N.E.2d 1248, 1257 (2004).

In February 2001, when Thede was injured, personal injury suits against municipal employees were subject to a one-year limitations period. 745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West 2002). Accordingly, if Kapsas was an employee of Community General Hospital, Thede's suit is time-barred. Tosado v. Miller, 188 Ill.2d 186, 196, 242 Ill.Dec. 120, 720 N.E.2d 1075, 1081 (1999). If Kapsas was an independent contractor, the one-year limitations period does not apply. 745 ILCS 10/1-202 (West 2006).

The nature of the relationship between a principal and an agent is a question of fact. Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital, 156 Ill.2d 511, 524, 190 Ill. Dec. 758, 622 N.E.2d 788, 795 (1993). Therefore, summary judgment would be inappropriate unless the evidence documenting the relationship between Kapsas and Community General Hospital is so clear as to be undisputed. Scardina v. Alexian Brothers Medical Center, 308 Ill. App.3d 359, 363, 241 Ill.Dec. 747, 719 N.E.2d 1150, 1153 (1999). See Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill.2d at 43, 284 Ill.Dec. 302, 809 N.E.2d at 1257. Thede could only rely upon her pleadings to create a question of material fact until Kapsas supplied facts that clearly entitled her to judgment as a matter of law. Williams v. Covenant Medical Center, 316 Ill.App.3d 682, 250 Ill.Dec. 40, 737 N.E.2d 662 (2000).

Kapsas produced a copy of her employment agreement with Community General Hospital, as well as deposition testimony from herself and representatives of the hospital. Thede claims a genuine issue of material fact is created by a clause in Kapsas's employment agreement and language in a consent form Thede signed. Thede asserts these items controvert Kapsas's evidence that Community General Hospital had a right to control Kapsas's work as a physician. See Wheaton v. Suwana, 355 Ill.App.3d 506, 511-12, 291 Ill. Dec. 407, 823 N.E.2d 993, 997 (2005).

Whether a principal has a right to control the manner in which an agent works is the most important of eight factors in determining whether the agent is an employee or an independent contractor. Warren v. Williams, 313 Ill.App.3d 450, 246 Ill.Dec. 487, 730 N.E.2d 512 (2000). Wheaton, 355 Ill.App.3d at 511, 291 Ill. Dec. 407, 823 N.E.2d at 997 (all eight factors). At issue is not whether the principal exerts actual control, but whether the principal reserves the right to control the agent. Gunterberg v. B & M Transportation Co., 27 Ill.App.3d 732, 738, 327 N.E.2d 528, 533 (1975).

First, Thede argues Community General Hospital has no right to control Kapsas's work because the hospital bargained for the following language assigning it any income Kapsas earned for medically-related activities outside the scope of her employment at the hospital:

"6. Outside Contract—Fees and Revenue belong to CGH

Physician [Kapsas] shall not enter into any contract utilizing or altering any of CHG's assets, nor shall she enter into any contract for the rendering of medical services to any third party.

All fees, billing and revenue generated or attributable to Physician's services in any way related to the practice of medicine and/or surgery, whether within or without CGH shall belong to CHG. This includes any renumeration [sic] received by Physician for outside medically-related activities. CGH may, at its sole discretion, grant exceptions to the outside income rule."

Thede asserts that this provision anticipates and approves of Kapsas practicing medicine without the hospital's supervision, and the portion of paragraph 6 appearing in Thede's brief could be read that way. But when the paragraph is taken as a whole, it restates Kapsas's fiduciary duties to the hospital and generally prohibits Kapsas from outside medical employment. See ABC Trans National Transport, Inc. v. Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc., 62 Ill.App.3d 671, 683, 20 Ill.Dec. 160, 379 N.E.2d 1228, 1237 (1978); Restatement (Third) of Agency §§ 8.01 through 8.12 (2006). In context, paragraph 6 gives the hospital an express contractual right to disgorge any income Kapsas makes from moonlighting. East Peoria Elevator Co. v. Geo. W. Cole Grain Co., 19 Ill.App.2d 82, 94-95, 153 N.E.2d 307 313-314 (1958); Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.02 (2006).

A trial court is not required to entertain unreasonable inferences raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Purdy Co. v. Transportation Insurance Co., Inc., 209 Ill.App.3d 519, 527, 154 Ill. Dec. 318, 568 N.E.2d 318 322-23 (1991). The trial court was correct to conclude, as a matter of law, that paragraph 6 of Kapsas's employment agreement was not evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding Kapsas's employment relationship with Community General Hospital.

Second, Thede argues the...