Theresa Weston Saunders v. Dist. of D.C., Civil Action No. 02–01803 (CKK).

• Citation: 789 F.Supp.2d 48
• Decision Date: 06 June 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 02–01803 (CKK).
• Parties: Theresa Weston SAUNDERS, Plaintiff,v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

789 F.Supp.2d 48

Theresa Weston SAUNDERS, Plaintiff,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 02–01803 (CKK).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

June 6, 2011.

Theresa Weston Saunders, Glendale, MD, pro se.Wendy Lee Kahn, Zwerding, Paul, Kahn & Wolly, PC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.Alex Karpinski, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, Mark D. Back, Youth Services Administration, Laurel, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR–KOTELLY, District Judge.

Plaintiff Theresa Weston Saunders (“Saunders”) commenced this action against the District of Columbia (the “District”), and two District officials, alleging among other things that she was retaliated against in violation of the Federal False Claims Act (the “F–FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq., for disclosures she purportedly made concerning the use and management of federal funding by the District's Office of Chief Technology Officer.¹ Presently before the Court is the District's [77] Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Federal False Claims Act Retaliation Claim as Time–Barred (“Motion to Dismiss”). The focus of the District's motion is narrow—the District argues only that Saunders failed to bring suit within the limitations period governing F–FCA retaliation claims. The extent of the parties' dispute is similarly narrow and presents a pure question of law: the District argues that a one-year limitations period applies, while Saunders maintains that a three-year limitations period applies. The parties are in agreement that Saunders' claim is untimely if the District is correct and timely if Saunders is correct. Accordingly, the sole issue before the Court is the appropriate limitations period. Upon a searching review of the parties' submissions, the relevant authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court agrees with Saunders that her F–FCA retaliation claim is subject to a three-year limitations period. Based on that conclusion, the Court will deny the District's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Because this motion turns on a pure question of law, the Court will limit itself to providing some context for its decision. The Court assumes familiarity with its prior opinions in this action, which set forth in detail the background of this case.

A. Factual Background

Saunders was employed by the District in various capacities from 1982 through 2000. See Am. Compl., ECF No. [18], ¶¶ 5, 10, 33. During her tenure in the Office of Chief Technology Officer, which occurred at the tail-end of her employment, Saunders allegedly discovered and reported numerous deficiencies in the District's use and management of federal funding. Id. ¶¶ 14, 32, 47. Her actions allegedly led to a series of reprisals, culminating in her termination in the summer of 2000. Id. ¶¶ 14–32.

B. Procedural Background

Saunders commenced this action on September 11, 2002. See Compl., ECF No. [1]. The District moved for dismissal early on. See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. [9]. When Saunders in turn moved to amend her Complaint, the Court granted Saunders leave to file an amended complaint and denied the District's motion to dismiss without prejudice. See Order (Mar. 23, 2004), ECF No. [30]. The District later filed a renewed motion to dismiss. See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. [31]. The Court resolved the majority of the District's motion, but held the motion in abeyance insofar as it sought dismissal of Saunders' F–FCA retaliation claim, directing the parties to submit further briefing on the sufficiency of Saunders' factual allegations and the applicable statute of limitations. See Saunders v. District of Columbia, 2005 WL 3213984, at *7–8 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2005). Upon consideration of the parties' supplemental briefing, the Court concluded that Saunders' factual allegations were sufficient to state a claim for retaliation under the F–FCA. See Saunders v. District of Columbia, 711 F.Supp.2d 42, 56–57 (D.D.C.2010). At the same time, the Court again found that the parties' briefing on the statute of limitations question was “woefully inadequate,” preventing the Court from resolving the question on the record created by the parties. Id. at 53. The Court proceeded to outline the key questions that needed to be addressed, and again directed the parties to submit further briefing. See id. at 53–56.

The matter now comes before the Court upon the filing of the parties' second round of supplemental briefing on the statute of limitations question. See Def.'s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Renewed Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. [77–1]; Pl.'s Opp'n to Def. District of Columbia's Renewed Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. [79]; Def.'s Reply to Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Renewed Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. [83]. The matter is fully briefed and ripe for a decision.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a), “in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Rule 12(b)(6) provides a vehicle for parties to challenge the sufficiency of a complaint on the ground that it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “If the allegations ... show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007).

III. DISCUSSION

Broadly speaking, the F–FCA confers a private cause of action upon an individual who has been retaliated against by her employer for engaging in activity that could reasonably lead to a viable false claims action. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). Until relatively recently, Congress had never specified the limitations period governing F–FCA retaliation claims, requiring courts to “borrow” the statute of limitations applicable to the closest analog under state law. This motion turns on a pure question of law—what is the limitations period that should apply to Saunders' F–FCA retaliation claim? The District argues that a one-year limitations period should apply; Saunders counters that a three-year limitations period should apply. Resolution of this disagreement is dispositive of this motion; the parties are in agreement that Saunders' claim is untimely if the District is correct, and timely if Saunders is correct.

The Court agrees with Saunders that her claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. In explaining why, the Court will divide its discussion into two parts. The Court will first ask whether there is even a need to “borrow” a statute of limitations from state law now that Congress has specified that F–FCA retaliation claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Thereafter, the Court will explain why resolving that particular question is ultimately unnecessary. Even if the Court were to “borrow” a statute of limitations from District of Columbia law, it would borrow a three-year statute of limitations.

A. Because Congress Has Now Specified that a Three–Year Limitations Period Governs F–FCA Retaliation Claims, “Borrowing” a State Statute of Limitations Is Arguably Inappropriate

In ascertaining the statute of limitations applicable to a federal cause of action, the first question that must be asked is whether Congress has supplied a limitations period. Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 414, 125 S.Ct. 2444, 162 L.Ed.2d 390 (2005). Unsurprisingly, only when Congress has failed to supply a limitations period for a federal cause of action may one be “borrowed” from another source. Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324, 109 S.Ct. 621, 102 L.Ed.2d 665 (1989). Therefore, the threshold question for the Court is whether Congress has specified the statute of limitations governing F–FCA retaliation claims.

In 2005, the Supreme Court answered this very question, concluding that Congress had not supplied a statute of limitations for F–FCA retaliation claims, and directing that courts should instead “borrow” the statute of limitations governing the closest analog under state law. Graham Cnty., 545 U.S. at 417–18, 125 S.Ct. 2444. Since then, however, Congress has enacted the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the “Dodd–Frank Act” or the “Act”), Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, which amended the F–FCA to supply an express statute of limitations for F–FCA retaliation claims.² As a result, the F–FCA now provides that “[a] civil action under [the F–FCA's anti-retaliation provisions] may not be brought more than 3 years after the date when the retaliation occurred.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(3).

The effect of the amendment upon the timeliness of Saunders' F–FCA retaliation claim presents a difficult question. Analytically, the issue may be approached in at least two ways. One way is to ask whether the statute of limitations should be applied retroactively in this case, even though the amendment was not in effect either at the time Saunders' cause of action accrued or at the time she commenced this action. However, because statutes of limitations “lie on the cusp of the procedural/substantive distinction,” a court must keep in mind that their retroactive application may upset legitimate reliance interests. Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 49 F.3d 886, 892 (2d Cir.1995) (Cabranes, J., concurring). At the same time, the concerns that accompany the retroactive application of a statute of limitations may be less pronounced where, as here, “there had been no authoritative specification of which statute of limitations [previously] applied.” Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482...