Thibeault v. Poole

• Decision Date: 30 June 1933
• Citation: 186 N.E. 632,283 Mass. 480
• Parties: THIBEAULT v. POOLE (two cases).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

283 Mass. 480

186 N.E. 632

THIBEAULT

v.POOLE (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampshire.

June 30, 1933.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Hampshire County; Williams, Judge.

Separate actions by Joseph H. Thibeault and by his wife, Mary E. Thibeault, against Herbert S. Poole. Verdict for plaintiff in each case, and defendant brings exceptions.

Exceptions in the first action sustained, and exceptions in the second action overruled.D. H. Keeedy, of Springfield, and J. T. Storrs, of Ware, for plaintiff.

G. J. Callahan, of Springfield, for defendant.

RUGG, Chief Justice.

These two actions of tort, one by the wife and the other by her husband, arise out of a collision between an automobile owned by the husband and driven by the wife and an automobile driven by the defendant. The wife seeks to recover compensation for personal injuries sustained by her. The husband seeks to recover damages sustained by him, as alleged in count one of his declaration, for injury to his automobile, and in count two for medical and hospital expenses incurred by him on account of his wife in consequence of her injuries.

The collision occurred in West Brookfield on the Boston Post road where it is joined by the road from Ware. Confessedly, there was evidence warranting a finding that negligence of the defendant contributed to the accident. Motions to direct verdicts in favor of the defendant on the ground that the wife was guilty of contributory negligence were denied. There was testimony from which it could have been found that Mrs. Thibeault was driving with a companion from Ware to West Brookfield, and as she came into the Post road, going easterly, was ascending a considerable grade. The defendant was driving westerly on the Post road, near the middle of which was a white line, and down the considerable grade approaching the junction with the road from Ware. The wife testified that, as she approached the place where the two roads unite, she looked both west and east on the Post road and saw ‘nothing to interfere with my crossing and did so, and the minute I straightened out [on the Post Road] I saw this car [that of the defendant] coming at terrific speed * * * just as I crossed the white line and was going up the hill towards West Brookfield * * * then I saw the defendant and thought he was going to hit me. * * * I saw nothing whatever to interfere with my crossing. As I was crossing the intersection, I looked again. * * * I was looking always-all the way across. When the accident happened, I had gotten across the white line and had straightened out to go to West Brookfield.’ As she came near the intersection she ‘saw the automobile approaching. It did not mean anything to me because it was at such a distance I thought I could make the crossing without any trouble whatever.’ Parts of her testimony might be thought inconsistent with what has been narrated and with other testimony. But the principle that by her other testimony she bound herself to a rejection of what has been quoted is not applicable on this record. At most it is an instance of somewhat conflicting statements where it is for the jury to find the truth. Sullivan v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 224 Mass. 405, 406, 112 N. E. 1025. There was other evidence tending to show that the defendant turned to his left in an attempt to pass in front of the other automobile and that the collision occurred on his extreme left of the road.

It is plain that it could not have been ruled that the defendant had sustained the burden of proving that Mrs. Thibeault was guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law. This was a question of fact to be settled by the jury upon more or less conflicting evidence under appropriate instructions. The case on this point falls within the principle of numerous decisions. Jeddrey v. Boston & Northern Street Railway, 198 Mass. 232, 235, 84 N. E. 316, and cases cited; Salisbury v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 239 Mass. 430, 132 N. E. 239;Payson v. Checker Taxi Co., 262 Mass. 22, 26, 159 N. E. 449;Bagdazurian v. Nathanson, 269 Mass. 386, 169 N. E. 148;Keyes v. Checker Taxi Co., 275 Mass. 461, 467, 176 N. E. 207, and cases cited; Dodge v. Town Taxi, Inc., 281 Mass. 77; 183 N. E. 260; G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, § 85.

In the action in which the husband was plaintiff the jury were instructed: ‘There was nothing on the evidence that Joseph Thibeault could do to prevent this accident. He was not there * * * if it is proved to you by the greater weight of the evidence that’ the negligence of the defendant ‘caused the accident, then Mr. Thibeault’ is ‘entitled to recover even though Mrs. Thibeault's negligence contributed to the accident. Her negligence might bar her from recovery but it wouldn't bar her husband.’ ‘It will be possible for you * * * to find * * * for Mr. Thibeault’ against the defendant ‘and yet deny Mrs. Thibeault damages on the ground of her contributory negligence.’ The defendant excepted to such portion of the charge as permitted ‘Mr. Thibeault to recover consequential damages for expenses of nursing, hospital and medical care, even though the jury find that Mrs. Thibeault's negligence contributed to the accident and to her injury.’ No exception was saved to the portion of the charge which permitted the husband to recover for damage to his automobile. Nash v. Lang, 268 Mass. 407, 167 N. E. 762.

The question is whether the stated ruling to which exception was taken was right. The husband's right to sue for expenses incurred by him in furnishing care for his wife as consequential damages flowing from the negligence of the defendant grows out of the obligations attaching to the marriage relation. At common law and apart from statute, the husband might by one action in his own name recover both for the personal injury to the wife and for all expenses and other damage resulting to him from that injury. That was long ago changed by statute. See now G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 209, § 6. The result of modern statutes is that the husband is the nominal and legal head of the family and as such is liable for the reasonable support and necessary nursing and physicians' care of his wife and minor children. The wife, however, may bind her own estate for her expenses of this nature. In the absence of evidence it is presumed that the husband is liable for all such expenses already incurred, and therefore he may maintain an action therefor in his own name as a remnant of his common law rights. If, however, it appears that the wife has paid or rendered herself liable for such expenses, she may recover therefor in her own action. In any event, she is entitled to recover for such expenses liable to accrue in the future. Cassidy v. Constantine, 269 Mass. 56, 168 N. E. 169, 66 A. L. R. 1186. No point of that nature is raised on the present record. Therefore it is presumed that the husband was entitled to recover for such expenses as are here in issue. The result of the history of common law rights of husband and wife and of the changes wrought by modern statutes is that the law splits the cause of action arising from tortious personal injury to a wife and gives the wife right to recover for her personal injuries in an action in her own name, and gives her husband the right to recover for expenses for nursing and physicians' care incurred as a result of such injuries, unless he is barred on the evidence and under the doctrine of Cassidy v. Constantine. These rights of action are separate and distinct. The right of the husband to recover such expenses is independent of the wife, and a judgment either way in an earlier action by the wife does not aid or bar the husband in a later action. The same principle applies in general to an action by a father to recover expenses incurred by him in the care of his minor child injured through the tortious act of a third person. The action for personal injuries belongs to the child, but the action for consequential damages to the parent. Duffee v. Boston Elevated Railway, 191 Mass. 563, 77 N. E. 1036;McGreevey v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 232 Mass. 347, 122 N. E. 278;Slavinsky v. National Bottling Torah Co., 267 Mass. 319, 322, 166 N. E. 821. Compare King v. Viscoloid Co., 219 Miss. 420, 106 N. E. 988, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1170. The reason for this is that, since the cause of action is by the law split into two separate and distinct rights, each action must stand on its...