Thigpen v. State
Decision Date | 05 June 1979 |
Docket Number | 3 Div. 997 |
Citation | 374 So.2d 401 |
Parties | Donald THIGPEN v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
H. Diana Hicks, Mobile, Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit, III, John C. Boger, New York City, Anthony G. Amsterdam, Stanford, Cal., for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen. and Mary Jane LeCroy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State, appellee.
This appeal from the denial of a petition for writ of coram nobis represents an effort by Donald Thigpen to avoid his sentence of death. Thigpen was originally convicted and sentenced to death in May of 1972 for the shotgun slaying of Cassie Lee Davis. On appeal of that conviction the sentence was reduced to life imprisonment pursuant to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). Thigpen v. State, 50 Ala.App. 176, 277 So.2d 922 (1973). It was while he was serving that life sentence that Thigpen escaped and was involved in the murder of Henry Lambeth. He was indicted and convicted under Title 14, Section 319, Code of Alabama 1940 (now Alabama Code Section 13-1-75 (1975)) which provides for a mandatory death sentence where a prisoner is convicted of first degree murder while serving a life sentence. Again Thigpen was sentenced to death. His appeal of this conviction was affirmed. Thigpen v. State, 355 So.2d 392 (Ala.Cr.App.1977), affirmed, 355 So.2d 400 (Ala.1978).
Since both of his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, Thigpen seeks relief by way of writ of error coram nobis. His collateral attack upon his 1972 conviction in Jefferson County was unsuccessful. Thigpen v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 372 So.2d 385 (1979). The present appeal concerns a denial of Thigpen's petition for writ of error coram nobis filed in Escambia County wherein he sought to overturn his 1975 conviction.
Initially Thigpen argues that Title 14, Section 319, Code of Alabama 1940 (Alabama Code Section 13-1-75 (1975)), is unconstitutional in its present application. He contends that Section 319 has been applied only very rarely and in an arbitrary, selective, and capricious manner, alleging that only a few life-term prisoners have been prosecuted for first degree murder under Section 319, which requires the death sentence, while other life-term prisoners have been prosecuted for first degree murder under Title 14, Section 314, Code 1940 (now Alabama Code Section 13-1-70 (1975)), in which the death penalty is not mandatory. Title 14, Section 318, Code 1940 (Alabama Code Section 13-1-74 (1975)). In support of his argument Thigpen states that, since 1862 when Section 319 was enacted, the official reporter system of Alabama shows that it has only been applied eight times. Williams v. State, 130 Ala. 31, 30 So. 336 (1901); Miller v. State, 145 Ala. 677, 40 So. 47 (1906); Johnson v. State, 183 Ala. 79, 63 So. 163 (1913); Bailey v. State, 211 Ala. 667, 101 So. 546 (1924); Williams v. State, 239 Ala. 296, 195 So. 213 (1940); Alstin v. State, 248 Ala. 163, 26 So.2d 877 (1946); Cobb v. State, 251 Ala. 505, 38 So.2d 279 (1949); Harris v. State, 352 So.2d 460 (Ala.Cr.App.1976), affirmed, 352 So.2d 479 (Ala.1977).
The constitutionality of Section 319 was recently upheld in Harris v. State, 352 So.2d 460 (Ala.Cr.App.1976), affirmed, 352 So.2d 479 (Ala.1977). On direct appeal Thigpen's attorneys did not initially challenge the constitutionality of Section 319. Thigpen, 355 So.2d at 395. On rehearing and by direction of this Court the issue of constitutionality was presented. Thigpen, 355 So.2d at 399. Now Thigpen, armed with different counsel, seeks to present another reason for declaring Section 319 unconstitutional. Coram nobis does not serve the function of an appeal or a delayed appeal. Summers v. State, 366 So.2d 336, 340 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), cert. denied, 366 So.2d 346 (Ala.1979). Summers, 366 So.2d at 340. By raising certain challenges to the constitutionality of Section 319 on direct appeal a petitioner is effectively precluded from asserting additional grounds for challenge on a collateral attack of the same judgment where the newly asserted grounds could have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence at the time of trial or direct appeal. A defendant should not be permitted to attack an issue in a piecemeal fashion in an effort to suspend indefinitely the execution of judgment.
Thigpen's evidence shows that Section 319 was totally unused for twenty-five years, between 1949 and 1974 when Johnny Harris (see Harris, supra) was indicted; that between 1961 and 1976, three life-term prisoners were prosecuted for first degree murder under Title 14, Section 318, Code of Alabama 1940 ( ); and that in 1976 and 1977, three life-term prisoners were prosecuted for first degree murder under Alabama Code Section 13-11-2 (1975), Alabama's new Death Penalty Act. Thigpen relies upon the differences in punishments among each of the three sections to support his argument of unconstitutional application.
Section 319 states: "Any convict sentenced to imprisonment for life, who commits murder in the first degree while such sentence remains in force against him, shall, on conviction, suffer death." Until the decision of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), first degree murder was punished in this State by death or life imprisonment at the discretion of the jury. Title 14, Section 318, Code of Alabama 1940. Under Alabama's new Death Penalty Act the punishment for any murder committed while the defendant is under a sentence of life imprisonment is death or life without parole. Alabama Code Section 13-11-2(a)(6). This section was not effective when Thigpen killed Mr. Lambeth. After Furman the only sentence which could be imposed upon a conviction of the crime of murder in the first degree was life imprisonment. Hubbard v. State, 290 Ala. 118, 119, 274 So.2d 298 (1973). Thus, in order to seek the death penalty against Thigpen, Section 319 was the only statute under which the State could travel. In Thigpen's trial which resulted in the conviction he now attacks, while the death penalty was mandatory upon a conviction of first degree murder, the trial judge did instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of murder in the second degree and punishment that it carried (ten years to life).
Johnson v. State, 335 So.2d 663, 676 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 335 So.2d 678 (Ala.1976), involved the first degree murder prosecution pursuant to Section 318 growing out of the same events for which Johnny Harris was prosecuted for murder under Section 319. Johnson was not serving a life sentence. Johnson v. State, 54 Ala.App 581, 310 So.2d 504 (1975); Johnson v. State, 54 Ala.App. 586, 310 So.2d 509 (1975). On appeal Johnson argued that he was a victim of selective enforcement and thus was denied equal protection of the laws.
"In 1962, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446, said:
(Citations omitted.)"
The rule is well established that although a "law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights", there is a denial of equal protection of the law. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886).
The essential elements of a claim of discriminatory enforcement are (1) that there was in fact some selectivity in enforcement, (2) that the selectivity was intentional, and (3) that the selectivity was based on some invidious or unjustifiable standard. 13 Am.Jur. POF2d 609 at 624-625 (1977). The burden resting upon a party seeking to prove unconstitutionally discriminatory enforcement of the law is a heavy one.
In United States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939, 93 S.Ct. 2772, 37 L.Ed.2d 398 (1973), the defendant claimed a denial of equal protection in the prosecutor's decision to proceed against him under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 ( ), rather than under § 1621, the general perjury statute, which requires the "two-witness rule" or the ...
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