Thomas Armstrong v. Treasurer of Athens County

• Decision Date: 01 January 1842
• Citation: 16 Pet. 281,41 U.S. 281,10 L.Ed. 965
• Parties: THOMAS ARMSTRONG and others, Plaintiffs in error, v. The TREASURER OF ATHENS COUNTY, Defendant in error
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

41 U.S. 281

16 Pet. 281

10 L.Ed. 965

THOMAS ARMSTRONG and others, Plaintiffs in error, v. The TREASURER OF ATHENS COUNTY, Defendant in error.

January Term, 1842

ERROR to the Supreme Court of the state of Ohio. A bill was filed in the court of common pleas of the county of Athens, in the state of Ohio, by Thomas Armstrong and others, stating that they were seised in fee of certain lands purchased by them from the president and trustees of the Ohio University, in pursuance of the provisions of an act of the assembly of the state of Ohio, entitled 'an act authorizing the trustees of the Ohio University, to dispose of certain lands,' passed February 4th, 1826. The lands were situated within the two townships granted by congress, within the bounds of the Ohio Company's purchase, for the endowment of a university. By the 17th section of the act of the assembly of Ohio, passed February 1804, entitled, 'an act establishing a University in the town of Athens,' it is declared, 'that the lands in the two townships aforesaid, with the buildings which are or may be erected thereon, shall be for ever exempt from all state taxes.' The bill asserted, that the lands were purchased from the president and trustees of the University, in the full faith and confidence, that the same would remain for ever and exempt from all taxes for state purposes. The bill further represented, that notwithstanding the declaration contained in the act of February 18th, 1804, in pursuance of the provisions of an act of the assembly of Ohio, passed on the 21st of March 1840, entitled 'an act to amend an act authorizing the trustees of the Ohio University to dispose of certain lands, passed February 4th, 1826,' the several tracts of land belonging to the complainants had been appraised by the assessor of Athens county, and placed on the duplicate for taxation, by the auditor of the county, and taxes for state and county purposes had been assessed on the said lands. The tax duplicates had been placed in the hands of a collector, and they had been called upon to pay the same. The bill prayed for an answer, and for a perpetual injunction from further proceedings to collect the said taxes; and for further and other relief.

By the ordinance of congress of 1787, under which a large body of land was sold to a company, two townships of land were reserved for the purposes of a university; and in 1804, the legislature of Ohio established a university at Athens, appropriating to it these two townships of land. By this act, the land was to be leased out for ninety-nine years, the rents to be pain to the University; and the land was declared to be exempted from all state taxes. In 1826, the legislature of Ohio authorized all the land belonging to the University to be sold in fee-simple; and nothing was stated in this act, exempting the land to be sold from taxes. The appellants purchased the land from the University, sold under the authority of this law.

The treasurer of Athens county appeared and answered the bill, and admitted all the facts stated in it, and also that he intended to collect the taxes assessed on the land; asserting that he had a right to do so by virtue of an act of the general assembly of Ohio, passed 21st March 1840, in connection with other general laws of Ohio defining the duties of treasurer; which said act, and other further acts, he set up as a defence to the complainant's bill.

At the October term of the court of common pleas, the injunction which had been granted on the filing of this bill, was made perpetual. The defendant appealed to the supreme court, and the decree of the court of common pleas was, at the December term 1840, reversed; and the complainants were adjudged to pay costs.

In the record of the proceedings of the supreme court of Ohio, was the following certificate: 'I do hereby certify, that in the above-named case, there was drawn in question the validity of the statute of the state of Ohio, passed on the 21st day of March 1840, entitled 'an act to amend the act, authorizing the trustees of the Ohio University to dispose of certain lands, passed July 4th, 1826, on the ground that it was repugnant to the constitution of the United States, and that the decision of the court was in favor of the validity of said statute.

EBEN LANE,

Chief Judge of the Supreme Court of Ohio.'

From the decree of the supreme court of Ohio, the complainants appealed to the supreme court of the United States.

The case was submitted to the court, on a printed argument, by Ewing, for the appellants. No counsel appeared for the appellees.

Ewing, in the printed argument, stpted, that the act of the 18th of February 1804, expressly declares, that these lands 'shall for ever be exempted from state taxes.' This exemption is not limited to the duration of the particular tenure by which they were at first held, but the exemption was of the land and the improvements upon it for ever. The act of February 4th, 1826, authorizing the sale, does not, directly or indirectly, withdraw that exemption, or declare that it shall not attach to the land after sale. It was exempt for ever, when it was offered for sale; and passed, with this exemption, into the hands of the purchaser. It was his, charged with the burdens, and favored with the privileges, which attached to it, under the several laws and parts of laws then in force respecting it; and those laws formed part and parcel of his contract. The law of 1840, subsequently passed, changing those laws, to his injury, was a violation of his contract, contrary to the constitution of the United States, and therefore void. The case of the state of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164, is in point; there is nothing to distinguish the two cases from each other.

CATRON, Justice, delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error from a state court; and it has become the duty of this court, before proceeding to examine the merits of the controversy, to determine whether jurisdiction over it is conferred by the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789. It is true, no question upon that subject was raised in the argument presented for the appellant (the respondent having no counsel); but it has been the uniform practice of this court, in every case of this description, to ascertain, in the first instance whether the record presented a case in which we were authorized by law to revise the judgment or decree of a state court. And this question has so often arisen, and parties have been so frequently subjected to unnecessary expense in bringing causes here, in which a writ of error or appeal to this court would not lie, that we have thought this a fit occasion to state the principles upon which the court have constantly acted, and which may now be regarded as the law of the court.

In order to give this court jurisdiction, under the 25th section of the act of 1789, it must appear on the record itself, to be one of the cases enumer ated in that section: and nothing out of the record certified to this court can be taken into consideration. This must be shown: 1st. Either by express averment, or by necessary intendment in the pleadings in the case: or 2d. By the direction given by the court, and stated in the exception: or 3d. When the proceeding is according to the law of Louisiana, by the statement of facts, and of the decision, as usually made in such cases by the court: or 4th. It must be entered on the record of the proceedings in the appellate court, in cases where the record shows that such a point may have arisen and been decided, that it was in fact raised and decided; and this entry must appear to have been made by the order of the court, or by the presiding judge, by order of the court, and certified by the clerk, as a part of the record in the state court: or 5th. In proceedings in equity, it may be stated in the body of the final decree of the state court from which the appeal is taken to this court: or 6th. It must appear from the record, that the question was necessarily involved in the decision; and that the state court could not have given the judgment or decree which they passed, without...