Thomas Cty. Branch v. City of Thomasville
Decision Date | 05 February 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 6:98-CV-63 (CDL).,6:98-CV-63 (CDL). |
Parties | THE THOMAS COUNTY BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, Shernika Holton, Gladys Shotwell, Spencer Wilson, Sandra McIntyre, Mary Hill, Willie Mae Lewis, Jennifer Hightower, Evelyn Wilkerson, Sharon Bostick, Audrey Linder, and Lisa Webb, Plaintiffs v. CITY OF THOMASVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
Betty Walker-Lanier, Tifton, GA, Laverne Lewis Gaskins, Valdosta, GA, Paul Dieseth, Minneapolis, MN, Thomas J. Henderson, Tanya Blackwell, Mark A. Dann, Derek W. Black, Washington, DC, Leslie Marie Gross, Riverdale, GA, Charles C. Moore, Eric A. Ruzicka, Theresa M. Bevilacqua, Paul J. Robbennolt, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiffs.
Jerry A. Lumley, Macon, GA, for Defendant.
The Court tried the above-captioned school desegregation case without a jury beginning on July 21, 2003, and ending on August 6, 2003. Based upon the evidence presented, the Court finds in favor of Defendant.
To fully understand the context in which the Court makes its specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is necessary to review preliminarily the contentions of the parties, the procedural posture of this case, and the evolution of the law relating to the desegregation of public schools in this country.
Plaintiffs, on behalf of black1 children attending the public elementary, middle, and high schools operated by the City of Thomasville School District ("the District"), filed this lawsuit in 1998. They contend that the District operates and maintains a racially segregated school system that deprives black students of their constitutional right to equal protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. 14. In addition, Plaintiffs contend that the District's actions violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d et seq. (West 2003); see also 34 C.F.R. pt. 100 (implementing regulations for Title VI).2
It is undisputed that the District operated a de jure racially segregated public school system in 1954 when the United States Supreme Court declared such systems unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). It is also undisputed that prior to the filing of this lawsuit, no litigation had ever been instituted pursuant to Brown and its progeny challenging the alleged segregation of the District's schools. Consequently, there has been no opportunity for any court to determine whether the District has eliminated the vestiges of its previous de jure segregated system.
Plaintiffs maintain that subsequent to Brown the District never effectively desegregated its school system and that the District failed to eliminate the vestiges of its previous de jure racially segregated school system. Plaintiffs further contend that the District's school system is still racially segregated today, fifty years after racially segregated schools were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. As a result of this segregation, Plaintiffs argue that black children who attend the District's schools are not being provided with the same educational opportunities as similarly situated white children.
The District contends that it first began desegregating its public schools in 1965 (Pls.' Ex. 197), that the Office of Civil Rights within the United States Department of Health, Education & Welfare ("HEW") approved its desegregation plan in 1970 (Pls.' Ex. 291), and that, as of 1975, its public schools were effectively desegregated with no vestiges of the previous segregated system. (Pls.' Ex. 350 at 2.) The District strongly disputes Plaintiffs' contention that it presently engages in purposeful discrimination resulting in racial segregation. The District further maintains that any current racial imbalances within its school system are the result of demographic patterns or other factors beyond the District's control.
Plaintiffs' Complaint contains claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 2003). Subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit, the Court conditionally certified this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defining the class as: "all present and future parents or guardians of African American children enrolled or eligible to be enrolled within the Thomasville City School District." Thomas County Branch of N.A.A.C.P. v. Thomasville City Sch. Dist., 187 F.R.D. 690, 700 (M.D.Ga.1999). The Court later denied Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Reconsider Conditionally-Certified Class. Thomas County Branch of N.A.A.C.P. v. Thomasville City Sch. Dist., 2003 WL 169758 at *3 (M.D.Ga. Jan.21, 2003) (unreported opinion). At the same time, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, finding that under Eleventh Circuit precedent any present racial imbalances in the District are presumed to be the result of previous de jure segregation.3 Id. at *2 ( ). The Court further found that this presumption is rebut-table and that the District had the burden at trial of showing that any present racial imbalances are not traceable, in a proximate way, to the previous system. Id.
May 17, 2004 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (Brown I). In Brown I, the Court found "separate but equal" to be irreconcilable with the Fourteenth Amendment, declaring that "in the field of public education the doctrine of `separate but equal' has no place."4 Id. at 495, 74 S.Ct. 686. Accordingly, the Court held that "the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other `tangible' factors may be equal, deprive[s] the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities," in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Id. at 493, 74 S.Ct. 686.5
Identifying the constitutional violation was the easy part. One year after deciding Brown I the Supreme Court began the difficult task of providing guidance to the lower courts as to how to implement its ruling. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955) (Brown II). The Court, understanding the importance of local control of public schools, showed considerable restraint and patience, at least initially. However, this restraint produced few specific guidelines for the lower courts. Instead, the Supreme Court seemed content to give lower courts considerable discretion, explaining only that "[i]n fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles," id. at 300, 75 S.Ct. 753, and that the courts should issue such orders and decrees as are "necessary and proper to admit [students] to public schools on a racially non-discriminatory basis." Id. at 301, 75 S.Ct. 753. The only time constraint placed on local school officials was that they desegregate their schools "with all deliberate speed." Id. (emphasis added).
Many school systems (and politicians) used this indefinite guidance to delay the implementation of what at the time was a controversial change in public policy. As a result, in the years that followed, the Supreme Court docket became crowded with cases in which the lower courts on the front line had struggled to apply the legal principles emanating from Brown I and Brown II to the realities of this country's school systems. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5 (1958) (legislature of the State of Arkansas claimed that "there is no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on Court's considered interpretation of the United States Constitution") the governor and ;6 Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964) ( ).7
Congress ultimately became concerned with the lack of progress and included provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to address school desegregation. See Pub.L. 88-352, §§ 401-10, 601-05, 78 Stat 246-49, 252-53 (1964) ( ). Congress declared in Title VI of that Act that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d. HEW issued regulations pursuant to Title VI which addressed racial discrimination in federally assisted school systems. Specifically, HEW's Office of Education established standards for school systems in the process of desegregation to remain qualified for federal funds. See 45 CFR §§ 80.1-80.13 (2003). Meanwhile, HEW's Office of Civil Rights was responsible for enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Paisey v. Vitale, in and for Broward County, Fla., 634 F.Supp. 741, 745 (S.D.Fla.1986) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist.
...school districts to make certain that no “imbalance exists regarding ... facilities.” See Thomas Cnty. Branch of N.A.A. C.P. v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299 F.Supp.2d 1340, 1364 (M.D.Ga.2004), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom., Holton, 425 F.3d 1325. Courts consi......
-
Moore v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd.
...States v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1353 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (citing Thomas Cty. Branch of N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1364 (M.D. Ga. 2004), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch.Di......
-
Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd.
...States v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1353 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (citing Thomas Cty. Branch of N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1364 (M.D. Ga. 2004), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. D......
-
Holton v. City of Thomasville School Dist.
...traceable to prior de jure segregation nor the result of present intentional discrimination. Thomas County Branch of NAACP v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299 F.Supp.2d 1340, 1367 (M.D.Ga.2004). For each area, the district court determined that demographic and other external factors were......
-
Grutter Effects: Implications for "re-desegregation" of Public Education in Georgia?
...conscious admissions policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Thomas County Branch of the NAACP v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1351-52 (M.D. Ga. 2004) (illustrating a recent charge of de jure segregation the court declared de facto); Hightower v. West, 430 F.2d 55......
-
Doubting Thomasville's Ability-grouping Program: Holton v. City of Thomasville School District - William Benjamin Bryant
...oversight concerning its prior de jure segregated system. Thomas County Branch of the NAACP v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1342 & n.2 (M.D. Ga. 2004). 6. 490 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 7. Id. at 1259. 8. Holton I, 425 F.3d at 1328. 9. 425 F.3d 1325 (1......