Thomas ex rel. Smith v. Sheahan

• Citation: 556 F.Supp.2d 861
• Decision Date: 02 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. 04 C 3563.,04 C 3563.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
• Parties: Marlita THOMAS, as Mother, Next Friend, and Special Administrator of Norman L. Smith, Jr., deceased, Plaintiff, v. Cook County Sheriff, Michael F. SHEAHAN; Cook County; John Stroger, Jr.; Sgt. Monczynski; Sgt. Hernandez; Sgt. Stroner; Sgt. Dew; Lt. Krzyzowski; Ofr. Sanchez; Ofr. Davis; Ofr. Facundo; Ofr. Houston; Ofr. Johnson; Ofr. Thiemecke; Ofr. Toomey; P. Westbrook, Defendants.

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556 F.Supp.2d 861

Marlita THOMAS, as Mother, Next Friend, and Special Administrator of Norman L. Smith, Jr., deceased, Plaintiff, v. Cook County Sheriff, Michael F. SHEAHAN; Cook County; John Stroger, Jr.; Sgt. Monczynski; Sgt. Hernandez; Sgt. Stroner; Sgt. Dew; Lt. Krzyzowski; Ofr. Sanchez; Ofr. Davis; Ofr. Facundo; Ofr. Houston; Ofr. Johnson; Ofr. Thiemecke; Ofr. Toomey; P. Westbrook, Defendants.

No. 04 C 3563.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

June 2, 2008.

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Daniel S. Alexander, Law Offices of Daniel S. Alexander, Christopher Rudolf Smith, Jared Samuel Kosoglad, Law Office of Christopher R. Smith, Phillip Lindsley Coffey, The Law Offices of Smith & Coffey, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Daniel Francis Gallagher, Dominick L. Lanzito, Lawrence S. Kowalczyk, Terrence Franklin Guolee, Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., Donald J. Pechous, John A. Ouska, Andrew Joseph Creighton, Edward J. Maloney, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RUBEN CASTILLO, Judge.

Plaintiff Marlita Thomas ("Plaintiff) brought this suit against Cook County, the Sheriff of Cook County ("Sheriff), and various officers and medical technicians at the Cook County Department of Corrections ("CCDOC" or "Jail") after her son, Norman Smith ("Smith"), died of pneumococcal meningitis on April 30, 2004, while being held as a pretrial detainee at the CCDOC. Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/1 (2005); the Illinois Survival Act, 755 ILCS 5/27-6 (2005); and Illinois common law, alleging that her son died because the Sheriffs officers and medical staff at the Jail ignored his obvious symptoms of meningitis and his and his fellow inmates' repeated requests for medical help. Three and a half years later, after a two-week trial, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff and against certain defendants in the total amount of $4,450,000. (R. 471, 12/13/07 Jury Verdict.) Following the jury verdict, Defendants Cook County, the Sheriff, and Officers Jesus Facundo ("Facundo"), Terrence Toomey ("Toomey"), and Alex Sanchez ("Sanchez") (collectively, "Defendants") timely filed a joint motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a new trial. (R. 480, Defs.' Post-Verdict JMOL Mot.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs Fifth Amended Complaint ("Complaint") alleged five counts: (1) a Section 1983 claim against the individual officer and medical technician defendants for a violation of Smith's Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights; (2) a Section 1983 claim against the institutional defendants (the Sheriff and Cook County) for policies and practices that violated Smith's constitutional rights; and state law claims for (3) wrongful death; (4) a survival action; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (R. 150, Compl.) In its opinion on summary judgment, this Court dismissed the claims against Lieutenant Raymond Krzyzowski, Sergeant Steven Stroner, Sergeant Gerald Dew, Sergeant James Monczynski, and Sergeant Ivan Hernandez, but upheld the Section 1983 and state law claims against the remaining individual defendants: Officers Sanchez, Toomey, Facundo, Donetta Davis ("Davis"), Douglas Johnson ("Johnson") Louis Thiemecke ("Thiemecke"), and Darryl Houston ("Houston"), and Correctional Medical Technician ("CMT") Peggy Westbrook ("Westbrook"). Thomas v. Sheahan, 499 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1092-93, 1100 (N.D.Ill.2007).¹ The Court also found that Plaintiff presented a genuine issue of material fact that Cook County had a policy or practice of: failing to maintain a system in place so that medical requests of detainees are reviewed promptly by properly trained medical staff and acted upon in a reasonable manner; severely understaffing officers; failing to fix broken video monitors at the Jail; and allowing officers to falsify their daily tier logs. Id. at 1095. The Court dismissed the state law claims against Cook County. Id. at 1100.

Before the case was submitted to the jury, Defendants filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)(2), which this Court denied without prejudice. (R. 462, Defs.' Initial JMOL Mot.) After deliberating, the jury found that as to Plaintiffs denial of medical care claim against the individual defendants, Officers Facundo, Sanchez, and Toomey were liable, but Officers Davis, Houston, Johnson, Thiemecke, and CMT Westbrook were not. (R. 480, Defs.' Post-Verdict JMOL Mot., Ex. 2, Verdict Form A.) The jury awarded Plaintiff $150,000 in compensatory damages on this claim. As to Plaintiffs federal policy and practice, or Monell, claim,² the jury found that Cook County was liable: (1) for the failure to have a system in place so that the medical requests of the detainees were reviewed promptly by properly trained medical staff and acted upon in a reasonable manner; (2) for the practice of severely understaffing correctional officers; and (3) for the failure to timely fix broken video monitors at the Jail. (Id.) The jury found the Sheriff also liable for the practice of severely understaffing correctional officers, but not liable for the falsification of daily tier logs. (Id.) On these federal policy and practice claims, the jury awarded Plaintiff $3,000,000 from Cook County, and $1,000,000 from the Sheriff. (Id.) On the state law claims, the jury did not find any defendant liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress and awarded Plaintiff zero damages on this claim. (Id.) The jury found only Officers Facundo, Sanchez, and Toomey liable on Plaintiffs wrongful death and survival claims and awarded Plaintiff $150,000 in compensatory damages on each of those claims. (Id.)

Following the jury verdict, the remaining Defendants—Officers Facundo, Sanchez, and Toomey, Cook County, and the Sheriff-—renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), adding to and incorporating the arguments set forth in their initial motion and in the alternative, requesting a remittitur or a new trial. (R. 480, Defs.' Post-Verdict JMOL Mot. at 1.)

ANALYSIS

In their motion for judgment as a matter of law, Defendants argue that: (1) there was insufficient evidence presented at trial for Plaintiff to succeed on any of her claims; (2) the jury failed to follow this Court's instructions; (3) it was error to allow the jury to assess Kability against both the Sheriff and Cook County for the Monell claims; (4) the jury's finding of liability on the Monell claims is inconsistent with their finding of liability on the individual claims; (5) there is no evidence of proximate cause between the alleged policies and Smith's death; (6) the jury's verdict on the Monell claim alleging failure to review and act on detainee medical requests is against the manifest weight of the evidence; (7) the jury's verdict is excessive and not based upon the evidence; (8) it was error to allow the deposition testimony of Carlos Matias to be read to the jury; (9) the Court's evidentiary rulings deprived Defendants of a fair trial; (10) damages for future earnings and loss of support were speculative; (11) special interrogatories should have been given as Defendants requested; (12) the Court erred in accepting certain of Plaintiffs instructions over Defendants' objections; (13) the Court's bias denied Defendants a fair trial; and (14) Plaintiffs counsel recanted on representations made to this Court regarding not mentioning any "delay" in transporting Smith to the hospital the day he died. (R. 480, Defs.' Post-Verdict JMOL Mot.; see also R. 462, Defs.' Initial JMOL Mot.)

I. Legal Standard

On a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party; that is, in the light that supports the jury's verdict. Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir.2000). The Court is "obliged to leave the judgment undisturbed unless the moving party can show that no rational jury could have brought in a verdict against it." Hossack v. Floor Covering Assocs. of Joliet, Inc., 492 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir.2007) (internal citations omitted). In other words, the record must demonstrate no "legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party." Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of III, Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 926 (7th Cir.2004) (internal citations omitted). "Although the court reviews the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury was not required to believe." Hossack, 492 F.3d at 859 (internal citations omitted). The Court must give credence only to "uncontradicted and unimpeached" evidence supporting the moving party. Id. at 859-60.

II. Plaintiffs Federal Claims

A. Claims Against the Individual Defendants

The jury found Officers Facundo, Toomey, and Sanchez liable for violating Smith's constitutional rights by failing to provide him with medical care. Defendants argue that based on the evidence, no rational jury could have found them liable; that is, no rational jury could have found that: (1) the danger to Smith was objectively serious or posed a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) the officers showed "deliberate indifference" to Smith's health or safety by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the risk. Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686, 695-96 (7th Cir.2006) (setting out standards for finding liability under Section 1983).

An objectively serious medical need is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir.1997). Defendants do not dispute that the jury had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for finding that Smith had an objectively serious medical need....