Thomas v. Sheahan
| Decision Date | 15 August 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 04 C 3563.,04 C 3563. |
| Parties | Marlita THOMAS, as Mother, Next Friend, and Special Administrator of Norman L. Smith, Jr., deceased, Plaintiff, v. Cook County Sheriff, Michael F. SHEAHAN; Cook County; John Stroger, Jr.; Sgt. Monczynski, Star 831; Sgt; Hernandez, Star 1010; Sgt. Stroner, Star 944; Sgt. Dew, Star 1020; Lt. Krzyzowski, Star 130; Ofr. Sanchez, Star 8131; Ofr. Davis, Star 7153; Ofr. Facundo, Star 4254; Ofr. Houston; Ofr. Johnson, Star 6273; Ofr. Thiemecke, Star 8136; Ofr. Toomey, Star 7463; P. Westbrook, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Daniel S. Alexander, Smith, Coffey & Alexander, Christopher Rudolf Smith, Jared Samuel Kosoglad, Law Office of Christopher R. Smith, Phillip Lindsley Coffey, The Law Offices of Smith & Coffey, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Daniel Francis Gallagher, Dominick L. Lanzito, Lawrence S. Kowalczyk, Terrence Franklin Guolee, Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., Donald J. Pechous, John A. Ouska, Andrew Joseph Creighton, Chicago, IL, Dana L. Kurtz, Kurtz Law Offices, LLC, Lockport, IL, for Defendants.
This case arises out of the tragic death of Norman L. Smith, Jr., ("Smith") while he was in the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections ("CCDOC" or "Cook County Jail"). On Friday, April 23 2004, Smith was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance. Smith's mother claims that he died seven days later at Cook County Jail because the sheriffs officers and medical staff at the Jail ignored his obvious symptoms of meningitis and the repeated requests of Smith and his fellow inmates for medical help. Plaintiff Marlita E. Thomas ("Thomas" or "Plaintiff'), as Smith's mother and the independent administrator of his estate, brings this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/1 (2005); the Illinois Survival Act, 755 ILCS 5/27-6 (2005); and Illinois common law against Cook County, the Sheriff of Cook County Michael F. Sheahan ("Sheriff') in his official capacity, the President of the Cook County Board John Stroger, Jr. ("Stroger") in his official capacity, Sergeant James Monczynski ("Monczynski"), Officer Alex Sanchez ("Sanchez"), Officer Donetta Davis ("Davis"), Officer Terrence Toomey ("Toomey"), Officer Douglas Johnson ("Johnson"), Officer Louis Thiemecke ("Thiemecke"), Officer Darryl Houston ("Houston"), Officer Jesus Facundo ("Facundo"), Sergeant Gerald Dew ("Dew"), Sergeant Steven Stroner ("Stroner"), Lieutenant Raymond Krzyzowski ("Krzyzowski"), Sergeant. Ivan Hernandez ("Hernandez"), and Peggy Westbrook ("Westbrook") (collectively, "Defendants").1
At issue is Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint ("Complaint"). (R. 150.) Defendants have joined in three separate motions for summary judgment, filed by the individual defendants (R. 260), Hernandez (R. 286), and Cook County (R. 324).2
Defendants also filed a motion to strike the following documents: (1) Plaintiffs Rule Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) statement of additional facts; (2) Plaintiffs combined response to Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement of undisputed facts; (3) Plaintiffs combined response to Defendants' motions for summary judgment in their entirety or in part; and (4) Plaintiffs exhibits 3, 8, 14, 23, 66, and 74.3 Hernandez filed an additional motion to strike, essentially repeating certain claims in the joint motion to strike (R. 373, Hernandez Mot. to Strike); accordingly, this Court will address only the joint motion to strike and will address Hernandez's motion specifically where it deviates from the joint motion.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff violated the local rules and thus should be given the ultimate sanction of striking Plaintiffs statement of additional facts and her responses to Defendants' statements of fact. Local Rule 56.1 requires that statements of facts contain allegations of material fact, and the factual allegations must be supported by admissible record evidence. Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 582-83 (N.D.Ill.2000). Courts in this district have broad discretion to enforce Local Rule 56.1, and the Seventh Circuit regularly upholds its strict enforcement. See, e.g., Koszola v. Bd. of Ed. of City of Chi., 385 F.3d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir.2004); Midwest Imps., Ltd. v. Coval, 71 F.3d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir.1995).
Defendants complain that Plaintiff filed 140 numbered paragraphs in her joint statement of additional facts, even though under Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C), plaintiff needed prior leave of Court to file more than 40 paragraphs. (R. 352, Defs.' Mot. to Strike at 3.) Plaintiff, however, had to respond to three separate summary judgment motions from Cook County, Hernandez, and the remaining Defendants. While Defendants concede that perhaps Plaintiff could have filed 120 paragraphs total (40 paragraphs per motion), they quibble over the remaining 20. (Id. at 3.) This Court admonishes Plaintiff for not following the local rules, but we find that the factual complexity in this case warrants the relaxation of the 40-paragraph limit. See Local Rule 56.1, Committee Comment ("A party may seek leave to file more asserted statements of fact or additional fact, upon a showing that the complexity of the case requires a relaxation of the 80 or 40 statement limit".) Defendants also complain that Plaintiff's statement of facts should be stricken because it is not "concise," but the more appropriate action would be for this Court to simply disregard any extraneous facts Plaintiff includes. (R. 352, Defs.' Mot. to Strike at 6.)
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff violates Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) — which requires a statement "consisting of short numbered paragraphs" — by impermissibly combining six to ten statements of fact into a single numbered paragraph. (Id. at 3.) Not only do Defendants do the same thing in their statements of fact ), but they compound the problem by responding to Plaintiffs numerous factual statements as merely "Disputed" despite that certain fact statements are incontrovertibly undisputed. In addition, Defendants do not provide a list to this Court of the allegedly problematic paragraphs beyond a reference by example to Plaintiffs paragraphs 53 to 57. We also note that both parties improperly include some legal conclusions, hearsay, and speculation in their statements of fact, which this Court will not consider. Malec, 191 F.R.D. at 583. Because of the mutual responsibility the parties share for their unwieldy statements of fact, this Court will not sanction Plaintiff. First, a movant's 56.1(a) statement should contain only factual allegations. It is inappropriate to allege legal conclusions in a 56.1(a) statement on the off-chance that one's opponent might not file a correct response.
Defendants next request that this Court strike affidavits from and any references to Smith's fellow inmates: Titus Haynes, George Robotis, Darius Parker, and Alan Robinson. Defendants argue that Plaintiff never disclosed them as witnesses or individuals with relevant information before the September 15, 2006 discovery cut-off, and thus Defendants did not have the opportunity to depose them. (R. 352, Defs.' Mot. to Strike at 6-7.) Defendants also ask for the draconian remedy of striking all of Plaintiffs summary judgment submissions. (Id. at 7-8.) In her response, however, Plaintiff attached a copy of a 2004 fax that her counsel sent to counsel for the individual Defendants which included Robinson, Robotis, and Haynes as potential witnesses. (R. 361, Resp. to Mot. to Strike, Ex. 1, Fax.) Then, in 2006, before the close of discovery, Plaintiffs attorney disclosed the addresses for these witnesses to Defendants' counsel. (Id., Exs. 2-5.) The Sheriff himself raised the possibility of Parker's testimony in his Rule 26(a)(1) supplemental disclosures, as the Sheriff stated that any of the names listed on a "Group Grievance" document, submitted by Parker, may have information relevant to medical requests on Smith's behalf. (Id., Exs. 6-7.) Furthermore, Plaintiff's counsel disclosed Parker's address in a letter dated August 25, 2006. (Id., Ex. 8.) Because Plaintiff disclosed these witnesses prior to the discovery cutoff, we will not strike her summary judgment submissions.
Defendants also request that this Court strike Plaintiffs Exhibit 23, Addendum to Dr. Katz's Expert Opinion Report, because it was disclosed for the first time on or about November 7, 2006, after the close of discovery and after Dr. Katz's deposition had already been taken. (Id. at 8-9.) The one-page addendum addresses the deposition testimony of Smith's cell-mate, Cory Mitchell, which occurred after Dr. Katz's deposition. The addendum is proper for this purpose.
We grant Defendants' motion to strike only as to paragraph 139 of Plaintiffs statement of facts, in which Plaintiff attempts to incorporate by reference all facts submitted and answered and all supporting materials filed in the case of Addie McCall v. Sheahan, 03 C 5948, 2003 WL 23801014 (N.D.Ill. filed Aug. 22, 2003), in which Judge Holderman granted summary judgment to the Sheriff on the plaintiffs policy claims. In addition to far exceeding the Local Rule's limit on statements of fact, Plaintiff does not attempt to demonstrate the relevance, probative value, and admissibility of these materials beyond a cursory summary of that case. Malec, 191 F.R.D. at 583 () It is not this Court's job to weed through the stack of additional evidence Plaintiff wishes to admit. Accordingly, this Court will strike the portion of Plain...
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