Thomas Jefferson, Inc. v. Hotel Emp. Union, Local 255 (AFL)

• Decision Date: 27 July 1955
• Citation: 81 So.2d 731
• Parties: 28 Lab.Cas. P 69,398 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION, LOCAL 255 (AFL) et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 731

81 So.2d 731

28 Lab.Cas. P 69,398

THOMAS JEFFERSON, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION, LOCAL 255 (AFL) et al., Appellees.

Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division A.

July 27, 1955.

Anderson & Nadeau, Sibley & Davis, Miami Beach, and Patton & Kanner, Miami, for appellant.

Gramling & Gramling, Miami, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

This cause came on to be heard on motion by petitioner for supersedeas pending the determination by this court of an appeal taken by it from an interlocutory order of the lower court, which appeal is hereby deemed to be and will be considered as a petition for the writ of certiorari. Section 59.45, Fla.Stat.1953, F.S.A.

The order brought here for review on certiorari was entered by the lower court in an injunction proceeding brought by petitioner against respondents to enjoin the respondent Union from picketing the San Marino Hotel, owned and operated by petitioner. The issue before the lower court on the complaint and answer filed by the respondent Union was whether the hotel employees had designated the Union as its bargaining agent. The Chancellor heard the testimony on this issue, but found that 'there was not enough evidence produced by either side to determine this easily ascertainable fact.' He thereupon entered an order enjoining picketing by the Union and appointed a Commissioner to hold an election by secret ballot of the employees of petitioner as of June 15, 1955, 'to determine the free choice of said employees as to their representation by defendant Union in the matter of labor-management relations * * *.' The petitioner filed a 'Notice of Appeal' from so much of the decree as provided for the holding of an election among petitioner's employees and applied to the lower court for a stay of that portion of the decree. The lower court granted a stay as to the entire order, including the injunctive portion of the decree, and set the terms of such a bond, but declined to grant supersedeas limited to the portion of the order sought to be reviewed. The application to this court followed.

30 F.S.A. Rule 19(10) of the Supreme Court Rules authorizes this court to review and overrule, modify or discharge an order of the lower court refusing to grant a supersedeas or stay. We held in All Florida Surety Co. v. Coker, etc., Fla.1955, 79 So.2d 762, 765, that 'The allowance or denial of supersedeas in an appeal from a judgment or decree that is not wholly for the payment of money rests within the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, subject to review by this Court where the order entered on application for stay is deemed to be arbitrary or unreasonable.'

Measured by this standard, we think it was error to refuse to grant the relief sought. The petitioner points out that, unless supersedeas is granted, the election will be held and its right to have a decision on the question of whether the decree was erroneous in this respect will become moot and the object of its appeal defeated. Certainly, no sounder reason for the granting of supersedeas can be imagined.

Nor do we think that the trial court was justified in imposing, as a condition to the granting of supersedeas as to the portion of the order appealed from, a requirement that the injunctive portion of the decree also be superseded. The petitioner was not aggrieved by this portion of the order, and did not seek a review thereof. Cf. Lockleer v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla.1951, 50 So.2d...