Thomas L. Chaney v. Clark County Agricultural Society, Inc., 93-LW-4370

• Decision Date: 24 September 1993
• Docket Number: 3041,93-LW-4370
• Parties: THOMAS L. CHANEY, Plaintiff-Appellant v. CLARK COUNTY AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY, INC., Defendant-Appellee Case
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

THOMAS L. CHANEY, Plaintiff-Appellant v. CLARK COUNTY AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY, INC. Defendant-Appellee

No. 3041

93-LW-4370 (2nd)

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District Clark

September 24, 1993

(T.C. Case No. 92 CV 0406)

Charles N. Ricketts, 302 N. Plum Street, Springfield, Ohio 45504 S.Ct. Regis. No. 0006175 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Quinton Dressell, 22 S. Limestone Street, Springfield, Ohio 45502 S.Ct. Regis. No. 0011758 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

FREDERICK N. YOUNG, J.

Thomas L. Chaney (appellant) appeals from a summary judgment granted to the Clark County Agricultural Society, Inc. (appellee) by the Common Pleas Court of Clark County, Ohio, in appellant's suit against appellee for overtime compensation pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A., Section 201 et. seq.

Appellant was an employee of the appellee from December, 1980, until December, 1991, and filed suit on June 6, 1992, alleging that during such period of employment appellee failed to pay the appellant overtime compensation as mandated by the Fair Labor Standards Act (the Act). The appellee's answer lists seven defenses, one of which was "defendant is an employer exempt from the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act." The appellee filed a motion for summary judgment on December 7, 1992, accompanied by a memorandum and an affidavit of the treasurer of appellee which included as an exhibit a copy of a section of the field operations handbook of the U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division. The second exhibit to the affidavit chronicled the monthly receipts of the appellee for the years 1991, 1990, and 1989. Appellant responded with a memorandum and an affidavit by the appellant.

The court rendered its decision on summary judgment on March 19, 1993, with the following opinion:

This matter is before the Court on motion of defendant seeking summary judgment.filed December 7, 1992.

The Court has reviewed the pleadings, motion, memorandums and affidavits filed relating thereto.

Plaintiff was an employee of the Clark County Agricultural Society from 1980 until 1991. During that time he claims to have worked overtime during this employment. Plaintiff claims to be entitled to compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C., Section 201 et. seq.).

The Court has reviewed the memorandums and arguments of counsel. After due consideration, this Court is compelled to find that defendant in the capacity of his employment for this employer is exempt from the provisions and regulations alleged to be applicable herein.

As a matter of law, this Court is, therefore, compelled to find that the motion seeking summary judgment is well taken. Judgment is, therefore, granted in favor of defendant and against-plaintiff in the within action. [Emphasis added]

We are unable to deduce from the opinion of the trial court whether summary judgment was granted to appellee on the grounds that the appellant's specific activities rendered his employment exempt from the requirements of the Act, or whether the employer itself was held to be exempt from the provisions of the Act. We have before us, however, the complete record that was before the trial court and since we will make our own determination with regard to the issues raised, it is unnecessary for us to determine which ground, exempt employment activities or exempt employer, the trial court based its decision on.

Rule 56 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure-controls summary judgment practice and states in pertinent part:

(C) * * * Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law *** A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from such evidence or stipulations and only therefrom, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse against whom the motion for summary judgment is made.

As this court stated in Mercer Savings Bank v. Wooster (Nov. 15, 1991), Montgomery App. NO. 1273, unreported,

* * * In construing Rule 56, the Ohio Supreme Court has stressed that its language forms a tripartite test whereby the moving party must establish: (1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion is made, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor. See Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co.. Inc. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66.

In addition, on a motion for summary judgment, a non-movant may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Civ.R. 56(E). Jackson v. Alert Fire & Safety Equip. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 48, 51.

In the case before us there is no issue as to any material fact. The appellant does not question the fact that the appellee is a county agricultural society, commonly known as the Fair Board, and is a non-profit corporation created and existing pursuant to Ohio Revised Code, Chapter 1711 for the purpose of holding an annual county fair, and managing and maintaining the grounds on which this fair is held. The status of the appellee was properly before the court from the affidavit of its treasurer, attached to appellee's motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, the appellee does not question the fact of the appellant's employment by appellee from 1980 until 1991, nor the duties of his job, the type of work which he did, and the amount he was paid. The fact that appellant in the course of employment was compensated at a rate in excess of the appropriate federal minimum wage, and the fact that he was not paid time and a half for hours in excess of 40 per week are not questioned by either party.

The appellee essentially maintains, and the trial court apparently agreed, that it is exempt from the provisions of the Act. The appellant argues, without presenting any authorities, that the various activities of the appellee bring him under the requirements of the Act, i.e., to pay overtime for time worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

The issue of whether an institution is exempt from the overtime provision of the Act is one of law and statutory interpretation, Brennan v. Keyser (1974), 507 Fed.2d 472, and is determined on the nature Of the employer's business, not on the nature of the employee's work. Marshall v. New Hampshire Jockey Club. Inc. (1977) 562 Fed.2d 1323. As the appellee has pointed out in its brief, the fact that a particular employee may perform non-exempt work does...