Thomas Smith Farms, Inc. v. Alday, 34433

Decision Date02 February 1966
Docket NumberNo. 34433,34433
PartiesTHOMAS SMITH FARMS, INC., Petitioner, v. James R. ALDAY and Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Steve M. Watkins, of Truett & Watkins, Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Dye & Joanos, Patrick H. Mears, Tallahassee, and J. Franklin Garner, Lakeland, for respondents.

DREW, Justice.

The claimant was injured when he fell from a mule barn he was constructing for his employer, a corporate farmer engaged primarily in growing tobacco. Claimant was a full-time employee hired to repair buildings and tenant houses and to erect new buildings on the farm although it was established that during the year he had been employed he had also worked in the tobacco barn for not more than 60 hours on non-carpentry work. The employer controverted the claim on the ground that, since its sole operation was farming, its employees were excluded from workmen's compensation coverage.

The deputy commissioner found that the claimant was in the employ of a bona fide farmer and was engaged in agricultural work and therefore dismissed the claim. On appeal to the Full Commission that body, finding the claimant to be engaged in nonagricultural work, reversed the order of the deputy and remanded the case to determine whether three or more employees of the employer were engaged in non-agricultural work. The Commission board this holding on the ruling in this Court in Cassady, Sheriff v. Hiatt & Lee 1 that:

'It is the character of the labor performed by the employee that must determine its application [the exemption] rather than the character of the employer's business.'

Concededly, we were dealing with the Unemployment Compensation Law in this case, the reasons compelling the conclusion are equal--if not greater--when concerned with the Workmen's Compensation Law. We would not be consistent with our oft repeated holding that this latter act should always be construed liberally in favor of the workmen if, in this instance, we should--as petitioner urges--adopt a construction that would eliminate from the protection of this law a large group of workmen.

In is opinion the Full Commission quoted at length from its earlier opinion of Rodrigez v. Flavor Pict Co-op, Dec. No. 2-1405 (Dec.1964) which this Court tacitly approved in Flavor Pict Co-op v. Rodrigez 9 wherein we refused to hear argument on the grounds that there was no deviation from the essential requirements of law. Having read again the opinion of the Full Commission in Rodrigez we are impressed anew with its historical concept and cogent reasoning and herewith adopt as the opinion of this Court the following quoted portions:

'Turning to the question of whether or not claimant was an agricultural farm employee within the meaning of the law or whether he was engaged in a different activity, we deem it beneficial to discuss the history of the term 'agricultural labor,' from the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Law in 1935.

'As enacted in 1935, the Florida Workmen's Compensation Law exempted 'agricultural and horticultural farm labor' from the employment covered by the Act, and provided that this exemption should include:

(a) 'canning of agricultural and horticultural products;

(b) 'the operation of manufacturing articles of or from palmetto fiber; and

(c) 'operations commonly known as 'working the trees' for naval stores purposes, and the removal of stumps from land which may be used for agricultural, horticultural or grazing purposes, and land-clearing, logging, poles, piling, and cross tie operations, and also services performed in producing agricultural and horticultural crops, and all labor employed in picking, gathering, harvesting, hauling, processing, packing and handling, in their natural or fresh state, all agricultural and horticultural products.'

'The original 1935 Act provided, however, that 'agricultural labor used in the growing and harvesting of cane, and by-products, used in the manufacturing of sugar or the by-products of sugar shall come under and whthin the provisions of this act.' Later during the same session the Legislature repealed this particular provision.

'In 1937 the Legislature consolidated and revised the exemption with respect to 'agricultural and horticultural farm labor' by defining same as including:

'turpentine labor, labor in processing gum-spirits-of-turpentine, crude-gum, oleoresin and gun-rosin, labor engaged in logging, poles, piling and cross-tie operations, the production and distribution by producer of dairy products, and all labor employed in the production and handling of agricultural and horticultural products in their natural or fresh state and whether the same be engaged in picking, gathering, harvesting, processing, packing, canning, or handling thereof, or in the hauling of same from the grove or field to the packing house or cannery.'

The 1937 Legislature also enacted the Florida unemployment Compensation Law. In this Act, it excluded 'agricultural labor' from the term 'employment,' without defining the meaning of 'agricultural labor.'

'The 1941 Legislature shortened the term 'agricultural and horticultural farm labor' to read 'agricultural farm labor,' as used in this exemption, and deleted from the Workmen's Compensation Law the definition or detailed specification thereof. (It did retain the exemption of 'turpentine labor, labor in processing gumspirits of turpentine, crude gum, oleoresin and gum rosin.')

'No further change was made in this exemption until 1957, when the Legislature amended the exclusion to read:

'3. Agricultural labor performed on a farm in the employ of a bona fide farmer or associations of farmers. The term 'farm' includes stock, dairy, poultry, fruit, fur-bearing animals, and truck farms, ranches, nurseries, and orchards.

* * *

* * *

'5. Turpentine labor, labor in processing gum-spirits-of turpentine, crude gum, oleoresin and gun rosin.'

The definition of the term 'farm' as included by the 1957 Legislature was adapted from that in the Unemployment Compensation Law, which has a somewhat broader definition, viz: 'the term 'farm' includes stock, dairy, poultry, fruit, furbearing animals, and truck farms, plantations, ranches, nurseries, ranges, greenhouses or other similar structures used primarily for the raising of agricultural or horticultural commodities, and orchards.'

'In the interim, the 1941 Legislature had amended the Unemployment Compensation Law by adoptimg the comprehensive definition of 'agricultural labor' contained in the 1939 Federal Unemployment Tax Act. It is to be noted that the definition of 'agricultural labor' contained in the Unemployment Compensation Law and in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act covers not only such recognized agricultural chores as cultivating the soil, harvesting the crops, etc., but also all services performed on a farm in connection with the cultivation, raising and harvesting of the crops. Furthermore, without regard to whether performed on a farm, said definition covers all services performed in connection with the operation and management of the farm if performed in the employ of the owner, tenant or operator. Likewise, without regard to whether performed on a farm said definition covers all services performed in doing a variety of named acts as an incident to ordinary farming operations or as an incident to the preparation of fruits and vegetables for market (with certain specified exceptions). These phrases 'in connection with' and 'as an incident to' broaden the unemployment compensation definition of agricultural labor beyond the recognized farming chores of actually planting, cultivating, raising, and harvesting crops. In Farming, Inc. v. Manning, 121 F.Supp. 252, the Federal Court held that the right to exemption is dependent 'upon the nature of the services performed by the employees.'

'Court decisions construing Unemployment Compensation cases are herewith enumerated: United States v. Navar [5 Cir.], 1946, 158 F.2d 91; Jones Collector of I. R. v. Gaylord Guernsey Farms [10 Cir.], 1942, 128 F.2d 1008; Cowicke [Cowiche] Growers v. Bates, Wash.1941 , 117 P.2d 624; and California Employment Commission v. Kovacevich, Calif.1946 , 165 P. 917, wherein the Supreme Court of California considered an unemployment compensation law which exempted 'agricultural labor' without defining the term, and stated that the exemption refers to 'the type of work that is being done' and is not dependent on the status of the employer. The Court quoted with approval the definition of 'agriculture' in Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Ed., viz: 'the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops * * *' It held that office workers are not 'agricultural labor.'

'The Florida Workmen's Compensation Law relating to the exemption of 'agricultural labor's has never used such phrases as 'in connection with' or 'as an incident to' to broaden the term beyond its ordinary meaning. Other states construing 'agricultural labor' are as follows, viz: The Arkansas Supreme Court in Gwin v. J. W. Vestal & Son, 170 S.W.2d 598, 205 Ark. 742, held that as used in the Arkansas Workmen's Compensation Law exempting 'agricultural farm labor,' the words 'agricultural' and 'farm' are descriptive adjuectives modifying the noun 'labor.' In Stuart v. Klect, C.C.A.Ariz., 129 F.2d 400, the Arizona Supreme Court held that 'agriculture' is the art or science of cultivating the ground, and raising and harvesting crops, often including also the feeding, breeding, and management of livestock; tillage; husbandry; farming; including to a variable degree the preparation of these products for man's use and their disposal by marketing or otherwise. In the Idaho case of In re Batt [66 Idaho 188, 157 P.2d 547], the court held that whether employees are engaged in 'agricultural labor' depends on the type of employees' service and not on the employer's occupation.

'In Tison v. Hyer, et al., 1944 ...

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