Thomas v. Allstate Insurance Company, No. 14-03-00879-CV (TX 7/15/2004)
| Decision Date | 15 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-03-00879-CV.,14-03-00879-CV. |
| Parties | GLENN THOMAS, Appellant v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
On Appeal from the 152nd District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 00-65990-A.
Affirmed in Part, Reversed and Remanded in Part.
Panel consists of Justices YATES, ANDERSON, and HUDSON.
Appellant Glenn Thomas appeals from a summary judgment in which the trial court dismissed with prejudice Thomas's claims against his automobile insurance carrier, appellee Allstate Insurance Company. We hold Allstate's summary judgment proof conclusively establishes Thomas does not have a claim resting on a theory of a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's take-nothing summary judgment on Thomas's statutory claims that rest on the bad faith theory.1 We further hold Allstate's summary judgment motion does not establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact in relation to Thomas's claims for misrepresentation under the Texas Insurance Code. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment on those claims and remand them to the trial court for further proceedings.
Thomas was involved in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist on April 17, 2000. Thomas filed claims with Allstate for property damage to his car, past and future medical expenses, lost earnings, and pain and suffering. In support of his medical expenses, Thomas submitted medical records and bills from his treating physicians.
According to the claims diary of David Marks, an Allstate claims adjuster handling Thomas's claims, on April 28, 2000, Marks received a telephone call from a doctor's office where Thomas was seeking treatment. The doctor asked whether Allstate would accept bills from the doctor's office, and Marks explained they could not guarantee payment of the medical bills. In the course of the call, Marks also spoke with Thomas and told Thomas he did not see a final liability decision as having been made at that time. Marks's notes then read, At some point, Allstate obtained information from the Southwest Index Bureau and the National Index Claim Bureau indicating Thomas had previously filed two claims regarding injuries to his back, knee, wrist, and arms.
On May 8, 2000, the claims diary reflects that Allstate had attributed fault to the other motorist and therefore had determined to handle the claim as an uninsured motorist claim, rather than under Thomas's collision coverage. In an entry the same day, Marks recorded, On May 22, 2000, the claims diary reflects Allstate was going to issue a check for the property damage.
Allstate then requested Thomas to provide additional medical records.2 On July 25, 2000, Thomas wrote Allstate, indicating he would again provide information from his treating physicians, but objecting that "Allstate's medical authorization is much to [sic] broad and harassing in nature." On September 8, 2000, Allstate, over the signature of Connie Darby, wrote Thomas:
We are reserving our right to later disclaim any obligation under the policy and assert a defense of no coverage under the policy because:
Part E — Duties After An Accident or Loss
B. A person seeking any coverage must:
1. Cooperate with us in the investigation, settlement or defense of any claim or suit
4. Authorize us to obtain:
a. medical reports; and
b. other pertinent records.
On January 17, 2001, Thomas sued Allstate for breach of contract, violation of Texas Insurance Code articles 21.21 and 21.55, violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court subsequently severed the extracontractual claims from the underlying breach of contract claims.
During discovery in the breach of contract action, Allstate requested production of copies of tax returns from 1990 to the present, copies of documents evidencing medical treatment and bills in connection with the automobile accident, and signed authorizations to obtain employment records and medical records. The medical authorization form was directed to "any physician or health care practitioner who has attended to [Thomas] or any hospitals or clinics in which he has been confined or treated" and covered "any and all medical information, records, reports and statements which such physicians, health care practitioners, hospitals or clinics may have relative to any evaluation, examination, treatment or therapy rendered to him."
When Thomas did not provide this information, Allstate filed a Motion to Compel. Thomas then amended his petition to delete claims for lost earnings and earning capacity. On August 22, 2001, the trial court ordered Thomas to "provide an unlimited medical records authorization for five years before April 17, 2000 and provide medical records for ten years before the accident relating to the parts of his body that he claims were injured in the accident." The trial court also ordered Thomas "to identify prior injuries and all health care providers who have provided medical treatment to [Thomas] for five years prior to April 17, 2000." Finally, the court denied as moot, that part of Allstate's motion seeking to compel work and wage information. According to Allstate, Thomas did not provide a complete list of medical providers in response to the court's order.
On September 3, 2002, the underlying breach of contract case proceeded to a two-day jury trial. On October 4, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment on the jury's verdict and awarded Thomas $4,728.25 in past damages, $5,000.00 in future damages, and $2,144.25 in costs. On the same day, Allstate delivered checks for those amounts to Thomas's attorney.
On March 21, 2003, Allstate filed two summary judgment motions challenging Thomas's remaining claims: a no-evidence motion under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 166a(i) and a traditional motion under Rule 166a(c). In the no-evidence motion, Allstate sought dismissal of Thomas's "claims under article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code and all of [Thomas's] statutory and common law claims of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing." In the traditional motion, styled "Motion for Summary Judgment," Allstate sought "dismissal of all [Thomas's] claims under article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code" and further alleged: "Allstate has not violated art. 21.21 as a matter of law because Allstate acted in good faith toward its insured and made a prompt, fair settlement with [Thomas], therefore all of [Thomas's] claims should be dismissed."3
At the time Allstate filed the summary judgment motions, Thomas's First Amended Original Petition was his live pleading. In that petition, Thomas alleged Allstate had violated Insurance Code article 21.21 in eleven particular regards, most of which tracked the article 21.21 language. In the paragraph containing the DTPA cause of action, Thomas cited no particular DTPA section and restated, in identical language, the eleven Insurance Code allegations. Finally, Thomas alleged breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, citing delayed payment of his claim and failure to reasonably investigate.
On April 28, 2003, Thomas filed a Second Amended Petition. He included a paragraph on "breach of contract," in which he alleged Allstate "breached the contract by specifically failing to pay [Thomas's] claim when it had all the necessary information to do so." He also included a paragraph on "DTPA and Texas Insurance Code Violations." In this paragraph, he quoted definitions and provisions from Texas Business and Commerce Code sections 17.45, .46, and .50, and alleged generally that Allstate "has violated [Thomas's] rights as a consumer under the DTPA; Tex. Bus. Comm. Code Ann. § 17.41 et. seq." He also quoted Insurance Code article 21.21 definitions and provisions and, as in the First Amended Original Petition, alleged Allstate had violated Insurance Code article 21.21 in eleven "particulars," generally tracking the article 21.21 language. Thomas did not separately allege breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing.
In a single document, Thomas subsequently responded to both summary judgment motions. On May 28, 2003, the trial court signed an order providing:
After considering the Motions, any responses thereto, and arguments, it is the Court's opinion that the Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED. It is, therefore,
ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Allstate Insurance Company is granted in its entirety and that summary judgment is entered in Allstate Insurance Company's favor on all claims brought against it by Glenn Thomas, all such claims being hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Thomas then filed a Motion for New Trial. The motion was overruled by operation of law.
In a single issue, Thomas contends the trial court erred in granting a final summary judgment in favor of Allstate on all of Thomas's claims. Thomas then separately challenges the trial courts rulings on (1) his common law claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, (2) his article 21.21 claims, and (3) his DTPA claims. Before we turn to the propriety of the trial court's summary judgment on each of appellant's claims, however, we briefly consider the nature of the...
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